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General Introduction
Historical Events
Three funds from bank BNP Paribas freezed on August the 9th, 2007. These funds
were made of United States mortgage loans, the so-called subprimes, structured
in asset-backed securities (ABS), such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO).
The French bank was unable to price the assets of the funds, because Mortgage
securities’ transactions were suspended. The funds came back to the market at the
end of the same month, with reasonable losses, around 1%. At the same time, the
insurance company AXA was facing similar difficulties. On august the 9th, the
French index CAC40 lost 2.17% though there was no other annoucement in France.
The commodity market was also deeply impacted. Why market’s reaction was so
large?
The freezing of BNP Paribas was a warning signal for international markets.
Markets were less sensitive to the problems of U.S. investment banks like Bear
Stearns. Indeed, a few days before, the shares’ prices of two funds from Bear
Stearns droped to zero. But it was known that Bear Stearns had invested in the
U.S. laverage housing. These speculative investment funds were based on the
hypothesis that U.S. housing prices would climb, and that would help the banks
recover risky loans. The reputation of BNP Paribas was affected by the freezing.
This also suggested that any of the international banks, funds or inurance companies
could have invested in the subprime market. For example, a rush to withdraw cash
from Northern Rock, the British mortgage lender, started on September the 17th,
when Bank of England proposed to provide emergency financing to this bank if
needed. The banks themselves were fearing each other, as shown by the interbank
rate Euribor, which started to raise from August 2007 and reached in December
2007, 95 basis points more that the European Central Bank’s refinancing rate,
instead of the usual 15-20 points, illustrated on Figure 1. Obviously, such a high
interbank rate highly affected banks, because they had to borrow at higher rates
than the rates of the long term loans they had provided. This was also called the
“liquidity crisis”.
By the end of september 2007, large business banks had suffered substantial
losses mainly due to the depreciations of assets. Among them, the investment bank
2
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Figure 1: Interbank rate spreads (basis points, daily data) a
aSource: Angelini, Nobili, and Picillo (2011)
Merrill Lynch announced the highest loss of 8.4 billions USD1. However subprime
mortgage originations had reached their maximal value in 2006, to represent 600
billions USD2 in 2006. The comparison of losses between major investment banks
in 2007 and the amount of the subprime market helps to understand that there
was still a tremendous amount of subprime products in the whole economy, even
if more concentrated in the U.S.. From the beginning of 2007 to April 2008, the
major international losses or writedowns were, in billions USD3: Citigroup ≤ 40,
UBS and Merrill Lynch ≤ 36, AIG ≤ 20, Bank of America and IKB Deutsche
≤ 14, Morgan Stanley and HSBC ≤ 12, JP Morgan Chase, Washington Mutual,
Barclays, Ambac, Deutsche Bank ≤ 9.
1source: Bloomberg
2source: Inside Mortgage Market
3sources: Bloomberg and Reuters – Estimations of losses differ according to information
sources.
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Massive losses kept increasing due to the deepening of the subprime mortgage
crisis. In March 2008, Bear Stearns was unable to find any refunding: the liquidity
of the bank falled from 18 billion USD on March the 10th, to 2 billion USD on
March the 13th. Finally, the Federal Reserve did not accept to provide a loan
directly to Bear Stearns and organized a merger agreement with JP Morgan Chase
in a stock swap, worth only 2 USD per share. Finally, the price per share reached
10 USD thanks to a class action of the shareholders. Even this low price of 10 USD
per share remains negligible, compared to the value per share in January 2007:
172 USD, or in February 2008: 93 USD. The 29 billions USD loan made by the
FED to JP Morgan to buy the assets of Bear Stearns was a non-revolving term
loan maturing at the end of the month. Because Bear Stearns assets were illiquid,
the low price per share was designed to guarantee that JP Morgan could refund
the FED. That’s why the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Christopher Cox, explained that a lack of confidence rather than a lack of capital
was mainly responsible for the collapse of Bear Stearns: “capital is not synonymous
with liquidity”. Indeed, the SEC was subject to many attacks about its role in
the collapse of Bear Stearns, and Christopher Cox answered that the investment
bank was enough capitalized even when JP Morgan bought it. Among the large
shareholders of Bear Stearns, in 2007, there were rich individual investors, as well as
a number of investments funds and banks, among which Morgan Stanley, Barclays,
UBS. We should pradoxically recall that in 2007, Bear Stearns was the “Most
Admired” securities firm in Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” survey.
Its ratio capital-assets at the end of the year 2006 was larger than 18%.
Just one month later, a major investment bank collapsed. Rather than a lack
of liquidity, the decrease of assets’ prices provoked the collapse. Lehman Brothers’
stocks were deprecetiated by 73% of their value between January and July 2008.
The laverage ratio was lower than the one of Bear Stearns, around 4% in 2003 and
it decreased to 3% in 2007. On September the 9th, 2008 the price of the share
of Lehman Brothers falled by 45%, because negociations about an hypothetical
Korean buyer had been cut off. The same day, the S&P500 went down by 3.4%.
On September the 15th, Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and
4
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the Dow Jones lost also 4.4%. On September the 22th, 2008 negociations led to
a proposal of Barclays, who was supposed to buy the main activities of Lehman
Brothers, including the nice building in Manhattan, which indeed constituted
the main part of the transaction (960 millions USD) with the other buildings in
New Jersey. Again assets were worth nothing. Furthermore, even the real estate
was significantly undervalued. Because of this bankruptcy, Lehman’s mortgage
securities would be liquidated: 4.3 billions USD. This provoked a rush on selling
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities. They were also two large falls in the Dow
Jones, −6.9% on September the 29th, and −7.3% on October the 9th, the seventh
consecutive day of decrease. A large number of banks, funds, all over the world
(Europe, U.S. and Asia) had invested in or were secured by Lehman’s assets, and
their shares were devaluated in response to their exposures, which generated large
losses for all of them. This was the end of the “too big to fail”.
The origins of the subprime story
Real estate market
The development of the suprime market was the mix between a quite old state
policy in the United States (Clinton, Bush), which aimed at helping the inhabitants
to become owners, the regulation, and the behavior of mortgage U.S. specialists,
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - FHA was also insurer), and the “shadow banking
system”. The arrival of a large number of financial intermediaries on the mortgage
market decreased the costs of lending, as studied by Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven
(2012). After the dot-com bubble, growth had picked up again in the U.S. thanks
to the boom of the real estate market, the consumption of the households and the
low refinancing rate of the FED post September-11th. Indeeed, there was a very
low unemployment rate in the U.S. from 2002 to 2007. Schwartz (2008) explains
this low unemployment, at least partially, by a high employment in the building
sector. There was a high demand on the market for housing because banks had to
make houses affordable (especially through low interest loans). There were 3 types
of mortgage loans depending on the quality of the borrowers: “prime” correponds
5
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to the best quality of borrowers, “Alt-A” intermediary, and “subprime” the worst.
The quality of a borrower was based on many criteria, such that, the income,
the credit history, the health coverage, the familial status, etc... The subprime
mortgage originations by year expanded from 94 billions USD in 2001 to 664 billions
USD in 2005 and 600 billions USD in 2006. Among the main subprime mortgage
originators4, there were HSBC, New Century Financial, Countrywide, Citigroup,
which were also affected by large losses. Shiller (2008) analyzes booms in real
estate prices overall the U.S. until 2007. Prices had never decreased from 1957 to
2007, even if there were disparities between the different states. As a consequence,
no-one was expecting that foreclosures could not cover the total amount of loans.
The share of subprime loans over the total rised from 2% in 2002 to more than
13% in 2005, thanks to a low director rate from the Federal Reserve until the end
of year 2004, around 1%. The banks or financial intermediaries proposing loans
could keep considerable laverage on the rates of those subprime loans while risky
households were still able to pay. To crown it all, this created a boom in prices
of the real estate, illustrated on Figure 3. Mortgage loans were guaranteed by
real estate prices, as a consequence banks could not expect to make losses even if
households would default.
The Federal Funds rate started to rise in 2005 to reach 5% in 2007. Obviously
rates of variable rate loans (or, even worse laveraged loans) highly increased. The
increase of the interest rate was likely to produce a delayed effect on borrowers
with variable rate loans, because usually first the duration of the loan increases and
then the monthly payment. However, risky borrowers started to default even before
the repercussions of the increase of the Federal Funds rate on subprimes’ interest
rates. These defaults are probably due to the low quality of borrowers as proposed
by Sorbe (2009). Actually, the boom in housing prices lead to a global decrease
in denial rates, according to Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012). The delayed effect of the
increase of the Federal Funds rate can be also explained by some original loans, for
example the “interests only”, when the borrower only pays the interests on the loan
for the first 2− 3 years of the loan; “balloon payments”, where the whole amount
4source: Inside Mortgage Finance
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is repaid at the end, and also “neg-am”, when the monthly payment is lower than
the corresponding interests, which makes the amount of the loan increasing with
time. For a detailed analyzis of these original loans in the subprime market by
state, see Chomsisengphet, Murphy, and Pennington-Cross (2008). As far as the
default rate was low enough, profits coming from these loans were high enough
to keep considering these subprime mortgage loans as a very profitable market.
Moreover, investors were looking for financial products with high yields, and they
were rare, because the FED was keeping a low refinancing rate. First financial
insights on the subprime problems happened at the first quarter of year 2007 when
defaults started to increase significantly. Until 2006, the average rate of default on
all mortgage loans was around 5%, and the average rate of foreclosure on the same
loans was about 1%. Both rates started to rise in 2006 to reach significant higher
values in 2008: 6.4% of defaults and 2.5% of foreclosures. The rate of foreclosures
kept increasing in the following years, as illustrated by Figure 2. Banks decided to
foreclose and the demand went down: the bubble of housing prices collapsed in
2006, Figure 3.
There are to sensitive remarks with foreclosures.
• Due to the collapse of housing prices, some households were in “negative
equity”: when the price of the house is lower than the remaining part of the
debt. Within the U.S., the states’ regulations are different about foreclosures.
Some states highly protect the borrowers, and some others protect the bankers:
when there is foreclosure, and when the value of the house is lower than
the remaining part of the debt, some states protect the borrowers from
prosecutions even if the loan is not fully repaid by the price of the house
(Harding, Miceli, and Sirmans, 2000). This kind of laws obvisouly encourage
to default, as explained by Crouhy, Jarrow, and Turnbull (2008). Among
these protecting states, with the highest rates of foreclosures over the crisis,
we can find: Arizona, Nevada, California, Florida.
• When borrowers were defaulting, and when home prices fell, it would have
been more interesting for banks to not foreclose, but wait until the borrower
pay something. Indeed, foreclose procedure are costly and usually when
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Figure 2: U.S. annual forclosure activitya
ahttp://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/2012-year-end-foreclosure-
market-report-7547
selling a house this way, the bank gets between 40% and 60% of its value,
as shown by Blundell-Wignall (2008). Foreclosures were very interesting
when housing prices were still climbing, but became less profitable when
prices decreased. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) explain that secritization is
partially responsible for this high level of foreclosure.
Securitization
Securitization is considered as the main vector of contamination of the crisis.
Securitization aimed at transforming illiquid assets, such as mortgage loans, car
loans, students loans, even credit cards loans in a variety of marketable products
with different yields and risks, possibly with insurances. Those products were
rated by the well known agencies (Moody’s, Standard&Poor’s, Fitch), and were
offered to all types of investors. Subprime securitized assets were appreciated
because of their high yields. In the U.S. the issuance of securitized assets increased
8
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Figure 3: U.S. Case-Shiller home price indexa
ahttp://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-
indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff–p-us—-
from 126 billions USD in 1985 to 2.7 trillions USD in 2005, mainly composed of
mortgage backed securities5. Concerning mortgage loans, (75% of prime loans) 46%
of subprime loans were securitized in 2001, and in 2006, 75% of subprime loans
(86% of prime6). Added to the growth of the suprime loans, this shows that a
high number of risky products appeared. It is considered that those products were
sophisticated enough to hide their “risky side”. Moreover, with the hypothesis of
increasing housing prices, mortgage backed assets could be considered as very safe
assets. Securitized assets (called Residential Morgagte Backed Securities RMBS and
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities CMBS) made of mortgage subprime loans
were largely profitable until 2006, which encouraged investors from all horizons to
5Sources: Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Inside MBS&ABS
6Source: Inside Mortgage Finance
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buy them: big banks, big insurance companies, investment banks, private investors.
Until 2007, MBS and CDO were AAA rated by the agencies. Moody’s started to
lower the credit ratings on subprime products at the end of the year 2006. In the
following, all rating agencies lowered the ratings of a large number of assets. For
example from 2005 to 2007, Standard&Poor’s downrated 66% of CDO made of
ABS, among which 44% to the speculative grade. The same way, 17% of the RMBS
were downgraded, 8% to speculative grade7. One problem of these assets was the
short maturity. Assets-backed securities could be short term, “commercial papers”
ABCP, or long term: obligations. Initially, short loans (less than 3 months) were
transformed in ABCP, while long term loans became obligations. From 2006, some
housing loans (RMBS CMBS) became commercial papers. The issuance of ABCP
highy increased, as shown on Figure 4.
At the end of maturity of each short term asset, the issuer must sell a new
asset to pay back the previous one. This kind of asset (ABCP of mortgage loans)
allowed to benefit from the difference between long term rates and short term rates.
They were especially interesting when long term rates were subprime rates. These
products were usually created by Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV), a kind
of financial companies designed to earn the spread between assets and liabilities.
Those companies were often created by banks but functionning under a lighter
regulation than banks. The counterparty of such a practice is the risk of liquidity.
When assets mature, if no one buy the new assets, prices collapses. Indeed when
mortgage loans were downgraded by rating agencies, the corresponding ABCP were
also downgraded. Since the main demand was for AAA products, SIV became
unable to sell their assets. As a result, banks had to provide liquidity to their
SIV, that’s what happened for HSBC, Citigroup, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, etc... This also
explains the sharp decrease in the issuance of ABCP post August 2007, see Figure
4.
Maturity risk can highly accelerate price drop: a financial intermediary looking
for liquidity can easily collapse, like Bear Stearns. When markets became aware of
the high risk of the products, banks were not willing to lend to others, in order to
7source: Standard and Poor’s (2008)
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Figure 4: Issuance of commercial paper (ABCP) and long maturity ABS (non-ABCP)a
aSource: Mizen (2008)
avoid injecting cash in junk assets, and never be refunded. That’s how subprime
CDO helped the interbank market to dry up.
The securitized assets made markets very sensitive to any information. To
conclude about securitization, it is very impressive to see how fast the financial crisis
developed (mid 2007 to mid 2008) while mortgage loans defaults and foreclosures
were still at the beginning ot their endless rises, as illustrated on Figure 2.
Rating the subprime
During the crisis, rating agencies lowevered the grade of a large number of products,
and sometimes AAA-assets became junk bonds in a few weeks. This huge difference
of rating is unsual, and cannot be the only effect of the macroeconomic context. This
proves that risk was largely underestimated. Because of securitization, mortgage
11
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backed assets were complicated enough to become opaque for investors: it was
difficult to figure out what kind of borrowers and houses were really concerned
by the assets. In addition, what is the risk provided by a number of houses and
borrowers all over the U.S.? Because of this lack of information, the only judgment
of investors was the rating of the assets.
CDO had to be rated to be offered to investors. There were only 3 global rating
agencies, and their rating mechanisms were well-known from the issuers. As a
consequence, they could propose particular structures of CDO to obtain the AAA
rating. Issuers needed to sell AAA-rated CDO, because there was a high demand
for those products. Indeed money market funds were only intersted by AAA assets
and mutual funds were also looking for high rated assets. As a consequence, issuers
prepared their CDO to get good ratings. To rate the products, they had to pay the
rating agencies. Therefore CDO with lower ratings would have not been interesting,
because of the costs of production and costs of rating, and there would have been
no demand. Besides the funds, banks were interested by AAA assets, because they
were part of Basel II ratios. Banks were also interested by the securitization of
lower graded assets, because it allowed them to remove a part of their assets from
their balance sheets, and therefore satisfy more easily Basel capital requirements.
Rating Agencies were paid to rate products, and did not proceed to cross checks
about origins of mortgages, which would have been more costly (Crouhy et al.,
2008). The quality of subprime borrowers was decreasing from 2005, especially
because of the increase of the Federal funds refinancing rate, but there was still
a high demand for high yield products. This helped to maintain a high level of
subprime assets production.
Too Big To Fail
Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008. The Federal Reserve did not intervine to save
the bank. This provoked a shock on financial markets, because no one expected it.
The concept of TBTF (too big too fail) was broken. Nevertheless, later in the crisis,
other major financial institutions were seriously damaged, but actually the Federal
12
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Reserve Bank organized their rescue. For example, the Federal Reserve proposed
a credit of 85 billions USD to the insurance company AIG to meet its collateral
requirements, and then the U.S. Treasury prepared the bailout of the company,
in September 2008, one week after Lehman’s collapse. The Federal Reserve and
the U.S. Treasury could not let any other big financial institution down without
running the risk of a financial panic. Citigroup in November 2008 and Bank of
America in January 2009 benefited from this TBTF policy.
This illustrate how large financial institutions received governments supports
regarless of their management, owners and creditors, because the governments
“recognize that the consequences for the broader economy of allowing a disorderly
failure greatly outweight the costs of avoiding the failure in some way.” That’s
how Bernanke (2010) explains the situation. According to Bernanke, TBTF
institutions are subjected to “moral hazard”, because creditors do not ask for
enough compensations for risk. TBTF institutions may take more risk than they
should. In addition, the TBTF concept penalize small institutions, because they
are sujected to tougher market discipline than large ones. Kane (2000) had already
explained that large financial institutions were “too big to discipline adequately”.
This is one of the unofficial incentives that led to banking megamergers.
These key issues of the subprime crisis strenghtened the determination of states
to control what was really happening in finance.
Baˆle III and others
Because states and regulation commissions (especially the SEC) were unable to
predict systemic risk (Lehman Brothers), they try now to identify and to watch
carefully those big financial structures that are disseminating assets all over the
world. There are also discussions about the role of “lender of last resort” played by
central banks.
First of all, the crisis happened while the implementation of Basel II Agreements
was not complete, but at the beginning. The decisions of Basel II were supposed
to be applied at the end of 2008 in Europe and at the beginning of 2009 for major
13
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U.S. banks (but never happened in the U.S.). Solvency II is supposed to care about
insurance companies, and should be fully implemented in 2014. The relevance
of such measures is hard to evaluate regarding the crisis. Basel II agreements
have sharpened the capital requirements against new forms of risks according to
their importance: they include the previous credit risk from Basel I, but also add
the operational risk (intern, there are numerous examples of computers’ problems
that generated huge distortions on market prices) and the market risk (losses
arriving from problems or movements in the market, for example the increase of
rate Euribor mid-2008). In addition, banks are supposed to proove that they have
made the right choices to measure accurately the different risks: the “Internal
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process”. Because this regulation must be applied at
the international level, everybody has to be able to understand the accounting of
the others: banks must provide to any interested shareholder a set of informations
about their capitals, which aims at helping the others to get an accurate view of
the banks. This is called the “Market Discipline”.
A large number of measures (also called Basel III) have been undertaken by
the Financial Stability Board and the G20 at the end of year 2010 to reinforce the
measures of Basel II. First, the ratios of Basel II are strenghtened: there must be
an increase in quality and quantity of the capital requirements. Second, to avoid
liquidity problems and specific risk problems, two new ratios are introduced, the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio, made of the supposed “quick resale price” of the different
assets of the bank; and a Net Stable Funding Ratio, an amount that must be larger
than the needs of the banks when facing a specific risk. Third, a leverage ratio has
also been introduced to limit the total exposure depending on the capital. Finally,
there will be also a new macroprudential tool, depending on the market supervisor,
which increases the requirements of major banks when market conditions degrade,
to prevent systemic risk. All these measures should be progressiely applied to the
banks from 2013 to 2019.
At the same time, in the U.S., a new law proposed by Obama’s administration
has been enacted on July 21th, 2010: the “Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act”. Indeed this Act is still not finished, because it was
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supposed to be controlled and finished (200 rules, 70 studies) by a set of regulators
18 months after the acceptation of the law, but it is not ready. This law strenghtens
the power of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and creates two regulators:
the “Financial Stability Oversight Council” and the “Office of Financial Research”,
both under government control. The new law also extends the types of financial
entities (hedge, insurers...) subject to different procedures, like liquidation, control,
settlements... The law also creates a number of Clearing Houses to avoid liquidity
problems, and finally strenghtens the protection of investors.
Across the ocean, there is a challenging process to standardize the legislation
(on financial supervision, commissions) between the 27 countries, and the creation
of number of new regulators to apply Basel III (details in Perrut (2012)).
Consequences and cures
All these agreements (or laws) have been acted with good will, and they tend to
avoid the major situations that led to the recent crisis. We can already question
about their effects and their possible usefulness.
In response to Basel III, there will be a change in rates of loans issued by the
concerned banks, and in the overall growth of loans. According to Cosimano and
Hakura (2011), the average annual lending rate of banks will be increased by 16
basis points, and therefore the loan growth will decrease by 1.3% in the long run.
They also explain that the effect on banks depend on the ability to raise funds,
which differs from one country to another (easier in the U.S. than in Europe).
Angelini, Clerc, Curdia, Gambacorta, Gerali, Locarno, Motto, Ro¨ger, Van den
Heuvel, and Vlcˇek (2011) quantify the effects of the new regulation on the output:
each percentage point of increase in the capital ratio of banks should decrease the
output by 0.09 %. The liquidity ratio should also produce a similar effect. On the
opposite, the new regulation should dampen volatility. Allen, Chan, Milne, and
Thomas (2012) also explain that credit could rarefy, but miscoordination costs of
implementing the reform rather than the ratios themselves would account for this
phenomenon.
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The study made by Al-Darwish, Hafeman, Impavido, Kemp, and O’Malley
(2011) shows the possible distorsions between Basel III and Solvency II. It seems
that bank capital requirements in Basel III are tougher than insurance companies
capital requirements of Solvency II. This could create a change in activities. Banks
will also remove exposure from their balance sheets to meet capital requirements,
they are likely to use securitization, and this might lead to “overcontentration
of exposures in less regulated areas of the financial system”. The structure of
capital of banks is likely to change because some assets are included in the capital
requirements while some others are not.
Actually, larger banks could better integrate the costs of new regulations,
and that could lead to a concentration of the activities. According to some
representatives of banks, the consumers and the firms will absorb a part of the
reform. For example, new saving products might be created with penalties for early
withdraw, in order to obtain guarantees on the capital requirements.
At the end of 2012, the SEC postponed the implementation of the capital
requirements ratios later than 2013. In February 2013, due to the poor economic
situation in Europe, the liquidity ratio has been decreased and the implementation
of the two ratios (NSFR and LCR) has also been postponed to 2015. Regulators
were fearing that these ratios would create a credit crunch to firms. The SEC also
abandoned the project to supervise monetary funds.
History repeats itself
The implementation of Basel II, Basel III and Solvency II has definitely put a stop to
the autoregulation and the liberalization of the banking sector which truly started
in the eighties, to end up a little before 2000. These laws (Basel III and especially
Dodd-Franck Act) strongly recall the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. After Worldcom
and Enron scandals, the U.S. had implemented a very strong law about listed firms
on the U.S. stock exchanges. This law is designed to avoid corporate and accounting
scandals. Therefore it is supposed to protect investors from operational risk. As
in the Dodd-Franck Act and Basel III, similar measures have been implemented
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to improve transparency (accounting standards, regular auditing procedure) and
establish emergency procedures and settlements for firms. Post crises, it seems that
regulators favourably respond to public opinion by making laws that guarantee
to never remake the crisis. Each crisis, there is a strong response to the entities
(banks, firms, insurance and audit companies...) that have endangered the whole
economy, or at least, impacted shareholders and investors. Each crisis presented
also a notion about systemic risk, last time there was the liquidation of Arthur
Anderson, and this time it was, amongst others, the collapses of AIG, Lehman
Brothers, Dexia...
A few years after the implementation of SOX, in 2007, there were numerous
criticisms about the effect it had on small and intermediary firms. Indeed, the
constraints applied to firms seemed to be too strong (multi annual reporting obli-
gations, IFRS standards) and too costly (audit fees). As a consequence, many
reports (among which Paulson (2006) and Bloomberg and Schumer (2007)) were
calling for relaxation of the conditions of SOX. They explained that NYSE was
loosing attractivity, by looking at the number of Initial Public Offerings on other
international stock exchanges, especially the Alternative Investment Market from
London. Actually this idea of the decrease of the number of IPO was manipulated.
There were a high number of IPO on small deregulated stock exchanges (AIM,
Alternext), corresponding to very small and risky firms. Major firms kept intro-
ducing on the NYSE, except Gazprom introduced on the London Stock Exchange,
which is easy to conceptualize. This question about relaxing SOX was shelved by
the recent subprime crisis.
In their book, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) tend to demonstrate that this
situation of crisis has been experienced many times before, even if persons, locations,
technologies and times change. They identify debt sovereign crises (internal and
external debts), inflation episodes, exchange rate crises, and banking crises. They
consider 66 countries over 8 centuries. They show that crises seem to be inevitable.
Because crises are infrequent enough, the actors (investors, regulators) forget about
the signs of “overheated” economy and think they will not reproduce their old
mistakes, thinking that “this time is different”. All crises are preceded by over
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accumulation of debts, from consumers, states or banks. Usually this accumulation
of debt goes hand in hand with growth but ends in failure. Banking crises usually
provoke a high increase in sovereign debts (80% in 3 years – which was an interesting
prediction for numerous countries today). They underline that most developed
economies are supposed to know about and therefore avoid the risk of sovereign
debt crises. Consequently they hold the trust of investors, but this may be an
illusion, they are vulnerable as emerging economies. Real prices of housing are
a good index for banking crises. To conclude, international institutions could
decrease risks by providing large sets of informations about the states (intern and
extern debts) and on banks.
Design of the research
All along the dissertation, we try to model key features of the past crisis. A
noticeable characteristic is the contagion of the subprime sector to the whole
banking system. The two first chapters deal with this question, and present the
network and contagion approaches of the financial system. Another distinguishing
feature of the crisis was the high increase of the credit supply associated to a kind
of bubble on housing prices. To analyze this bilateral phenomenon, the three last
chapters deal with the influence of the investment and the collateral constraints
on the – possibly – bubbly price of the assets. Chapter 1 (respectively chapter
3) reviews the fundamental literature that led to the research work of chapter 2
(respectively chapters 4 and 5).
Financial networks, chapters 1 and 2
The connectivity of financial activities is a concrete way to address the question
of the systemic risk. When markets participants are linked together because of
counterparties, contracts, securitization, the whole system is possibly affected by
a single default. How conceptualize this question of contagion? Especially, what
initiates the financial problems, how idiosyncratic shocks transmit to a complex
financial system, depending on its structure? From a macroeconomic point of view,
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the regulator tries to control and limit the activities of financial entities. The
prudential regulation policies have a local effect by influencing the balance sheets
of the agents, the capital requirements, etc... To which extent those policies modify
the global structure of the financial system, and how can we test their efficiency on
the resilience of the system? To answer all these questions, we adopt a network
approach of the financial system.
Different mechanisms have been analyzed in the literature on contagion, in-
cluding for example, bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), short-sales (Allen
and Gale, 2000), risky assets (Dasgupta, 2004). Very close to real phenomenons,
they are restricted to simple financial systems, compared to the complexity of the
contemporary finance world. Since 2007, a new branch of the literature emerged,
based on the network representation of the financial system. The novelty of this
approach is to capture the intricacy of links between financial agents, the number
of links, their financial weight, their maturity... For example, this new approach
allows to analyze systemic risk (Gai and Kapadia, 2010), prudential regulation
(Anand, Gai, and Marsilli, 2012) or herd behaviors (Cont and Bouchaud, 2000).
This evolution of the literature is presented in the first chapter of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 details our network model of the financial system and its implications.
We model the interbank market as a financial network populated by a large number
of agents, which may represent banks, insurances companies, funds, financial
intermediaries. These agents are supposed to be identically capitalized. We
suppose that these agents make investments among others, because they expects
profits on these investments. When they mature, the investments are supposed to
be paid back by their destinators to their issuers. However, if the investments were
not to be refunded, it would affect the balance sheet of the issuer, and maybe make
him default. As a consequence, this issuer would not honor his own debts, and
could propagate the default to his own creditors. This is our contagion mechanism
in the network. The origins of defaults come from some agents who decide to
strategically default, because their gains from defaulting exceed the amount of the
fine. Given these informations, we can calculate the defaults in the network. We
19
General Introduction
can also deduce the expected payoffs of the agents, and deduce there choices, in
terms of strategic defaults and numbers of investments.
The regulator sets a prudential ratio, which limits the number of assets of the
financial participants in terms of their capitalization. The resulting state of the
network depends on:
• the time-horizon maximization of the agents,
• the capitalization level of market participants,
• the prudential ratio.
Depending on these parameters, the financial network may reach either a
highly connected state (dense network), or a low connected state (sparse network).
Intermediate situations, where the network is moderately connected are rare,
because they tend to propagate defaults and reduce the payoffs of the agents,
especially in short and medium time-horizon. Dense networks better withstand
contagion, and increase the expected payoffs of agents, they also include a rare but
systemic risk.
Limiting the assets of participants avoids very dense networks, and the net
effects of this limit depend on the time horizon: it may reduce systemic risk for long
time-horizon maximization of participants, but it may become counterproductive
when agents adopt a myopic attitude. Finally, the prudential ratio is ineffective in
short-run maximizations.
Collateral limits, investment opportunities, and bubbles
It seems that for the recent crisis, subprime assets were overevaluated. This may
be linked to their high yields despite their also high risks. U.S. housing prices were
also overestimated. For the previous crisis, many firms were overpriced, it was
the dot-com bubble. For a long time, research has been tracking bubbles. Apart
from the words, theoretical models do not generate bubbles except under particular
assumptions, because the usual context (Santos and Woodford, 1997) does not
help emerge bubbles on assets. Historically (Blanchard and Watson, 1982), the
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price of an asset represents the discounted sum of the incoming dividends. If the
price of the asset is used as a collateral guarantee (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), it
may deviate from its historical value. Especially, if the price allows to relax a debt
constraint, many authors proved that the price of the asset is likely to include a
bubble part (Kocherlakota, 2009). Chapter 3 traces the stakes of the theoretical
literature on bubbles until very recent developments.
Chapter 4 extends the work of Miao and Wang (2011). They consider a
production economy with a large number of firms, all having the same production
function. These firms face stochastic investment opportunities. This means that
they can not achieve their investments at each period, but they wait for the
investment opportunity to happen. Because of this scarcity of investment, firms
might be willing to invest more than their capital gains to reach the optimal
level of investment, to wait until the next investment opportunity. This is made
possible through borrowing. Nevertheless, the authors assume that borrowing
needs guarantees. Because firms generate cash-flows at each period, it is possible to
determine the prices of the firms, as the discounted sum of their incoming cash-flows
(or dividends). To guarantee that the firms refund their loans, Miao and Wang
(2011) consider that the firms pledge a small amount of their value to secure the
loans. Precisely, a novelty of this model is the new collateral constraint: firms
pledge a small fraction of their capital, and the debts are secured by the value
of this small amount of capital. Their model shows that under specific collateral
constraints and stochastic investments, the optimal solution of the market is to
overprice firms to help them reach the optimal investment level. This pricing is
interpretated by the authors as including a bubble.
We deepen this model by adding a net positive interest rate on the loans to the
firms. Because it is usually assumed that increasing rates of the loans provokes the
collapses or at least help tame bubbles, we want to examine wether a net positive
interest rate on the loans influences firms’ prices, and to which extent. This would
account for a regulator’s policy that could control bubbles through interest rates.
We assume that this interest rate is fixed exogenously, and that the interests are
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paid to an external bank. In addition, we can determine an optimal interest rate if
the bank optimizes profits. The results are not really convincing. The impact of the
interest rates on the loans are negligible. This is mainly due to the very low debts
amounts, and the firms borrow just when investing: debts can be interpretated as
short-term maturity. In addition, we question about the existence of a bubble in
the prices. It seems that the equilibrium pricing corresponds to an affine pricing,
which does not include a bubble part. To overcome those obstacles, we decide to
change the role of the debts.
Chapter 5 is the completion of the analyzis of the weaknesses of the previous
model. Interest rates on debts do not play a crucial role, and debts amounts are
too small. Because capital of firms is usually composed of equity and debts, we
adapt this particular capital structure to the previous framework. Firms do not
borrow when the investment opportunity happens, but have a permanent part of
long-term debt in the capital. Firms face stochastic investment, and their debts
are limited to a fraction of the prices of their equities. This is the equivalent of
the mortgage loans, where loans were secured by the values of the houses. The
loans are supplied perfectly elastically by a bank, which also optimizes profits
by fixing the interest rate. In this case, we show that values of firms are very
sensitive to interest rates variations. We show that the results are independant
from the choice of the borrowing constraint: the results are identical with the
constraint of the previous chapter (pledge a value of a part of the capital), and
also with the most classical one (pledge a part of the value of the capital). Two
equilibrium situations coexist: the standard case, with high equity, normal price
and proportional debt, and the “binding” case, with lower equity, higher price and
larger debt. In the second case, the equity has a higher yield, but the equilibrium
prices are very sensitive to interest rates: increasing the interest rate highly affects
prices and capitals of firms. For a particular relation between parameters, there
exists a bubble in the firms’ prices, because the equity is negligible, but has a net
positive price, which allows for borrowing, and therefore firms have a net positive
capital.
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This analyzis has been a great opportunity to study models dealing with financial
crises. Using networks to capture propagation of defaults and systemic risk is very
relevant, though it remains difficult to bring together all interesting contributions
of different articles, because they often require conflicting assumptions. In that
direction, enhancing models is possible, but this has to be done carefully, to preserve
readability, tractability and their policy implications. An interesting variation
of chapter 2 would be to introduce a small number of bigger agents, to catch
concentration and TBTF situations.
Our bubbly contribution allowed us to understand how subtle it is to generate
bubbles by a theoretical approach with infinitely lived agents. Instead of speaking
about bubbles, it seems that we should focus of the dual role of prices: they represent
but also generate value. In the one hand, models are able to catch overheating
of the economy, on the other hand, up to now, crashes are not endogenous. In
addition alternating bubbles and crashes constitutes a serious challenge to improve
contemporary research.
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Chapter 1. Contagion in financial networks: review of the literature
1.1 Networks topology
Contemporary finance is characterized by both high connections between financial
entities and uncertainty concerning the connectivity of market participants in the
financial system. A study of the IMF (2010) analyzes cross border funds between
major financial countries. The size of flows does not rely on the size of the countries.
Among the different countries with cross border funds, they distinguish net lenders,
net borrowers and main conduits. For example, Luxembourg collects funds from
Lichentstein and Cayman Islands (net lender) and distributes to large industrial
countries: USA, UK, Spain, France, Germany... They enlight the complexity of
transfers between banks and funds, depeding on the types of asset, their durations,
ratings, etc...
Merton, Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, and Pelizzon (2013) analyze the effect
of sovereign and credit risk arising from different European countries on major
international banks, brokerages and insurances economies. On Figure 1.1, they
plot the financial network linked to Greece in August 2008. Greece was highly
connected to numerous international banks, sovereigns and insurances. However,
the authors also explain that connections were varying over time. They remarked
that the U.S. were little exposed to European banks and sovereigns in March 2012.
Securitization was supposed to improve risk management according to Duffie
and Garleanu (2001). It has been responsible for inconspicuously disseminating a
common risk all over the financial network. As explained by Kane (2009), financial
engineering helps financial institutions to get larger and more complex, which
strengthen their political influence, and may also increase the volatility of portfolios
that would not appear on monitoring technologies. In addition, trade volumes of
markets participants highly increased over the last decade. This led to a worldwide
connected financial network, conceptualized in Minoiu and Reyes (2013).
A detailed description of the federal funds market and the network of american
banks, was made by Bech and Atalay (2010). Their study lasted from 1997 to 2007.
They deliver an overview of the number of active banks each day, as well as the
number and the amount of the contracts and the number of interbank links. This
encourages to use a network structure to depict the financial system. A network
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Figure 1.1: Connectedness of sovereigns (blue dots), banks (red dots), and insurance
companies (black dots) to Greece, August 2008a
aSources: Merton et al. (2013).
approach to model interbank links allows to represent the multiplicity of links
between participants. It also captures the different paths or credit lines between
banks, i.e. the sequences of different intermediaries that link any two participants
together.
Allen and Babus (2008) present a literature review on the topic of networks,
especially in finance. Though empirical literature justifies the use of networks to
model financial systems, we mainly focus on the theoretical literature. Most of the
authors on financial networks have studied the contamination of defaults depending
on the structure of the network, and also how financial agents choose their links in
the network. A large majority of articles concludes that financial networks with a
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more complete set of connections better withstand shocks than less dense networks.
Logically, disconnected networks do not transmit failures. Allen and Babus also
underline that authors have been more studying the effects of the network structure
on the agents rather than the effects of the agents which constitute the network on
the network itself.
Introducing a time dynamic model within a general network structure remains
sensitive, unless there are tight constraints on parameters, such that the number
of agents. When considering very small networks: the implication is rather micro
orientated and the results are formulated by closed-form solutions. When studying
larger networks, the properties of the networks are deduced from probabilities and
the study of graph theory, as early developed by Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960) and
deepened by Bollobas (1985). We first present articles from the economic theory
that introduce cross deposits, and model contagion through different mechanisms.
Second, we show how the graph theory has successfully been applied to financial
contagion.
1.2 Theory of contagion
1.2.1 A well-known approach
One of the seminal contributions in the literature is Allen and Gale (2000). They
study how the banking system reacts to contagion in a two periods model. The
economy is made of consumers, each of them owning one unit of consumption at
time 0. A part of consumers will only consume at time 1 and the other part only at
time 2. Consumers can store their endowment at the banks, which access two types
of assets: “short” assets last over one period and have a net positive yield r > 1.
“Long” assets last over the two periods and have a higher yield than short assets,
r2 > r. However, if sold at the end of the first period, they have a lower yield,
which can be interpretated as a liquidation value, r1 < 1. Consumers are identical
at time 0 and there is a probability p that they only consume at time 1, and (1− p)
that they only consume at the end of the second period, t = 2. Consumers only
know their types – early or late consumer – at the end of the first period, (otherwise
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the realization of p would be known at time 0). The global economy is composed
of 4 regions, and each region has a bank (or a number of identical banks). The
probability p can take a low value pL and a high value pH , which distinguishes when
there might be a lot of early consumers pH or a lot of late consumers pL. There are
two states of nature, such that two regions have either a lot of early consumers or
a lot of late consumers, and the two other regions have the other type. The social
planner wants to optimize the utility of the consumers, u(c1) in period 1 and u(c2)
in period 2. Regions with a high number of early consumers face a high demand
for liquidity at time 1 while regions with a high number of late consumers face
a low demand for liquidity at time 1. Banks ignore the types of their consumers
before period 1. To face the demand for liquidity at time 1, banks are supposed
to hold the short asset, while they would obtain a higher yield for late consumers
by holding the long asset. If they face a larger liquidity demand at time 1 than
their holding of the short asset, they will loose some money by selling the long
asset. This standard framework had been previously introduced by Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) to deal with bank runs: when depositors expect the other depositors
to withdraw their funds, the optimal strategy is to withdraw before the others
do. One of the new features of the model of Allen and Gale (2000) is the “cross
deposits”: the optimal allocation between both assets can be obtained by allowing
transfers between the different banks. In this case, banks with a higher demand for
liquidity at time 1 withdraw their deposits in banks with low demand for liquidity
at time 1, and reciprocally at time 2. This is possible whatever the number of
counterparties: banks may hold deposits in all other banks, or just a part of them.
The authors model the effect of a shock of liquidity. Suppose that there is an excess
demand for liquidity in period 1 in one region: the bank of this region will withdraw
its deposits from the other bank(s). In addition, to face the excess of demand for
liquidity, the bank needs to liquidate some long assets. Because of this liquidation,
it happens that assets of the bank are loosing some value: r1 < 1. If the bank is
still able to guarantee at least c1 units of consumption to late consumers, the late
consumers will not withdraw their holdings in the bank at time 1. The amount
(c2 − c1)(1− pH) can be interpretated as a capital buffer. On the opposite, if the
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Figure 1.2: Complete networka
aSource: Allen and Gale (2000).
decrease in assets’ values do not guarantee at the late consumers at least c1 units of
consumption, they decide to withdraw at time 1 and the bank must liquidate all its
assets, the bank goes bankrupt. At time 1, the bank will also face the withdrawals
from other banks. Since all assets are liquidated, the other banks will also loose
some money because their withdrawals will also be devaluated. Because of this
depreciation, the other banks might get some trouble: if the capital buffer of the
other banks is lower than the loss on their deposits, they also go bankrupt. The
response of the whole system depends on the type of the market structure: when
banks hold deposits over all other banks, the network structure is said “complete”,
cf. Figure 1.2. If one of them goes bankrupt, the small size of the cross deposits
will limit the effect on other banks. On the opposite, if banks hold deposits over a
few (in the present case, just one bank) number of banks, the interbank market is
“incomplete”, cf. Figure 1.3. Banks will be more affected by the bankruptcy of one
of them, possibly making them also defaulting. Obviously, if the network is such
that some regions are not connected together (also called sparse network) cf. Figure
1.4, even through any intermediary region, a bankruptcy in one region can not
affect the other region. To conclude, interbank markets where banks are connected
together, but weakly, are more subject to contagion than other situations. In a
related model, Allen and Gale (1998) explain how small shocks in a given sector
may transform a banking crisis into a more widespread financial crisis. They do
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Figure 1.3: Incomplete networka
aSource: Allen and Gale (2000).
Figure 1.4: Sparse networka
aSource: Allen and Gale (2000).
not introduce shocks on liquidity demand or allow for cross holdings, but the “long”
asset is risky, and cannot be liquidated at time 1. In this situation, bank runs are
due to low-returns on the risky asset.
The framework introduced by Allen and Gale (2000) was extended in multiple
ways. For example Dasgupta (2004) analyzes a two regions and three periods
model, each region having one bank. There is one riskless asset, and each region
also own a private long-term risky asset, with low short resale price. Depositors of
each region also observe the depositors of the other region, especially the number of
withdrawals. The authors suppose the senority of interbank holdings on individual
31
Chapter 1. Contagion in financial networks: review of the literature
deposits. Given this context, Dasgupta determines the thresholds of yield of the
risky asset which lead to banks failures following regional liquidity shocks. He
analyzes the failure of one bank conditional to the failure of the other one and
exhibits an optimal level of interbank holdings depending on the probability of
failure.
Leitner (2005) also distinguishes liquid and illiquid assets and the effects of the
allocation of these assets over the banks. When liquid assets are too concentrated
over a little number of banks, the whole network is threatened. This captures the
risk associated with TBTF institutions.
1.2.2 Other major contributions
Generally speaking, to model financial connections, the authors introduce either
direct connections representing assets from banks hold by other banks, or different
types of assets that banks hold in a portfolio.
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) analyze the same problem as Allen and Gale
(2000). They study contagion in the interbank market following liquidity shocks.
They prove that interbank holdings reduce banks’ needs in liquid assets, and they
enlight how credit lines (interbank cross-holdings) expose the system to gridlocks
even if all banks are solvent, due to coordination mechanisms.
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) adopt a completely different approach of contagion
effects. Indeed, they analyze the existence and the uniqueness of a “clearing
payment vector” for complex financial networks, for example containing cyclical
obligations. They determine how the system reacts to an idiosyncratic shock using
this clearing payment vector. For example, they show that a shock on one bank
lowers the value of holdings of all other connected banks. Their particular approach
differs from the large majority of papers which exogenize the resale price of the
shares of a defaulting bank.
Rotemberg (2009) determines the needs in liquid asset of firms that use it to
settle their debts, depending on the structure of the network. He finds that when
the number of links between firms increases, the optimal level of liquid asset also
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increases. He also analyzes the effect of financial concentration on debts’ settlement
process.
Morris (2000) calculates analytically the threshold of contagion between ho-
mogenous investors with special network configurations. His approach relies on the
optimal behavior of agents depending on the others.
Egloff, Leippold, and Vanini (2007) also deal with contagion issues taking into
account the impact of the credit portfolio’s interdependence structure. Again, less
diversified portfolios are more likely to create giant distress.
Cossin and Schellhorn (2007) analyze the effect of the network structure on
firm’s prices when default’s risk depend on counterparties’ defaults. Even if they
prove that maximum diversification of counterparties reduces default risk in random
networks, the optimal behavior in cyclical networks is to choose a finite number of
counterparties to minimize risk.
Gale and Kariv (2007) prove that networks are likely to be incomplete given
the cost (or lack) of information. When the network is incomplete, it is more
vulnerable to shocks. The authors numerically illustrate this situation with a
particular network composed of 5 agents.
Many questions about contagion have been studied through these models, such
as the effect of the structure of the network (connectivity, concentration) on the risk
of contagion, the resale price in case of default, the requirements in liquid assets,
the coordination procedure. The network modelization of financial markets allows
to deal with all these questions in a unique framework. It captures the common
idea that intermediate connected banking systems are more vulnerable than highly
or sparsely connected systems.
1.3 Random graphs
There are many applications of random graphs and networks theory in different
fields of research, as illustrated by Newman, Strogatz, and Watts (2001) and
Newman (2003). Especially, random graphs are subject to percolation phenomena,
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and this may be usefull to model financial contagion. A technical appendix at the
end of the chapter gathers basic results of graph theory.
1.3.1 Percolation as contagion
Chapter 2 (our model) was motivated by the mathematical approach of percolation
in random graphs. How could we transpose percolation to financial systems? The
first step was the work of Watts (2002), who presents a simple model determining
the probability of global cascades on a random network of interacting agents with
a resistance effect (in finance this effect could be compared to a capital buffer).
Precisely, Watts analyzes the probability and the size of the spillover starting from
an initial “seed” in a network. The network approach is adapted to many different
situations in physics, biology, but also economics. The network is represented by a
random graph containing n agents. Agents can be represented by dots, or vertices,
and links between them by edges. To get a concrete situation, we suppose that
agents have to make choice 0 or 1 (buy or sell, trade or not, withdraw cash...) and
their choices depend on the choices of agents they observe. When they observe
an agent, there is an edge between the two dots representing the agents. These
connected agents are called “neighbors”. Among the neighbors of one agent, some
are making choice 0 and some others are making choice 1. The current agent decides
to make choice 1 if the fraction of his neighbors making choice 1 exceeds a private
threshold drawn from an arbitrary distribution φ. Each agent is connected to k
neighbors with a probability pk. The average number of neighbors is z. Watts wants
to determine the number of agents who adopt state 1, following the introduction
of a fraction f << 1 of all the agents making choice 1 in the network. Unlike
the complete network of Allen and Gale (2000), this model deals with incomplete
networks, each agent is not connected to all the others, but has a limited number of
neighbors. The incompleteness of the network is an important assumption: ∃c > 0
such that z < c ln(n). This is designed to guarantee the absence of local cycles
of connections (Erdo¨s and Re´nyi, 1960), which would highly change the behavior
of agents, creating resistance effects. Indeed, suppose that 4 agents are linked
consecutively, like Figure 1.3, one after the other. Suppose the first agent makes
34
Chapter 1. Contagion in financial networks: review of the literature
Figure 1.5: Example of uniform random graph n = 20. p is the probability to put an
edge between any two points.
choice 1. The second agent is connected to 2 agents, the first and the third. As a
consequence, if φ ≤ 1
2
, then the second agent adopts choice 1, and so on. On the
contrary, let us suppose that agents 2, 3 and 4 are connected together and agent
2 is connected to agent 1. Agent 1 makes choice 1. Agent 2 adopts choice 1 if
φ ≤ 1
3
. If φ > 1
3
, then agent 2 chooses choice 0 and the contagion stops. On Figure
1.5, the probability to put an edge between any pair of agents p is identical for all
agents (nodes). There are 20 agents. When p = 0.1, which represents on average 1
connection starting from half of agents, there are no cycles. On the opposite, when
p = 0.2, which is equivalent to take p = 4
n
, there are local cycles, represented in
red.
Watts determines the “early adopters” in the network: the immediate neighbors
of the seeds, that adopt state 1. Let us consider an agent having k neighbors among
which one seed (in state 1), and the other agents in state 0. This agent chooses state
1 with probability P(φ ≤ 1
k
). From there Watts derives the generating function of
an agent that has at least one neighbor in state 1: G(x) =
∑
k pkP(φ ≤
1
k
)xk. This
function gives two important quantities: G0(1) determines the fraction of agents
that may choose state 1 and G′0(1) the average number of connections made by
these same agents. Then he extends the generating function to a set of connected
agents (also called cluster) that might become 1 and he deduces the average size of
such 1-clusters. The average size of 1-clusters diverges for some particular value of
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Figure 1.6: The global cascade window. The dash line is the theoretical result, and the
solid circles represent numerical simulations. φ is the common threshold of decision and
z is the connectivity parameter representing the average number of neighbors. a
aSource: Watts (2002).
the number of vertices, in the “phase” transition. Watts applies this reasoning to
the particular uniform random graph, where the probability to put an edge between
two agents is exactly p = z
n
and where the individuals thresholds of decisions are
constant to the same φ∗. In this case, it is possible to determine theoretically
(asymptotic properties when n → ∞) and numerically (simulations for n large
enough) the existence of a giant set of connected agents in state 1 within the
network, depending on the value of z and of φ∗.
For z < 1 and z > 15 there are no global contagions in the economy and
when 1 < z < 15 they exist for any value of the individual threshold φ < 0.25, as
shown on Figure 1.6. In this case, the upper individual threshold φ∗ such that
giant 1-clusters exist is decreasing when z increases. Moreover, with the numerical
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simulations, the author calculates the frequency of these phenomena. He then
extends the results to a larger class of random networks, without major differences
in results. More connected networks are subject to larger contagions (cascades), but
they happen less frequently. As the author explains, there is however a problem,
random networks are not the best approximations for economic structures: agents
are not acting purely randomly, they may choose their connections.
Percolation phenomena remain very interesting, because they capture the effect
of the network structure on agents decisions. In the following, we study how these
techniques have been closely adapted to financial networks.
1.3.2 Percolation as herding behaviors: size of the clusters
Another approach using the same percolation phenomenon is the work of Cont
and Bouchaud (2000). They suppose that the dots (or vertices) represent traders.
As soon as two traders are connected with a link, (or edge), they adopt the same
behavior concerning an asset: buy, sell, or not trade. When the global size of
the financial network n → ∞; and when the probability to put a link between
two agents is p = z
n
with z = 1, Bollobas (1985) proved that the size distribution
of connected agents (or clusters) behaves as a power law. If z →< 1 the size
distribution of the clusters behaves as a power law modulated by an exponential
tail, which makes the variance finite. When z →< 1, the limit n → ∞ proves
that the number of neighbors of an agent is a Poisson random variable, with
parameter z. They suppose that there is a fixed number of orders by unit of
time. They also suppose that clusters are independant. There must be no trend in
the action of agents, as a consequence, there exists a parameter 0 < a < 1
2
such
that, for each cluster, P(buy) = P(sell) = a. The remaining case can be deduced:
P(not trade) = 1− 2a. From there, they derive the law of excess demand for the
asset, and the evolutions of the price of the asset. Precisely, their results prove that
price changes have a heavy tail, and the “size” of the tail (variance) is inversely
proportionnal to the number of orders per unit of time. This illustrates that illiquid
markets are subject to larger price’s variations.
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We must enlight that contagion through imitation processes between traders
have been explored through various approaches, and this influences the size of the
tail of the return distribution. For example, Johansen, Ledoit, and Sornette (2000)
introduce a “local self-reinforcing” imitation between noise traders. With a hazard
rate, the noise between traders reaches a critical point such that all traders place
the same selling order, which generates a crash. It is however optimal for traders
to keep investing in the market out of crash periods, because bubbles1 generate
high profits before crashes. The resulting assets’ returns follow log-periodic power
laws. The empirical study Johansen, Ledoit, and Sornette (1999) supports these
distribution. Recently, this model was extended successfully to the recent Chinese
stock market bubbles in Jiang, Zhou, Sornette, Woodard, Bastiaensen, and Cauwels
(2010).
Focardi and Fabozzi (2004) make another contagion model using percolation.
They also use the size of the clusters, when z →< 1, but instead of choosing the
action (buy, sell, not trade) of the traders who constitute the cluster, they introduce
a probability a of default on the cluster, which is the same for all clusters. The
number of defaulting clusters Na is therefore proportionnal to N the number of
clusters, and the number of defaulting traders Na
1−z
is proportionnal to the average
size of the cluster 1
1−z
. Depending on how z is close to 1, using the power law cut
off by an exponential law, they deduce a correlation vector of traders, due to the
size of the clusters, and also deduce the distribution of aggregate losses. As they
underline, there are some difficulties to use the theory of random graphs, because
results hold for n→∞, but simulations help find interesting results.
1.3.3 Financial resilience to the test of percolation
Gai and Kapadia (2010) add some more financial features to Watts (2002). Indeed,
they introduce a mechanism as the one of Allen and Gale (2000) in a random graph.
In this model, the nodes represent banks. They consider oriented links instead of
bilateral, this creates a directed graph. They add a weight on the links to represent
the size of financial flows. As a consequence, they have to consider separately the
1A heuristic description of the rational bubbles of this model is in Chapter 3.
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number of incoming links or liabilities Li, to a bank i, also called the “in-degree”
and the outgoing links or assets, the out-degree. They distinguish three types of
assets:
• a liquid asset ALi, which represents the interbank assets of other banks,
hold by bank i. The interbank assets of a bank are supposed to be evenly
distributed over the destinators;
• an illiquid asset Ai.
• deposits2: banks receive deposits from customers Ci. .
A bank is “solvent” if:
(1− f)ALi + pAi − Li − Ci > 0, (1.1)
where p is the price of the illiquid asset when sold; and f is the fraction of banks
holding assets hold of bank i belonging to defaulting banks.
All banks are initially solvent and the authors shock the network by making one
bank fail. The authors assume that when a bank fails, it does not refund any of its
liabilities to other banks. As done in Watts (2002), they calculate the probability
of default for a bank linked to the defaulting one. To calculate this probability,
Gai and Kapadia assume that the capital buffer, namely ALi + Ai − Li − Ci, is a
random variable (this implies that deposits are randomly distributed over banks).
Obviously, when a bank has assets in a lot of other banks, the situation is less
risky: because liabilities of one bank to the others are evenly distributed, the
more counterparties, the lowest the amount. The default of one bank with a lot of
counterparties will less impact the balance of his counterparties than the default
of a bank with few counterparties. In the following, the authors determine the
moment generating function of a neighboring bank, and the same for a cluster,
using the property that the average in-degree is equal to the average out-degree.
When the average degree is low, z < 1, there are no giant connected components (or
clusters), and the default cannot spread over the whole network. When the degree
2We adopt notations similar to our’s to make it simpler.
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increases: z > 1, there are larger components until there are giant components in
the network. In this case, larger clusters may default (systemic risk), but since
banks assets are distributed over more counterparties, this lowers the risk of default.
As a consequence, the more connected the network, the more resistant to shocks.
When the network is dense, it is more resilient to shocks, but when contagion
spreads, the whole network is threatened, this creates large failures. When the
degree is too high, there are too many banks with a lot of counterparties, and
there is no contagion anymore. By simulation over smaller networks, they get very
similar results to Watts (2002). A very close model was designed by Amini, Cont,
and Minca (2010).
Another analysis of networks is done by Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn
(2007). They also use a random network structure. An interesting contribution of
this study is the calibration of the parameters of the model: the number of banks
25, the probability to make a link between two banks 0.2, the weight of the links,
the percentage of interbank assets 20%, the percentage of capitalization (cash of
the bank) 5%. They get related results: more capitalized banks better withstand
defaults. Increasing connectivity first increases risk and then helps the network to
resist contagion. When the size of interbank liabilities increases defaults locally
spread more easily.
Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia (2011) analyze a network made of banks having
different types of assets: secured (safe) and unsecured (risky) interbank liabilities,
deposits, and capital. As in Gai and Kapadia (2010), links are directed, banks have
assets and liabilities. When needing liquidity, the secured assets keep their whole
value, the others are subject to “haircuts”, which also represent the risk associated
to them. In addition, each bank is also subject to an additional specific haircut that
decreases the value of his own unsecured assets, this represents idiosyncratic shocks.
Following a shock, one bank has liquidity problems. To avoid defaults on payments,
this bank needs to increase liquidity. To do that, the authors assume that this
bank will try first to sell unsecured interbank assets. The contagion mechanism
is as follows, when a bank is subject to a “hoarding” action from other banks, it
looses a part of his liabilities. This is likely to create liquidity problems in that
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bank, which may in response start to withdraw his deposits in other banks. Using
this mechanism and simulations, the authors determine the contagion over the
network following a shock on one bank. The results highly depend on the value of
parameters, among which, the resale price of the unsecured asset, the complexity of
the network (number of connections) and the different fractions of types of liabilities.
Of course, lowering the resale price of unsecured assets increases contagion. Given
the number of links, when the network is more concentrated over a few major
banks, this increases the risk. Given the concentration, more complex networks
also increase risk. Their results recommend to strengthen liquidity requirements.
The impact of actions of the agents on the network has been analyzed in
Anand et al. (2012). They mix random networks and global games as done by
Morris and Shin (2003). The banks who constitute the network have two types of
assets: interbank assets Ai, private equity (composed of cash) Ci, and liabilities
Li. Creditors of each bank receive information about the bank. Actually each
creditor is another bank in the network. Using the information, they decide, at
each period, what to do about the bank: continue to lend, or foreclose their funds.
The foreclosure leads to 0 payoff, whatever the further state of the bank. A bank
may remain solvent or become defaulting, depending on the decisions of creditors.
When a creditor decides to rollover a loan, the payoff depends on the state of the
bank. When the bank is solvent, the creditor j receives (1− aj) and when the bank
defaults, the creditor receives a negative payoff −aj. Depending on the value of
aj, three situations arise. In the extreme cases where aj < 0 or aj > 1, the game
has a unique Nash equilibrium. For intermediary situations 0 < aj < 1, there is
no dominant strategy, between foreclose and rollover: there are multiple equilibria.
The payoff of the creditor is influenced by the other creditors: the more creditors
rollover, the lower aj, and on the opposite, the more creditors foreclose, the highest
the risk of default from the bank. To solve the problem, the authors assume that
aj is a random variable common to all banks, that they finally fix to a constant
a. Using global games theory, the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a threshold
strategy. Imposing Laplacian beliefs about the actions of the other creditors3, they
3The fraction of creditors who rollover is a discrete uniform variable on [0, 1].
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prove that there is a unique equilibirum: when the creditor j specific parameter
aj satisfies the relation: aj ≤
Ai+Ci
Li
, then the creditor rollovers the loan of bank i.
In the other case, he forecloses. The time evolution of the game is as follows. At
the dates they receive information, following a Poisson process of parameter t, the
creditors meet together and decide to rollover or to foreclose their credits. Credits
are initially created at Poisson process times of parameter “ini”, and between
random banks in the network. Existing credits also mature at another Poisson rate
“end”. The authors deduce the stationnary state of the complete process, and the
state of the network, depending on aj, and the 3 other time parameters: t, ini and
end. To establish the results, they assume that all creditors (all banks) have the
same individual threshold of the game rollover/foreclose aj = a, and all banks have
the same level of cash Ci = C.
The results are intuitive. When the threshold a is low, the network is dense,
creditors rollover their loans. For high a, the state of the network relies on the
amount of cash C of the banks. As a consequence, when the ratio asset-liabilities
decreases, the network is prone to contagion of foreclosures and contagion of defaults.
When the debt maturity is increased (this correspond to a decrease of the debt
maturation parameter end), the network can be dense, if a is low, or sparse in the
other case.
For intermediary values of the foreclose parameter a, a hysteresis phenomenon
takes place, the connectivity of the network slowly increases until reaching a highly
connected state which leads to a gobal foreclosure strategy, and creates a low
connected network. The authors also deduce an endogenous rate of bank failure,
which has two solutions for the same intermediary values of the time parameters.
This rate can be either close to 0 or strictly positive. As a consequence, two
different situations exist: almost no defaults or a net positive rate of failure. The
authors deduce policy implications to improve the state of the economy: increasing
the capitalization of agents reduces foreclosures; and transparency (or increasing
the frequency of information) avoids hysteresis phenomena. This model of random
graphs and global games is very relevant, because it models the effects of the
agents on the network – foreclose or rollover – and the effect of the network on
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agents’ decisions – mainly through threshold effects. It also introduces a time
dynamic in random networks, which is innovative. This is done at the cost of a
hard mathematical tractability (master equation of the generating function...) and
new assumptions, especially the one on the random time rate creation of links. The
authors introduce nice mechanisms for example, the payoff of the creditor, but,
to get results, they have to adopt special values common to all agents instead of
individual random variables. This is a bit regrettable: without clearly explaining,
the model seems to be general while it becomes more “specialized”.
1.3.4 General remarks on financial networks
A technical constraint of the literature of random graphs must be enlighted. A
majority of authors wants to use the percolation phenomenon (Watts (2002), Anand
et al. (2012), Gai et al. (2011), Gai and Kapadia (2010), Cont and Bouchaud (2000),
Focardi and Fabozzi (2004)) in classical or oriented graphs. They all require the
probability to make a connection (link, debt, asset...) to be close to the percolation
threshold: P(link) = constant
n
, when there are n agents. This limits the scope of the
models. In the same field, to keep the random aspect of connections – otherwise the
mathematical literature would not apply – unusual hypothesis or mechanisms are
adopted, such as the random creation of links, the binary transmission of choices,
or clearing mechanisms. Purely random connections can be justified in biology
or chemistry, because when used to deal with microscopic structure, the molecule
or virus’s attacks, or the percolation in porous materials are precisely random.
However, assuming that financial links between agents are purely randomly created
remains surprising. We propose in the next chapter a model to avoid those two
problems.
Many remarks of the literature explain that even with a low number of agents
≈ 500 and an intermediate number of simulations ≈ 1000, the results of simulations
are consistent with the theoretical results. The same reasoning is applied in chapter
2, and the simulations are considered as truthful. This could also support the fact
that real financial networks have a finite number of agents, which is of the same
order of magnitude as in Bech and Atalay (2010). In micro approaches of networks
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models, Hale (2011) consider 7938 banks over 141 countries. In other studies,
the financial flows are aggregated by countries, like Chinazzi, Fagiolo, Reyes, and
Schiavo (2013) or Minoiu and Reyes (2013).
We use the same concepts of network theory as the aforementionned literature,
we present in the following chapter a macro network based on the behavior of
agents, we determine by an algorythm the state of the network depending on
agents’ choices. We do not use the same formulation for links between agents
and we introduce a different resistance/contagion mechanism along financial links.
Instead of studying the effect of an exogenous shock, such that the failure of a
bank, we endogenize the formation of the failure within the network. As Anand
et al. (2012) (and Allen and Gale (2000) for the interbank holdings), we use a “zero
recovery assumption”, when a bank defaults. As Nier et al. (2007) and according
to Bech and Atalay (2010), we allow the number of links to exceed the percolation
threshold. We question about the efficiency of capitalization ratio. We especially
end by studying two unusual questions: is the ratio independant of the absolute
level of capitalization? When increasing the ratio with a fixed number of links,
the systemic risk decreases. What is the effect of increasing the ratio when the
absolute capitalization is constant?
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Sandard results of graph theory
Definitions
We consider N points, also called nodes or vertices (V1, V2, ..., VN). An edge, (link
or connection ) is a pair of vertices (i, j). A graph is a set of vertices V and a set
of edges E. Any pair of vertices can be linked by an edge. Given the graph G, two
vertices V1 and V2 are “neighbors” if the edge (V1, V2) ∈ E. Given a vertice V1 in
the graph, the degree of this node is the number of its neighbors in the graph.
deg(V1) = # {V
′ ∈ G : (V1, V
′) ∈ E} . (A.1)
A path between two nodes V ∗ and V ′ is a finite sequence of vertices:
V ∗ = V0, V1, ..., Vn−1, Vn = V
′,
such that for any k ∈ [0, n− 1], the edge (Vk, Vk+1) ∈ E. A graph is “connected”
when any pair of nodes can be linked by a path. A cycle is a path such that the
extermities coincide. A graph is a “tree” if it is connected and none of its subgraphs
contains a cycle. A subgraph is a graph with a set of vertices Vs and a set of edges
Es such that Vs ⊆ V and Es ⊆ E.
Random graphs are such that for any pair of nodes there is an independant
random probability p to put an edge between these two nodes. Such a graph is
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noted G(N, p). There is therefore a probability (1− p) to not have an edge between
two vertices. A vertice is degree k if it has exactly k neighbors. This gives the
probability law of the degree. Let pk be the probability to have exactly k neighbors.
pk =
(
N − 1
k
)
pk(1− p)N−1−k. (A.2)
When N →∞ we deduce that pk ∼N→∞
zk exp−z
k!
with z = p(N − 1) ∼N→∞ pN is
the average degree of the vertices. This means that the degree distribution behaves
asymptotically as a Poisson distribution with parameter z = pN .
Arbitrary degree distribution
Newman (2003) focuses on random graphs with arbitrary distribution degree. This
represents the sets of graphs such that ∀X vertice of V , the degree probability is:
P[deg(X) = k] = pk, where (pk)k≤0 is given. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph corresponds to
taking for (pk)k≤0 the Poisson distribution with parameter z = pN .
The generating function of a discrete random variable X is the power series
expansion, which converges on [−1, 1]:
GX(x) =
∞∑
k=0
P[X = k]xk. (A.3)
Let G
(i)
X the ith derivative of GX . Then
k!pk = G
(k)
X (0). (A.4)
The ith moment µi = E [X
i] is related to the generating function by:
µi =
(
x
d
dx
)(i)
GX(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
, (A.5)
where
(
x d
dx
)(i)
means differentiate w.r.t. x and multiply by x iterated i times. We
especially have E[X] = G′X(1).
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Now we can calculate the size of the connected components (also called clusters),
using the method of Feld (1991) and Newman (2003). Consider a random edge,
and one of the two vertices joined by this edge. This vertice has a number of
neighbors. The generating function of the distribution of the number of neighbors
of this vertice is proportional to the degree of the vertice times the probability of
the vertice to have this precise degree: kpk, . The distribution probability must be
normalized, because the sum of the probabilities must be 1. As a consequence, the
probability to reach a neighbor having exactly k neighbors is:
kpk∑∞
i=1 ipi
=
kpk∑N
i=1 ipi
. (A.6)
We deduce the exact generating function of the distribution of the number of
neighbors of this vertice and the expression in terms of G0:
∑∞
k=1 kpkx
k∑∞
k=1 kpk
=
xG′0(x)
G′0(1)
. (A.7)
The next step is to determine the number of neighbors of one neighbor (who are also
called the second neighbors). However, in this probability, we must not include the
first vertice, because it is also a neighbor of the first neighbor. The probability to
reach k “second neighbors” is proportionnal to kpk. To normalize the distribution,
we get:
qk−1 =
kpk∑
i ipi
. (A.8)
The generating function of the distribution is: G1(x) =
∑∞
k=0 qkx
k.
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
. (A.9)
In this formulation, there is one problem, there is a positive probability that a
neighbor of a vertice A has a neighbor which is also a direct neighbor of A. This
would create a cycle, and this common neighbor would account for two neighbors
instead of one. Fortunately, as proved by Newman (2003), the probability of a
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vertice belonging to a cyclic component tends to 0 when1 N →∞ as N
−1
3 . Thus
we can consider that there are only trees in the graph.
The generating function of the sum of two independant random variables is the
product of the generating functions of the two variables. As a consequence, the
generating function of the sum of the neighbors of k neighbors is G1(x)
k.
Starting from a random edge, we reach one of the two vertices. From this
vertice, we look for all the other vertices that are connected. This set (or cluster)
has a number of vertices. Let H1(x) be the generating function of the number
of vertices of the clusters. The number of neighbors of the initial vertice has the
distribution function G1(x). If the initial vertice reaches m neighbors, we can also
consider the distribution of the m clusters generated by these m neighbors. The
distribution of the size of the m clusters reached by the initial vertice is H1(x)
m.
The total number of vertices that the initial vertice can generate is therefore:
H1(x) = x
∞∑
k=0
qk(H1(x))
k = xG1(H1(x)). (A.10)
The multiplier term x comes from the fact that our initial vertice at the end of the
random edge is connected to another vertice, which makes a change in the index,
xk+1 instead of xk. A similar way, we could also calculate the second neighbors of
an agent: G0(G1(x)), and so on. To get the distribution size of a whole cluster to
which a random vertice belongs, we introduce the distribution G0:
H0(x) = x
∞∑
k=0
pkH1(x)
k = xG0(H1(x)). (A.11)
Solving the equation (A.10) leads to the solution of (A.11). Then we can deduce
the average size of the clusters: H ′0(1):
H ′0(1) = 1 +G
′
0(1)H
′
1(1). (A.12)
1This is true as z < 1.
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Because (by definition of generating function) G0(1) = H1(1) = 1, and using
equation (A.10) applied at x = 1, we get:
H ′1(1) =
1
1−G′1(x)
; (A.13)
which is used in equation (A.12) to get:
H ′0(1) = 1 +
G′0(1)
1−G′1(1)
. (A.14)
G′0(1) represents the average degree z (or number of neighbors) of any vertice. G
′
1(1)
is the average number of neighbors of one neighbor. G′0(1)G
′
1(1) is the average total
number of second neighbors of one agent z2. The average cluster size is 1 +
z2
z−z2
.
The size diverges when the average number of second neighbors is the same as the
average number of neighbors, or G′1(1) = 1. This is called the phase transition.
For the standard Erdo¨s Re´nyi model, G0(x) = exp z(x− 1), where z = pN .
G1(x) = G0(x).
Percolation in Erdo¨s Re´nyi model
Authors are interested by properties of random graphs when p the probability to
put an edge is close to z
N
, where z is a constant. Indeed, the main results come from
the behavior of the limit of G(N, z
N
) when N →∞. The distribution of cluster size
can be well approximated using the moment generating function. As previously
done, we neglect the possibility of cycles in the components. C(k) represent the
probability of a vertice to belong to a cluster of size k when n→∞. (CN (k) is the
probability of a vertice to belong to a cluster of size k in a graph of N vertices.)
The moment generating function is:
φ(x) =
∞∑
k=1
exp (kx)C(k) (A.15)
φN(x) is the moment generating function in a graph of size N . As Amini et al.
(2010), we start from a graph of size N and we add one vertice. The probability
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to create m new edges is
(
N
m
) (
z
N
)m (
1− z
N
)N−m
. Because we suppose that there
are only trees and no cycles, the m new edges all reach different clusters, to avoid
creating a cycle. Let be c1, c2, ..., cm the size of these different clusters. The new
created cluster is of size 1 +
∑m
i=1 Ci. This process is described on Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Construction of a cluster of size N + 1a.
aSource: http://www.phys.ens.fr/ monasson/
CN+1(k) =
N∑
m=1
∑
c1,c2,...,cm
(
N
m
)(
z
N
)m (
1− z
N
)N−m
δ(c1 + c2 + ...+ cm + 1− k)
CN(c1)CN(c2)...CN(cm). (A.16)
We deduce the relation between the generating functions:
φN+1(x) = expx
(
1 +
z
N
+ φN(x)
z
N
)N
. (A.17)
When N →∞ the limit is:
φ(x) = expx+ z(φ(x)− 1). (A.18)
Differenciating this equation n times and applied in x = 0 yields the n-th cumulant.
Using the recursive relation between cumulants and moments, the authors deduce
that the distribution of clusters sizes H(k) is:
H(k) = f(z)
C(k)
k
; (A.19)
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where f(z) is a normalization constant.
Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960) proved that sizes of largest components change according
to the parameter z:
• when z < 1 the largest clusters have a number of vertices which is of
magnitude:
ln(N)− 5
2
ln(ln(N))
z − 1− ln(z)
.
The number of such components is finite when N →∞. When z →< 1 the
probability density for the cluster size distribution decreases as a power law
modulated by an exponential tail. ∃a, k0 such that
P (k) ∼k→∞
a
k
5
2
exp
(1− z)k
k0
.
The avergae cluster size is 1
1−z
.
• when z = 1 there exist two positive constraints b1 and b2 such that the size
Hi of the i largest clusters satisfies:
b1N
2
3 < Hi < b2N
2
3 .
The number of these clusters is finite when N →∞. The probability density
for the cluster size distribution decreases as a power law:
P (k) =∼k→∞
a
k
5
2
.
• when z > 1, there is one largest cluster, and its size is a lot larger than the
others. The size H of the largest cluster is:
H = Ng(z),
where g(z) is the unique solution to the equation 1− g = exp (−zg).
The particular phenomenon happening for z = 1 is the percolation, and it
corresponds to the union of all largest clusters to create a giant component. To
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Figure A.2: Size of the largest cluster and fraction of cluster by vertice as a function of
the parameter z.a
aSource: http://www.phys.ens.fr/ monasson/
illustrate these results, Figure A.2 shows the size of the largest cluster and the
fraction of the number of clusters on the number of dots in the graph.
Directed graphs
In directed graphs, edges have a direction, from one vertice to the other. Each
vertice of the graph has therefore two degrees, an “in-degree” and an “out-degree”,
which respectively are the number of edges pointing into the vertice, and out of
the vertice. There are two degree distributions, or a joint degree distribution: pij
represents the the probability that a vertice has in-degree i and out-degree j. This
method is developed by Newman (2003). The same way, the “in-component” is the
set of vertices that can reach a given vertice, and the “out-component” is the set of
vertices that can be reached from a given vertice. The generating function of the
degree of a vertice in the directed graph is:
G(x, y) =
∞∑
i,j=0
pijx
iyj. (A.20)
52
Appendix A. Sandard results of graph theory
The means of the in-degree and the out-degree are given by the first partial
derivatives of G w.r.t. x and y. Because every edge pointing into a vertice is also
starting from another vertice, these two means are equal. This value is called the
mean degree z. The generating function must therefore satisfy:
z =
∂G
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
(x,y)=1
=
∂G
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣
(x,y)=1
. (A.21)
This relation also imposes a constraint on the probability distribution:
∑
ij
(i− j)pij = 0. (A.22)
As in undirected graphs, it is possible to define generating functions of the number
of neighbors reached by a random vertice L0(x), and of the number of vertices
leaving a neighbor reached by a random edge L1(x), and their corresponding
equivalent generating functions for incoming edges. M0(x) and M1(x). We can
write the following relations between all generating functions:
L0(x) = G(x, 1);
L1(x) =
1
z
∂G
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣ y = 1;
M0(x) = G(1, y);
M1(x) =
1
z
∂G
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣ x = 1.
As made for undirected graphs, it is also possible to determine the size of the
clusters. The equivalent equation of (A.14) is M ′1(1) = 1. This gives the relation:
∞∑
i,j=1
(2ij − i− j)pij = 0. (A.23)
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2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivations
At the root of this piece of research, like many authors, we had the idea to see how
financial distress precolates through a financial network. The idea of percolation
is associated with two phases of the network: one is such that agents are not
connected enough, and defaults remain locals. The other one is such that financial
links allow defaults to propagate all over the network. The first phase appears at
the left of some critical number of links, while the second one appears at the right
of it.
For the transmission of defaults, authors have been adding various resistance
mechanisms of the agents, as we saw in the last chapter. However, this percolation
phenomenon takes place when the probability to put an edge between any two
agents is of type z
n
with z ≈ 1. One contribution of this work is to relax this
restrictive assumption and uncover an interesting second regime. In addition,
adding random links in a network is also a very specific assumption. But still we
believe that the network representation of the financial system is relevant.
In our model, we do not consider purely random networks. We suppose that
financial links are built to satisfy conditions on the balance sheets of the agents. We
mainly focus on financial intermerdiaries such as banks, funds, insurance companies.
For example, if an agent has a large amount of assets, we suppose that he must also
have a large amount of liabilities. We allow the number of financial connections
to widely exceed the percolation threshold of the network. Moreover, we consider
a large but finite number of agents. We do not investigate into the asymptotic
properties of the network. We want to reproduce two distinguishing features of
recent financial systems:
• the network has an influence on the financial entities. For example, what is the
effect of the defaulting bank on its counterparties, and on the counterparties
of the counterparties?
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• The financial entities build and shape the financial network, for example, by
choosing their counterparties.
Using such a network, we want to capture the high level of financial connections,
the possibility of systemic risk and determine the role of the regulator: increasing
the capitalization ratio forces the agents to increase the capital, which makes them
more resilient to the transmission of financial distresses, but it also reduces the
number of financial links in the economy, which may decrease the risk sharing.
2.1.2 Overview of the model
We consider a network populated by a large (but finite) number n of agents
owning the same amount2 of capital C. We limit the amounts of their assets by a
capitalization ratio φ.
We suppose that agents make investments towards other agents. All investments
have the same financial size, that we normalize to 1. An investment lasts one
period. When it matures, the investment is supposed to be repaid to the issuer. In
this case, the issuer has a net positive payoff e. Alternatively, if the investment is
not repaid, the issuer of the investment loses the value of his investment.
Financial agents are infinitely lived and optimize the discounted sum of their
expected payoffs. At each period, they choose the number of investments they
issue, and the destinators of their investments. This determines the structure of
the financial network.
Shocks on the network are endogenous, because they correspond to strategically
defaulting agents: when some agents are destinators of a large number of invest-
ments, and issue less investments, they can choose to default. In this case, they
keep the received investment (or liabilities) and they give up their own investments
(or assets). Giving up one’s investments somehow corresponds to a fine.
Because of these stragically defaulting agents, some issuers lose their invest-
ments, and so might also default, because their liabilities exceed their remaining
2The model does not focus on concentration phenomenons, like TBTF, which would require a
small number of bigger agents.
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assets added to their capitalizations. In this case we assume that these agents are
liquidated and their assets lose their entire value. Depending on the maximization
horizon of agents, short (one period), long (infinite periods) or myopic3 (intermer-
diary cases), we derive the number of financial links of the network, the number
of strategically defaulting and contaminated defaulting agents, and the payoffs of
each type of agent. We analyze the role of the regulation on the limitations of
the number of investments. We prove theoretically that well-defined solutions to
the problem exist. Then we simulate the solution using matlab, and we state our
results.
2.1.3 Implications and results
Short-horizon maximizations lead to less strategically defaulting agents than long-
horizon maximizations. This result corroborates the intuition. The network
converges to a dense state when agents optimize in the long-run and sparse state
when agents optimize over one period. However, for myopic behaviors, the state of
the network of agents depends on their capitalization: for highly capitalized agents,
the optimal choice is to create a dense network, which includes a non-negligible
systemic risk: all agents are defaulting. Limiting the assets of agents by a prudential
ratio decreases the systemic risk but does not completely eliminate it. For low
capitalized agents, such a prudential ratio may have counterproductive effects,
because it may create a sparse network, and dry up the liquidity.
Section 2 lays the model of the network as a matrix and details how some agents
enter strategic default while others do not. In Section 3 we analyze the investment
decisions of financial agents as functions of their expected payoffs. Section 4 presents
the results of the simulation of the network in short-term optimisation. Section
5 extends the results to all time-horizons, and delivers the policy implications.
Appendix B describes the heuristic way of computing simulations of the model.
3loosely speaking: a finite number of periods.
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2.2 Modelling the network
2.2.1 Investments, financial connections
The financial system is a network populated by a large number n of agents or
financial intermediaries (traders, investments banks, insurance companies...). To
simplify, all agents are supposed to be rational and risk neutral4. We assume
that agents are homogenous: they all have the same endowment, also called
capitalization. Agents are infinitely lived and time is discrete. In the model, an
“investment” is a financial contract.
Financial intermediaries make investments of the same financial size towards
other financial intermediaries, at each period, expecting some positive payoffs. This
constitutes the financial network. Investments last one period. At the beginning of
each period, agents simultaneously choose their targets for investments and the
number of their investments. These investments are supposed to be paid back at
the end of the period: this is the clearing process. Because investments change at
each period, there is a new realization of the financial network at each period. As
in Anand et al. (2012), the agents’ investment choices are not purely random. We
assume that agents know the number of investments planned by the other agents.
This means that agents have an accurate estimation of the number of assets of other
agents, while they ignore their number of liabilities. This catches the difficulty to
evaluate the assets-liabilities ratio of the agents and models counterparties risks.
In other words, agents do not know the exact structure of the network. They
choose the number and the destinators of their own investments to maximize their
expected payoffs. When an agent makes an investment towards any other agent,
he expects to get back his investment at the end of the period, with a net positive
yield.
A graph representation of the financial network is possible, as in Allen and Gale
(2000) or Gai and Kapadia (2010). Each agent is represented by a dot. Financial
flows between agents are represented by oriented edges between the different dots.
4The results still hold for risk-averse agents, as the concavity of the utility function would not
impact results to a large extent.
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Figure 2.1: Example of financial network with 5 agents
The directions of the arrows represent the claims on investments, i.e. the directions
of the financial flows at the end of each period. An example of financial network is
provided on Figure 2.1.
As all the outgoing financial flows and incoming financial flows of any dot have
the same standard financial size5, all financial flows can be represented by a (n×n)
matrix M between agents. For example, to model an investment from agent i to
agent j, we add an oriented edge on the graph from agent j to agent i, and we add
in the matrix the number 1 on line i and column j: Mij = 1. Any investment from
j to i is a debt from i to j, so the matrix representing the links between agents
is anti-symmetric Mji = −1. We suppose that only one investment is possible
between any two agents, so that multiple and reciprocal investment do not exist.
Because investments are reallocated at each period, the matrix also changes. At
time t, the matrix is denoted by M t. For example, the matrix corresponding to
the previous graph on Figure 2.1 is:
5We normalize the values of all financial flows to 1.
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M =


0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0
1 1 0 1 −1
0 −1 −1 0 1
0 0 1 −1 0


. (2.1)
2.2.2 Structure and allocation of investments
Agents expect to make profitable investments: there is an arbitrary payoff e such
that any refunded investment is supposed to return some gain. By contrast, an
investment that is not paid back is definitively lost, and costs one unit (the amount
of the investment). From a financial point of view, the parameter e may represent
the real interest rate on a financial contract on the interbank market, for example.
At each period t, each financial agent i receives some number of investments
also called liabilities6, Lti and makes a certain number of investments (also called
assets), noted Ati. These two numbers can be expressed using the matrix of the
financial links:
Ati =
∑
j
(M tji)
+, (2.2)
Lti = −
∑
j
(M tij)
−, (2.3)
where .+ = max(0, .) and .− = max(0,−.).
At the end of the period, any agent has to refund the investments he received,
and his investments are also redeemed. We assume that the investments of each
financial agent Ati are limited to a fraction of the capitalization
7 C by a prudential
debt to capital ratio φ fixed by the regulator, such that:
φAti ≤ C. (2.4)
6An agent has no choice but to accept an investment from any other agent.
7Recall that all agents are equally capitalized: ∀(i, j), Ci = Cj = C. In addition, we suppose
that capitalization is constant over time.
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This constraint captures the usual capital requirements. For each agent, the
following relation between his assets Ai and his liabilities Li must be satisfied,
illustrating the balance sheet:
C + Lti ≥ A
t
i. (2.5)
When C + Lti − A
t
i > 0, there is some cash that is not invested by agent i.
To summarize, at each period, financial agents make investments given the
number of investments of other agents. The allocation of investments is restricted
to the networks, such that, for each agent, both conditions (2.4) and (2.5) are
satisfied.
2.2.3 Contagion mechanism
Any agent expects to get back his investments Ati at the end of the period. Some
of them might not be actually paid back as we shall see later. Let ARti be the
investments refunded to agent i. If ARti + C < L
t
i, agent i does not have enough
cash to refund all his liabilities. In this case, the agent is said to be “contaminated
defaulting”. He does not refund any of his creditors, because we assume that the
liquidation value of his assets is zero. Like Allen and Gale (2000) and Anand et al.
(2012), we use a “zero recovery assumption” when there is a default8.
On the opposite, any agent i such that ARti + C > L
t
i refunds all his creditors,
and is said to be “healthy”. To calculate the exact number of defaulting agents, we
study the contamination of the defaults along the paths of investments also called
lines of credit. As explained by Watts (2002), paths may have different forms that
account for their resistance: trees are more vulnerable than cycles.
The higher the capitalization C, the easier it is for an agent to resist default
on an investment. From a macroeconomic point of view, the prudential ratio also
represents the capacity of the network to limit the proliferation of financial distress
along credit chains, as will be proved later on.
8This was a major feature of the recent crisis. Relaxing this assumption, for example, refunding
a random part of the creditors would generate significantly less defaulting agents.
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2.3 Strategic default and agents’ choices
Within the financial network, given agents’ investments, at time t, some agents
are net creditors: Ati > L
t
i (they make more investments than they receive) and
some other agents are net debtors Lti > A
t
i. The net debtors might be interested
in strategically defaulting and quiting the network during the period: they will
not pay back the investments they received at the beginning of the period. They
strategically default if the gain of this action exceeds the discounted sum of their
expected payoffs from investments. In this case, they definitively leave the financial
network9. A strategically defaulting agent leaves the network before the end of the
period and therefore also gives up his own investments. The corresponding fine
associated to this behavior is a foreclosure of assets. This form of default allows to
endogenize the formation of defaults, while most of the literature concentrates on
the effect of an exogenous shock10 on the financial network. Making a strategic
default, because the gain of default exceeds the fine, consisting in giving up one’s
investments was introduced in general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets
by Dubet, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1989).
Actually, this type of default does not guarantee a particularly high payoff to
the strategic defaulting agent, because he gives up his investments. The choice of
the settlement mechanism when an agent defaults (keep a fraction of the assets,
give up the assets, loose a part of the pledged capitalization) usually relies on the
legal context. In our model, we decide that a strategic defaulting agent is giving
up his investments, because it is an intermediate way to penalize the default, it
does not protect especially the defaulting agents or their victims (the investors). In
the introduction, we explained that subprime borrowers were also making strategic
defaults because prices of their houses were lower than the amounts of their loans.
Long before this crisis, it was known that households could make strategic defaults
by filing bankruptcy, as explained by White (1998). The protection of investors and
the enforcement law processes influence the choices of the investors and determine
9These strategically defaulting agents can be compared to the “black holes” of other models
in the network literature, for example Rotemberg (2009).
10such as liquidity excess demand or decrease of the value of the assets.
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the size of capital markets, as proved by Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997). As a consequence, the choices of the investors (number of investments) are
partially depending on this particular mechanism.
As strategically defaulting agents leave the network without reimbursing their
creditors, this impacts the solvency of other creditors who may not be able to
honor their obligations and may thus become defaulting by contamination. This
also reduces the expected payoff of other agents who still remain solvent. Using the
contagion mechanism and the structure of the network, we determine the number
of defaulting agents D, depending on the number of strategically defaulting agents
S.
Strategically defaulting agents are leaving the network, and contaminated
defaulting agents collapse, we assume that these two categories of agents are
replaced by new agents with the same capitalization C at the beginning of the
following period. This allows to keep a constant number of agents over time in the
network. This assumption is standard in network models with defaulting agents in
a dynamic set-up, see for example in Anand et al. (2012).
Let Gti(A
t
i) be the expected gain of agent i from his investments A
t
i at time t,
and β the discount factor. The maximization process of each agent can naturally
be represented by a Bellman equation. Let V (Ati, L
t
i) be the value function of agent
i, depending on the number of his assets Ati and his number of liabilities L
t
i. At
each period, each agent makes a choice, either he stays in the network until next
period, or he defaults:
V (Ati, L
t
i) = max(strategically default, stay at least one more period)
11, (2.6)
V (Ati, L
t
i) = max
(
Lti − A
t
i,Et
[
Gti(A
t
i) + βV (A
t+1
i , L
t+1
i )
])
. (2.7)
Proposition 2.3.1. The value function V is well defined and unique.
Proof. For simplicity, we suppose that we already know the common number – see
Proposition 2.3.2 – m of investments made by agents at each period. We follow
11This Bellman equation can be interpreted as that of the McCall (1970) employment search
model.
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Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) to solve for the Bellman equation of a McCall type
of problem. Let Lt be the set of incoming links at time t. Lt = L is independant of
time as soon as the number of investments At = m is constant over time. Equation
(2.7) can be written as:
V (m,Lti) = max
(
Lti −m,Et
[
Gt(m) + βV (m,L
t+1
i )
])
. (2.8)
The expectation is linear, which gives:
V (m,Lti) = max
(
Lti −m,Et [Gt(m)] + Et
[
βV (m,Lt+1i )
])
. (2.9)
Let T be the operator defined as follows:
V (m,Lti) = max
(
Lti −m,Et [Gt(m)] + Et
[
βV (m,Lt+1i )
])
= T (V (m,Lti)). (2.10)
Let V1 and V2 be two functions, such that for any 0 < L
t
i < N , V1(m,L
t
i) <
V2(m,L
t
i). Then,
T (V1)(m,L
t
i) = max
(
Lti −m,Et [Gt(m)] + Et
[
βV1(m,L
t+1
i )
])
,
≤ max
(
Lti −m,Et [Gt(m)] + Et
[
βV2(m,L
t+1
i )
])
,
≤ T (V2)(m,L
t
i). (2.11)
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This proves that T is monotonic. We check that the operator also satisfies the
discounting property. Let α be a positive constant.
T (V1 + α)(m,L
t
i) = max
(
Lti −m,Et [Gt(m)] + Et
[
β(V1 + α)(m,L
t+1
i )
])
,
= max
(
Lti −m,Et [Gt(m)]
+Et
[
βV1(m,L
t+1
i )
]
+ β
∫
αdLt+1i
)
,
= max
(
Lti −m,Et [Gt(m)] + Et
[
βV1(m,L
t+1
i )
]
+ βα
)
,
≤ max
(
Lti −m+ βα,Et [Gt(m)] + Et
[
βV1(m,L
t+1
i )
]
+ βα
)
,
≤ T (V1 + α)(m,L
t
i) + βα. (2.12)
By Blackwell’s theorem, we know that T is a contraction with modulus β on
the complete set of functions on L with the sup norm. As a consequence, there
is a unique fixed point of T . This is the unique value function to the Bellman
equation.
At the end of the period, we distinguish:
• S strategically defaulting agents: Lti − A
t
i > G
t
i + βEt
[
V (At+1i , L
t+1
i )
]
;
• (n−S) remaining agents in the network: Lti−A
t
i < G
t
i+βEt
[
V (At+1i , L
t+1
i )
]
,
among which:
– H healthy agents, whose situation is such that Lti ≤ C + AR
t
i: the
liabilities Lti healthy agents pay at the end of the period do not exceed
their own capitalization C added to their refunded investments ARti.
These agents reimburse their creditors and resist the contamination of
the default(s).
– D = (n−H−S) contaminated defaulting agents: the liabilities contami-
nated defaulting agents have to repay at the end of the period exceed the
refunded investments, added to the capitalization. The counterparties
are not paid back.
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The estimated number of healthy agents H is therefore a function of the number
of agents’ investments, the level of capitalization C, the prudential ratio φ and the
number of strategically defaulting agents S. The following step of the reasoning
is to determine the number of investments agents make each period. With these
numbers, we can derive the structure of the network and the number of strategic
defaulting S and defaulting agents D and the expected payoff of all agents.
2.3.1 Number of investments
The higher the number of strategically defaulting agents, the higher the number
of contaminated defaulting agents in the financial network. As a consequence the
more strategically defaulting agents, the lower the expected payoff of agents.
Proposition 2.3.2. There is a unique strategy of investments that minimizes the
number of strategically defaulting agents in the financial network: all agents make
the same number of investments.
Proof. The proof can be understood as the optimal choice of the targets of invest-
ment. For clarity, we remove the t time index. Agents have the same capitalization
C and are limited to Amax =
[
C
φ
]
investments. Each agent therefore makes between
0 and Amax investments. Because no reciprocal investment is possible, this leads to
Amax ≤
n
2
. Let A¯ be the average number of investments made by an agent in the
network. Ai is the number of investments made by agent i. We order the agents
owing to their number of investments. Let agent 0 be the “lowest” investor, i.e.
the one making the lowest number of investments. On the opposite, agent n is the
“largest” investor.
• Suppose that agent 0 is making exactly 0 investment. His expected payoff
from investing is thus 0. If he receives a least one investment, strategically
defaulting guarantees a strictly positive payoff. As a consequence, no creditor
will be paid back at the end of the period. Obviously, no one will make an
investment towards this agent. Agent making 0 investment is not a good
target for investment, the agent is said to be not “attractive”. Similarly,
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if agent 0 were to be a low investor: 0 < A0 << A¯, any other agent of
the network would fear this agent as a potential strategical defaulter. As a
consequence, he will not receive any investment either.
• We can suppose 0 < A¯ ≤ An ≤ Amax. If An = A¯, all agents make the same
number of investments. Any other agent of the network may consider to
invest towards agent n because he expects agent n not to be – a priori – a
strategically defaulting agent. If all agents of the network act this way, agent
n will receive approximately (n− 1) investments, and he is likely to become a
strategically defaulting agent because Amax << n−1. Thus investing towards
this agent is not a good strategy.
Both the lowest and the largest investors are not attractive. Investors restrict their
choices to the (n− 2) remaining agents of the network. We consider the new set of
agents, from agent 1 to agent n− 1, and we apply the same reasoning, until the
remaining agents are making exactly the same number of investments.
To decrease the overall number of strategically defaulting agents, agents are
willing to distribute evenly the investments among themselves. Any agent which
is not receiving investments because he is not attractive (too many or too few
investments) forces the other agents to make their investments towards other more
attractive agents. This situation creates some attractive agents receiving too many
investments: Li >> A¯ and possibly makes them strategically default. To minimize
the number of strategically defaulting agents, the best way is to maximize the
number of attractive agents.
To conclude, all agents have to make the same number of investments. From
there At represents the common number of investments by agents at time t.
2.3.2 Number of strategically defaulting agents
We showed that all agents make the same number of investments. We can determine
precisely the number of strategically defaulting, contaminated defaulting and
healthy agents in the economy as a function of the number of investments by agent.
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Agent i strategically defaults if and only if Lti −A
t
i > G
t
i + βEt
[
V (At+1i , L
t+1
i )
]
.
When at least one agent is strategically defaulting in the economy, there might
exist contaminated defaulting agents because some investments will not be paid
back. Logically, the outcome depends on the level of capitalization of agents.
The expected payoff of an agent depends on his total number of investments,
and on the financial situation of the counterparties of his investments. Let P(H)
be the probability to reach a healthy, P(D) a contaminated defaulting, or P(S)
a strategically defaulting agent with an investment. We consider agent i. The
expected payoff Gi(Ai) from investments of agent i (risk neutral), who does not
strategically default, is derived in the following proposition12:
Proposition 2.3.3. When all agents make each A investments, the expected payoff
of an agent staying in the network is:
G(A) = A ((e+ 1)P(H)− 1 + P(S)) . (2.13)
Proof.
G(Ai) = E

∑
j∈H
e1i→j −
∑
j∈(D∪S)
11i→j +
∑
j∈S
11j→i

 . (2.14)
The last term of the previous equation P ((j → i) ∩ (j ∈ S)) corresponds to the
probability that agent j is a strategically defaulting agent, and is investing towards
agent i. Before the end of the period, he leaves the network and gives up his own
investment to agent i.
G(Ai) = Ai [eP(H)− P(D)− P(S)) +
∑
j 6=i
P ((j → i) ∩ (j ∈ S)] . (2.15)
By definition, P(D) = 1− P(H)− P(S), there are (n− 1) directions for each
investment, this leads to P(j → i) = Aj
n−1
= Ai
n−1
= A
n
, because all agents are making
exactly A investments.
If no agent is strategically defaulting, there is no financial distress, and for
each agent Ai=ARi. In this case, the payoff for all agents is Gmax = Ae. In this
12To simplify notations, we removed the t time index.
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particular context, no agent is strategically defaulting except if at time T :
LTi − A >
∑
t≥T
βt−TGmax =
Ae
1− β
. (2.16)
This condition is equivalent to: LTi > A(1 +
e
1−β
). Using this condition we
determine the number of initially strategically defaulting agents. If some agents
are strategically defaulting because condition (2.16) is fulfilled for some i, we call
them initially strategically defaulting agents, because they will not pay back their
investments, and they will create contaminated defaulting agents. For this reason,
by equation (2.13), we know that G(A) < Gmax. Because G(A) is lower than
Gmax, it might happen that some other agents strategically default. To calculate
the exact number of strategically defaulting agents, we must evaluate the term
V ∗ = Et
[
V (At+1i , L
t+1
i )
]
. By induction, we have:
Et
[
V (A,Lt+1i )
]
= Et
[
max
(
Lt+1i − A,G(A) + βEt+1
[
V (A,Lt+2i )
])]
= E [max (Li − A,G(A) + βV
∗)] . (2.17)
In the previous equation, we remove the t subscripts, because there is no alea.
Proposition 2.3.4. The term V ∗ = E[V (A,Lt+1i )] represents a reservation payoff
of staying in the network, and postponing the decision to default strategically to the
next period. V ∗ is well defined, and only depends on A.
This proposition is crucial. The value of V ∗ influences the number of strategically
defaulting agents, and therefore the number of contaminated defaulting agents, and
the expected payoff of the agents. For this reason V ∗ “influences its own value”.
The following proof shows that V ∗ exists and is unique. Otherwise, we would not
have a solution to the Bellman equation (2.7).
Proof. We know that V ∗ ≥ 0, (0 is the case of no investment or risk loving agents)
and V ∗ ≤ Gmax
∑
t≥0 β
t. Let us write V ∗ = E
[
V (A,Lt+1i )
]
. The previous equation
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(2.17) becomes:
V ∗ = E
[
max
(
Lt+1i − A,G(A) + βV
∗
)]
, (2.18)
= E
[(
Lt+1i − A
)
1Lt+1
i
−A−G(A)≥βV ∗
]
+ E
[
(G(A) + βV ∗)1Lt+1
i
−A−G(A)<βV ∗
]
. =
n−1∑
k=A+G(A)+βV ∗
kP(Lt+1i = k) +
∑
k<A+G(A)+βV ∗
(G(A) + βV ∗)P(Lt+1i = k),
=
n−1∑
k=A+G(A)+βV ∗
kP(Lt+1i = k) + (G(A) + βV
∗)
∑
k<A+G(A)+βV ∗
P(Lt+1i = k).
No agent would invest if the expected payoff was not positive. The value function
is also positive. This explains the second equality.
Agents such that Lt+1i − A > G(A) + βV
∗ are exactly the strategically de-
faulting agents, while others remain in the economy. There are exactly n − S∗
remaining agents in the network, where S∗ is the equilibrium value of the number
of strategically defaulting agents. We can deduce that
∑
k<p+G(p)+βV ∗
P(Lt+1i = k) =
n− S∗
n
, (2.19)
and ∑
k≥p+G(p)+βV ∗
P(Lt+1i = k) =
S∗
n
. (2.20)
Since all the terms P(Lt+1i = k) can be calculated, at least numerically, we can
also calculate the values of the following function, which represents the cumulative
distribution function of the liabilities:
L(x) =
n−1∑
k=x
P(Lt+1i = k). (2.21)
From the last function, we deduce x∗ such that L(x∗) = S
∗
n
. This gives the
value of x∗ = A+G(A) + βV ∗. We can determine G∗(A) = G(A) as a function of
S∗, because using S∗, we can calculate D∗ and deduce G∗. The global equation
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(2.18) on V ∗ gives us the theoretical relation between S∗ and V ∗:
V ∗ =

 n−1∑
k=L−1(S
∗
n
)
kP(Lt+1i = k)

+ n− S∗
n
(G∗(A) + βV ∗) . (2.22)
For each value of S∗, we can calculate a corresponding value of V ∗ = V ∗(S∗). We
derive the term G∗(A) + βV ∗. Given the distribution of Lti, we can determine the
expectation S of the number of agents such that Lti − A > G
∗(A) + βV ∗. When
S∗ = S the solution is obtained. This proves that there exists a well-defined
solution. Given A, there is a unique (S∗, D∗, H∗, G∗(A)).
In practise, we construct a sequence, converging to the values of S∗, G(S∗) and
V ∗: we start from S1 the initially strategically defaulting agents of the network,
those such that relation (2.16) is verified. Then we calculate over the network the
spread of financial distress, i.e. the number of contaminated defaulting D1 and
healthy H1 agents. This gives G1 by equation (2.13). Using (2.22), we calculate
V1. Using V1 and the Bellman equation (2.7), we determine the new number S2.
Then we calculate, D2 and H2, and G2. Using (2.22) we calculate S3, and so on.
This sequence of (S,D,H,G) converges to the solution.
We proved that agents make the same number of investments at each period.
We know how to calculate the number of strategically defaulting, contaminated
defaulting and healthy agents, as well as the expected payoff function of the agents,
depending on the number of investments by agent. Agents optimize their expected
payoff by choosing the number of investments they make. The regulator limits the
number of investments by the prudential ratio to maximize the number of healthy
agents. In the model, because investments’ amounts are normalized to 1, the
number of investments determines the connectivity of the network. Increasing the
capitalization ratio decreases the connectivity of the network. φ does not a priori
limit the amount of investments, however, there exists an internal threshold within
any financial intermediary, which limits the financial position of the intermediary
73
Chapter 2. Systemic risk and capitalization ratio in an homogenous financial network
on any financial contract with one counterparty. As a consequence, φ does not only
limit the number but also the volume of the transactions of agents in the network.
In the sequel, we study how the agents’ problem (optimize the discouted sum
of profits), and the regulator’s problem (maximization of the number of healthy
agents) are compatible. To simplify the problem, we analyze first the short term
case, where agents play only one period. Then we see how the infinite periods game
changes the results. Intermediary cases, when agents are myopic and base their
expectations on a limited number of periods, will be presented briefly in the last
section.
2.4 Simulation of the one-period network: short-
term gains
A description of the method used to produce simulations is provided in Appendix
B of the chapter.
2.4.1 Initially strategically defaulting agents
Technically, the one-period network is equivalent to consider V ∗ = 0 in the Bellman
equation (2.7). We remove the t subscripts and the recursive equation becomes:
V (A,Li) = max(Li − A,G(A)). (2.23)
The payoff equation remains the same:
G(A) = A ((e+ 1)P(H)− 1 + P(S)) . (2.24)
The equation determining the number of initially strategically defaulting agents
slightly changes and becomes:
Li − A > Gmax = Ae. (2.25)
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Figure 2.2: Number of initially strategically defaulting agents w.r.t. the number of
investments by agent.
Figure 2.2 is plotted using the following parameter values: n = 400, φ = 7%,
and C = 10 (arbitrary units). The maximal number of investments by agent is
determined by the value of the prudential ratio: Amax =
C
φ
= 142. We simulate over
a large number of networks (≈ 2000) the average number of initially strategically
defaulting agents of the network depending on the payoff by investment from
e = 2.5% to e = 10% on Figure 2.2.
All the curves representing the number of initially strategically defaulting agents
have the same shape:
• After an initial increase, each curve is decreasing with respect to the number
of investments by agents,
• the curves are not smooth: there are regular thresholds of decreases.
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These observations can be easily explained. For each value of e, the regularity of
the “sudden decreases” of the curve corresponds to values of A such that Ae is an
integer. Indeed, the number of liabilities minus the number of assets is obviously an
integer, therefore the comparison threshold between the net gain from strategically
defaulting and the gain from investments does not change when Ae keeps the same
integer part. The periodicity in terms of investments is calculated the following
way: πe =
1
e
. For the first C investments, there is no constraint about the allocation
of investments because each agent satisfies Ai ≤ C: the allocation is purely random.
When the number of investments by agent increases and remains smaller than C,
the probability to get more investments than the average increases: the number
of strategically defaulting agents increases – as long as Ae keeps the same integer
part. Once the average number of investments by agent is larger than C, each
agent making A investments must receive at least (A− C) investments in order
to have the balance sheet condition (2.5) satisfied. This situation is equivalent to
distribute randomly C investments made by agent over the whole network and
(A− C) investments exactly received and made by each agent13. The probability
to get x more investments than A is therefore constant with respect to A, whatever
the value of A > C. The global decrease of the curve is due to the increasing gains
due to investments: Ae.
2.4.2 Viability of the short term network
Using the number of initially strategically defaulting agents, we calculate the
number of defaults in the network. These defaults reduce the expected gains of the
other agents, who therefore have an incentive to strategically default as well. We
determine the stationary equilibrium number of all strategically defaulting agents
in the network. For Figure 2.3, we adopt e = 5%. With the exact number of
strategically defaulting agents, we also know the number of contaminated defaulting
agents and the number of healthy agents in the network.
13In terms of graph theory, we can say that the in-degree of each node is larger than (A− C)
and the out degree is exactly A.
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Figure 2.3: Number of healthy and defaulting agents w.r.t. the number of investments
by agent
To determine the exact number of investments agents make, we plot the expected
payoff by agent depending on the number of investments on Figure 2.4, for different
values of the prameter e.
On Figure 2.4, we observe the expected payoff of agents as a function of the
number of investments by agent. For e = 10%, the expected payoff is strictly
increasing with respect to the number of investments by agents. As a consequence,
the unique equilibrium choice of agents is to make exactly Amax =
C
φ
investments.
If we consider the curves for which e = 2.5% or e = 5%, there exists a zone
such that the expected payoff is lower than or equal to zero. Agents do not enter
the network if the expected payoff is negative. For 40 investments by agents,
the expected payoff is strictly positive and reaches its maximal value. Agents
will therefore coordinate and make exactly 40 investments each. This situation
illustrates some features of the recent crisis. Agents make investments, but it is
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Figure 2.4: Expected payoffs w.r.t. the number of investments by agent
optimal not to invest as much as possible, because it generates too big distresses,
and negative payoffs. During the interbank crisis in 2008, banks refused to lend
(invest in the model), fearing that their counterparties may be in financial distress,
which generated a liquidity squeeze.
For the intermediary value e = 7.5% there is a “tricky” situation, the expected
payoff is positive for A ≤ 55 to A ≥ 75 investments by agents. The choice of
the agents in terms of expected payoff depends on the value of the prudential
ratio. If Amax ≤ 85 which is equivalent to φ ≤ 12%, the agents choose to make
Amax investments. On the contrary if φ > 12% agents choose to make A = 55
investments.
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We state the conclusions of the one-period networks:
• for high values of the return on investments (e > 8%), agents make the
highest number of investments, limited by the prudential ratio φ;
• for low values of the return on investments, agents choose to make a lower
number of investments than the theoretical limit fixed by the regulator. This
may represent liquidity problems;
• for very low values of the return on investment, risk-neutral agents do not play
in the network. Risk-seeking agents may invest even if the expected payoff
is negative because there is still a positive probability to be one strategic
defaulting agent, whose net gain is strictly positive;
• agents enter the network and make investments even if there is a net positive
number of strategically defaulting or contaminated defaulting agents.
From a social welfare perspective, the regulator seeks to minimize the number
of strategically defaulting and contaminated defaulting agents, and maximize the
number of healthy agents. On the previous example, using Figure 2.3, we remark
that this objective may correspond to the maximization of the expected payoff of
agents. However, these two objectives may be incompatible.
• For some parameter values, the maximization of the expected payoff and
the maximization of the number of healthy agents are conflicting, see for
example on Figure 2.5, φ = 10% and e = 8%: The expected payoff is on
average increasing with the number of investments by agent while the number
of contaminated defaulting agents reaches its maximum for some bounded
value. Agents want to make Amax =
C
φ
investments while the regulator would
prefer the agents to make either more than 80 or less than 50 investments.
The only solution for the regulator is to choose either φ < 12.5% or φ > 20%.
• To achieve his goals, the regulator is interested in increasing the value of the
prudential ratio φ to limit the number of investments by agent, but this is
likely to reduce the expected gains of agents.
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Figure 2.5: Optimization of the expected payoff vs. minimization of the number of
defaulting agents
• What is worse between strategically defaulting and contaminated defaulting
agents? The strategically defaulting agents make the choice to default, initiate
the defaults, and are responsible for the problems, and the contaminated
defaulting agents are consequences of the strategically defaulting agents. On
the one hand the regulator tries to banish strategically defaulting agents
even if there are few contaminated defaulting agents, on the other hand
the regulator tries to limit the proliferation of financial distresses coming
from a few number of strategically defaulting agents: the regulator arbitrates
(trade-off). Contaminated defaulting agents are more costly than strategically
defaulting agents, because they do not refund any of their creditors, while
strategically defaulting agents give up their own investments.
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2.5 Infinite time model
The one-period network yields a very large number of defaulting agents, which is
quite unrealistic. We therefore concentrate on the more realistic case of an infinite
time network. To determine the number of strategically defaulting agents, we
introduce the V ∗ 6= 0 parameter in the Bellman equation (2.7). Even if there is a
well-defined expression for V ∗, all the probabilities and also the contamination are
difficult to evaluate. V ∗ is estimated by a recursive method.
2.5.1 Determination of the postponing threshold V ∗
As we already know, from time T , V ∗ >
∑
t>T β
t−1Gti(A
t). Starting from V ∗ = 0 we
deduce A∗ such that Gt(A∗) is maximal. Then we replace V ∗ by 1
1−β
Gt(A∗) and we
compute again the new expected numbers of strategically defaulting, contaminated
defaulting and healthy agents, and we also deduce the expected gain function
Gt(At). Then we determine the new A∗ which maximizes Gt. We replace V ∗ by
1
1−β
Gt(A∗), until there is convergence. We assume that this lower bound estimation
of V ∗ is close to its real value as long as the probability P(S) to reach a strategically
defaulting agent with an investment remains very low.
To get the best accurate value of V ∗, there is an important discussion about
parameters e and β. The discount factor β is not supposed to change over the
period and is common to all financial entities. It is related to the long-term risk
free rate r∞. On the opposite, e is the return on a one-period repaid investment.
It is related to the short-term interest rate.
Suppose we know Gmax. Then
∑
t>0 β
tGmax =
β
1−β
Gmax. If the rate of return of
the capital is constant, then β = 1
1+e
. If also Gmax is proportional to e: Gmax = Ae,
the network is indifferent to the value of e. For high values of e, when almost
no one is strategically defaulting, this is true. On the opposite case, for low
values of the return on investment, Gmax 6= Ae, because there are strategically
defaulting and contaminated defaulting agents. Introducing a net shift V ∗ in
the maximization equation will modify the behavior of agents: there will be less
strategically defaulting agents.
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We assume that the long term interest rate is r∞ = 2.5%
14. In this case
β
1−β
= 49. To evaluate V ∗, we shall consider the corresponding gain. For e = 2.5%
the maximal expected payoff of the short-term network is G ≈ 0.38. A lower bound
for V ∗ is V ∗ = 18. As shown on Figure 2.7, taking V ∗ ≥ 10 is large enough to
completely eliminate strategically defaulting agents. As a consequence, there are
no contaminated defaulting agents, all financial agents are healthy.
We show the results of simulations, obtained for different values of V ∗, from
the one period model V ∗ = 0 to V ∗ = 10. This represents the state of the network
depending on the weight financial agents put on the future payoffs.
As we observe on Figure 2.6, as soon as V ∗ > 5, the number of initially
strategically defaulting agents is highly reduced compared to the one-period case.
When V ∗ > 10, there are no initially strategically defaulting agents anymore.
On Figure 2.7, we present the total number of strategically defaulting agents; S
remains very close to the number of initially strategically defaulting agents. This
is easy to understand: since V ∗ >> Gmax, the effect of the initially strategically
defaulting agents on Gmax is negligible compared to the value of V
∗. Then we
derive the number of healthy agents.
14We choose to adopt realistic parameters values like Nier et al. (2007), even if some other
range of parameters may lead to more impressive results. For the number of banks, we can take
into account the work of Bech and Atalay (2010). The same remark –adopting realistic values–
comes at the end of the fourth chapter, and has been a motivation for the last chapter. As a
matter of fact, this remark will never percolate further than the current dissertation, because
concerned articles are currently published. For example, in the model of Anand et al. (2012),
there could be a debate on the payoff of the global game in the case where an agent rollovers
a contract. If the bank remains solvent, the creditor earns (1− a) and if the bank defaults the
creditor earns a. We could expect that what a creditor earns (1− a) is related to the interest
rate (+/− risk premium) when the counterparty is solvent, while in case of default, a creditor
would loose a large proportion of his investment > 1
2
. This would give the range of a, from 0.5 to
1 but rather close to 1. Unfortunately, for a > 0.7 the network does not exist, agents choose to
foreclose, and there are almost no connections at the stationary state. In the following of the
dissertation, we keep realistic parameters’ values, sometimes to the detriment of more impressive
performances.
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Figure 2.6: Number of initially strategically defaulting agents w.r.t. the number of
investments
2.5.2 Global results
In this section, all the simulations correspond to e = 2.5%. On Figure 2.8, the
number of healthy agents is quite high, as soon as V ∗ > 2.5. To find the number of
investments by agents, we show the estimated expected payoff by agent on Figure
2.9.
Given the simulations on the expected payoffs depending on the value of V ∗,
we remark that the payoff is strictly increasing if V ∗ > 5. This proves that when
n = 400 and C = 10 in the infinite time horizon, the financial network reaches by
itself a stable and healthy situation. For V ∗ = 5 the expected payoff is on averge
increasing, but decreases when the number of investments by agents exceed 120.
This curious behavior is the representation of the systemic risk. To understand
this key issue, we zoom in Figure 2.10 on the number of healthy agents for V ∗ = 5.
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Figure 2.7: Number of strategically defaulting agents w.r.t. the number of investments
by agent
The curve of healthy agents is obtained by taking the average number of
healthy agents over a large number of simulations. The curve is quite smooth for
A < 100. Indeed, the difference between the total number of agents n = 400 and
the number of healthy agents corresponds to the number of strategically defaulting
agents, as drawn on Figure 2.7. However for A > 100 there are a few strategic
defaulting agents: S < 4. As a consequence, there is a net positive number of
contaminated defaulting agents. Precisely, among the different simulations, a large
number of them have a high number of healthy agents: H > 390 and some others
have 0 healthy agents, and D > 390 contaminated defaulting agents. Taking
the average over these simulations makes the average curve very noisy, even with
≈ 1500 simulations. This proves that systemic risk exists, because a few number of
simulations lead to the whole default of the economy. Using the simulations, we
can deduce the frequency of systemic defaults: in the range 100 to 115 investments
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Figure 2.8: Number of healthy agents w.r.t. the number of investments by agent
by agent, there is on average 1 situation of systemic default on 1000 simulations,
which represents a risk of 0.1%. From 115 to 130 investments by agent, there is a
systemic risk of 0.2%. Above 130 investments by agent, there is a systemic risk
of 0.5%. In this case, fixing the prudential ratio to φ = 10% avoids to exceed
A = 100 investments by agents, and prevents sytemic risk, without reducing by a
large amount the expected payoff of agents. The prudential ratio eliminates the
systemic risk.
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Figure 2.9: Expected payoff (estimated) w.r.t. the number of investments by agent
• Long-run networks have a lot less strategically defaulting agents than short-
term networks.
• When agents are risk neutral and optimize over their infinite lifetime, when
the discount factor and the return on investment can be linked: β = 1
1+e
, the
network reaches a state containing only healthy agents.
• The prudential ratio φ limits the number of investments by agents. If agents
adopt a myopic behavior, some cases of default appear for a high level of
investments by agent, this represent the systemic risk. Unlike conclusion of
most other networks models, more complete networks have a higher systemic
risk than less dense networks. Setting properly the value of the prudential
ratio φ avoids systemic risk.
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Figure 2.10: Healthy agents for V ∗ = 5
If agents attach less importance to their future payoffs, we say that they adopt
a myopic behavior. This myopic behavior may represent agents who expect to
achieve their payoffs in finite time, or agents who fear the long-term equilibirum of
the network (risk of crisis). This is equivalent to reduce V ∗. Precisely, we define
a myopic agent as an agent who only takes into account the gains of the current
period and the 3 following ones. We determine in the next section the performance
of the prudential ratio on the different situations: short-term, myopic, long-run.
2.5.3 Robustness of the ratio
In the two previous sections, we studied the case of a financial network containing
n = 400 agents, all of them owning a capital of C = 10 units. We raise the
question whether the results and the policy implication change with respect to
these variables. By simulation, we prove that the results hold when n changes, as
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soon as n remains large enough. When the capitalization of agents changes, the
results evolve. When agents have a lower capitalization, the number of assets is
close to the number of liabilities: agents make A investments and must have at least
A− C liabilities. As a consequence we could expect less strategically defaulting
agents. However, with less capital and the same prudential ratio, the maximum
number of investments is lower. Table 2.1 determines which effect dominates. We
fix e = 2.5% and β = 0.98, we let C vary.
On Table 2.1, we compare the results obtained with different values of the
capitalization, for two choices of the prudential ratio 5% and 10%, and for three
types of behaviors of agents: one-period optimization, infinite lifetime and myopic
behavior. In the table, we show the results of simulations for different capitalizations:
from C = 4 to C = 10 (arbitrary units). We determine the maximal number of
assets Amax, which only depends on the capitalization C and the prudential ratio
φ: Amax =
C
φ
. We deduce the theoretical maximal gain Amaxe. Then, by induction,
we determine the three terms V ∗, G∗ and A∗, which represent the optimal choices
of the agents.
To determine whether φ is effective, we distinguish three cases:
• A∗ = Amax, φ is fully effective because agents make the maximum number
of investments. In this case, the prudential ratio prevents to reach a too
connected state, which could present a systemic risk, especially when agents
are myopic.
• A∗ << Amax, φ is useless, agents make a small number of investments. There
are liquidity problems. Agents could make more investments, but they do not
make them, because they are afraid of contamination. The network would be
in bad state (systemic failure) for a high number of investments by agents.
This case would be emphasized by risk-averse agents.
• A∗ ≈< Amax, φ should be a little reduced to avoid risk of defaults.
Let us focus on a particular case: for n = 400, C = 5 and myopic behavior,
corresponding to the two red lines of Table 2.1. When φ = 5%, agents restrict
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C period φ% Amax Amaxe G
∗ V ∗ A∗
10 long 5 200 5 5 200 200
10 myopic 5 200 5 5 15 200
10 short 5 200 5 0.75 00 35
10 long 10 100 2.5 2.5 122.5 100
10 myopic 10 100 2.5 2.33 7 100
10 short 10 100 2.5 0.75 00 35
7 long 5 140 3.5 3.5 171 140
7 myopic 5 140 3.5 3.3 10 130
7 short 5 140 3.5 0.21 0 19
7 long 10 70 1.75 1.75 86 70
7 myopic 10 70 1.75 1.65 5 66
7 short 10 70 1.75 0.21 0 19
5 long 5 100 2.5 3.5 171.5 100
5 myopic 5 100 2.5 2.1 6.3 85
5 short 5 100 2.5 0.12 0 9
5 long 10 50 1.25 1 49 50
5 myopic 10 50 1.25 0.14 0.4 9
5 short 10 50 1.25 0.12 0 9
4 long 5 80 2 2 98 80
4 myopic 5 80 2 0.08 0.25 6
4 short 5 80 2 0.08 0 6
4 long 10 40 1 1 49 40
4 myopic 10 40 1 0.08 0.25 6
4 short 10 40 1 0.08 0 6
Table 2.1: State of the network depending on the capitalization (e = 2.5, β = 0.98)
their investments to 85 < Amax = 100 investments, to reach the optimal payoff.
The equilibrium values of the model are G∗ = 2.1 and V ∗ = 6.3. This value
also minimizes the number of contaminated defaulting and strategically defaulting
agents. For any value of A > 85 there is a net positive probability of systemic risk,
as explained in the previous section. For this reason, the regulator may decide
to reduce the maximal number of investments of the agents. By decreasing the
maximal number of investments: from 100 when φ = 5% to 50 when φ = 10%,
the regulator also decreases the expectations of the maximal gains of agents: from
89
Chapter 2. Systemic risk and capitalization ratio in an homogenous financial network
Gmax = 2.5 to Gmax = 1.25. This also decreases the maximal value of V
∗: V ∗ ≤ 3.75.
This situation creates more strategically defaulting agents. To avoid the risk of
contagion, agents decide to make less investments: A∗ = 9 than the maximal
number allowed: Amax = 50. This situation illustrates that, when the regulator
strenghten the prudential ratio to avoid the systemic risk, and agents are myopic,
liquidity may dry up. Mechanically, if the capitalization of agents is decreasing,
due to an external shock, this could produce the same effects; by reducing the
anticipations of the expected payoffs of the agents.
• When agents optimize over their infinite lifetime, even with low capitalized
agents, the use of a prudential ratio to avoid major defaults is necessary and
successful.
• When agents optimize over the current period only, the use of a prudential
ratio is useless, it cannot reduce the number of strategically defaulting agents.
Agents make less investments than they could. Defaults do not propagate.
• When agents are myopica, the use of a prudential ratio depends on the
capitalization of agents in the network:
– necessary and successful for highly capitalized agents, prevents systemic
risk,
– useless and harmless for weakly capitalized agents, this is the equivalent
of one-period optimization,
– necessary but counterproductive for intermediately capitalized agents:
prevents systemic risk, but generates liquidity problems.
aFor risk-averse agents, depending on the concavity of the utility function, V ∗ would be
reduced, and this would accentuate the myopic behavior of agents
2.5.4 Conclusion
The model of network developed in this piece research has several common im-
plications with the recent literature: the risk of default is less important for very
low and very high connected networks. Nevertheless, we must handle with care
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definitions of low and high connectivity, and incomplete, sparse or dense networks,
because these notions vary a lot depending on the network context: a complete
network in percolation models (Anand et al., 2012) would be an incomplete network
in contagion theory (Allen and Gale, 2000), Figure 1.3. Our range of connectivity
starts with the lowest percolation threshold (1 investment starting from each agent,
corresponding to the lowest bound of Watt’s global cascade window Figure 1.6) and
reaches high connected networks (C
φ
>> 1 investments by agent), which remain
still less connected than the complete network (Figure 1.2) of contagion theory...
Apart from that, our threshold of systemic risk (a large number of investments by
agent) does not correspond to the usual percolation threshold (a few investments by
agents). Indeed, the threshold of systemic risk mainly depends on the capitalization
and the expectations of agents.
Systemic risk exists when agents are myopic, and is increasing with respect to the
connectivity. The model has new features, such the endogenous shocks, represented
by the strategically defaulting agents. The model describes in a simple way the
effect of agents’ choices on the network and the effects of the network structure
on the financial health of agents. The model also takes into account the horizon
perspective to determine the optimal behavior of agents. The model derives policy
implications about the use of a capitalization ratio. To conclude, capitalization
ratios must be wisely employed, especially when confidence on financial markets is
threatened, and when agents tend to adopt myopic behaviors, because prudential
ratio, in these situations, may barely trade liquidity crisis for a systemic risk.
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Appendix B
About the computing
To obtain the simulations of Chapter 2, we have been programing on Matlab.
After choosing an arbitrary number of agents n, we had too fill the M matrix
corresponding to the financial network, such that, for any number of asset by agent,
conditions (2.4) and condition (2.5) are satisfied. For a number A of investment
by agent, we construct recursively the matrix M . We add one investment for each
agent, then 2 investments for each agent... until A investments by agent. But
the investments are not purely random to satisfy (2.5). In the algorythm, when
adding a new investment for all the agents, this requires to create a list of the
empty elements of the M matrix, to look for the agents which need an investment
to satistfy (2.5). This step was not obvious because it also needs to look for the
agents which can make an investment, and which have not already invest towards
this agent. To verify that the matrix is properly filled, we sum the lines and the
columns of the positive/negative part of the matrix.
Once the matrix M is filled, we can find the agents which initially strategically
default, those such that their net number of investments (received minus issued)
exceed the discounted sum of maximal payoffs. Then we calculate using the
matrix the effect of these initially strategically defaulting agents, this gives some
contaminated defaulting agents. With these two values of strategically defaulting
and contaminated defaulting agents, we calculate the new discounted sum of
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maximal payoffs, and the new number of strategically defaulting agents, and so on.
This is possible using a large number of loops.
There is another problem, it is possible to calculate the individual payoffs of
all the agents of the period, but difficult to estimate correctly the value V ∗ of the
expected discounted sum of incoming payoffs. This required to try (guess and verify
method) a large number of values of V ∗ and select the one which corresponds to
the average payoff for a large number of networks. The simulation of the one period
network is a lot easier, because V ∗ = 0, as explained in section 2.4. A simulation
of one network of 400 agents with the capitalization C = 10 and φ = 10% takes
about 10 minutes on a modern 2 cores 4 threads processor in parallel computing.
To get smooth curves, we must simulate at least 2000 networks, which lasts for
340 hours, about 14 days nonstop. In addition, we had to test a lot of different
parameters’ values.
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Chapter 3. Bubbles in asset prices
Inspired by a recent article, Miao and Wang (2011), we would like to exhibit the
possiblity of bubbles on asset prices in a production economy. When bubbles exist,
which conditions may help them to grow or burst? In that direction, do interest
rates impact these “bubbles”, and to what extent? To answer these questions, we
start from the first modern conception of bubbles, (Blanchard and Watson, 1982)
to reach recent evolutions of this problem. Preceeding crises, one often explains
that there exists a bubble in the economy. As mentioned in the introduction, it
seems that the subprime crisis was carried by a U.S. real estate bubble. We want
to understand how research has been able to generate bubbles.
This chapter presents the context of the following research through a selection
of major research articles. Of course, the literature on bubbles is quite developed
and therefore it would be unrealistic to try to be exhaustive. The selection of
the following articles is designed to present the main evolutions of the analysis of
bubbles, especially related to the following work1.
3.1 How to introduce bubbles in prices?
Historically, bubbles have occured frenquently enough and deserve to be explored.
There exists an abundant descriptive literature on bubbles. For example Garber
(1990) is interested in the Dutch tulipmania (1634), the Mississipi (or Compagnie
des Indes) (1719) and South Sea (1720) bubbles. There are explanations about the
market fundamentals and the expectations of participants: the scarcity of “sick”
bulbs for the tulipmania, the hope of profitable quick growth for the Mississipi
Company, and information asymmetry about national debt consolidation and hope
of profitable trade in the South Sea Company. All these situations happened
because buyers were expecting to make (large) profits, and the increase of the
prices was therefore reflecting anticipations of higher yields, and higher prices. We
do not focus on the descriptive articles on bubbles. In addition, there is a large
number of models accounting for large variations in asset returns, e.g., Sornette
1To improve the readability of the chapter, we adopte the same notations to design the same
objects, even if they do not correspond to authors’ original printings.
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(2009), which provides an in-depth survey of recent models derived from complex
system theory. Sornette notably shows that classical models (e.g., Garch, Gaussian
walks, linear models) fail to predict crises correctly, while other models (rationality
with imitations behaviors, non-linear correlations, power laws...) are a lot more
reliable. We start with the theoretical literature which model the idea that current
prices reflect anticipations of incoming profits.
3.1.1 First characterization of bubbles
As explained by Blanchard and Watson (1982), the price of an asset should reflect
market fundamentals under rational behaviors and rational expectations of agents.
Precisely, the price of an asset should depend exclusively on the information available
about its current and future returns. If the price differs from its fundamental value,
it means that there exists a rational deviation that we can name “bubble”. Blanchard
and Watson (1982) restrict their attention to the existence of rational bubbles
because irrational ones might be more difficult to conceptualize; even if a large
number of studies, especially in the experimental literature, tend to prove the
irrationality of agents, (Lei, Noussair, and Plott, 2001).
The yield Rt of an asset A whose price at time t is pt and dividend of time t is
dt verifies:
ptRt = (pt+1 − pt) + dt. (3.1)
With market clearing condition, someone holds the asset. With the no-arbitrage
condition and rational expectation, the expected yield of this asset must correspond
to the interest rate r of the riskless bond, otherwise no one would hold the asset.
Given the information available at time t, designed by Ωt, the yield Rt of the asset
satisfies the following relation2:
E[Rt|Ωt] = r. (3.2)
The two previous equations give a dynamic system. Blanchard (1979a) shows
that, using the property of induction on expectations, because Ωt ⊆ Ωt+1, the
2This relation can also be interpretated as the existence of at least one risk-neutral probability.
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system can be solved recursively forward. One of the solutions to this system at
time t is:
p∗t =
∞∑
i=0
(
1
1 + r
)i+1
E[dt+i|Ωt]. (3.3)
This particular solution is called the fundamental price, it corresponds to the
present value of the expected dividends. Let us consider any sequence (bt) that
satisfies:
E[bt+1|Ωt] = (1 + r)bt. (3.4)
Then the price pt = p
∗
t + bt is also a solution to the same problem. The component
bt does not need to be related to the dividends. In this sense, bt is called a bubble.
Since (1 + r) > 1, the bubble component is growing over time. If bt > 0, the price
of the asset p∗t + bt diverges in the long run. This seems to make deterministic
bubbles irrational. As we will see, this is a particular case of the transversality
condition, which indeed rules out any bubble satisfying equation (3.4).
Blanchard and Watson (1982) introduce more realistic bubbles by making them
stochastic. Let us consider a particular bubble (b′t) which can either exist or collapse
by introducing a probability θ:
• b′t =
(1+r)
θ
b′t−1 + µt with a probability θ,
• b′t = µt with a probability (1− θ), (3.5)
where µ is a random variable such that E[µt|Ωt−1] = 0. This bubble b
′
t keeps
growing with a probability θ or crashes with a probability 1− θ. It still satisfies
E[b′t+1|Ωt] = (1 + r)b
′
t and therefore the sequence (pt + b
′
t) is also solution to the
problem. We remark in this example that the growth rate of the bubble – when
it keeps growing – is 1+r
θ
> 1 + r, this compensates the risk of crashing. As the
authors explain, a lot of different bubbles are possible, making varying θ over
time, and even over the time duration of the bubble for example, also detailed in
Blanchard (1979b). This is also possible to link the bubble to the fundamental
value, for example by correlating the dates of crashes of the fundamental price and
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the bubble. In addition, since the bubble adds risk in the price, if agents are risk
averse, the growth rate of the bubble has to be even higher to compensate the
possibility of crash: the probability of crash represents the risk associated to the
bubble, and therefore, when the bubble exists, it has to yield more than the risk
free asset.
Blanchard and Watson (1982) raise the question of the possible influence of
bubbles on fundamental prices. They provide examples on housing prices or even
on firms’ equities: the existence of a bubble increase the overall price and might
reduce the dividends in the following, through decreasing productivity or increasing
stocks. As a consequence, the fundamental price of the asset keeps decreasing
while the bubble keeps growing, until it perhaps bursts. The remaining part of the
article is an empirical approach of the American Stock market using the variance
and conditionnal variance of prices to check wether bubbles may not exist. Their
analysis prooves that bubbles on asset prices are likely to exist.
Sornette and Malevergne (2001) generalize this model by looking at the tail size
distribution of such stochastic bubbles, on equation (3.5). Using the no-arbitrage
condition, they show that the tail of the return distribution of the asset is hyperbolic
with an exponent less than 1. When looking at multidimensional process, they find
that tails of the return distribution of the assets follow power laws, with the same
asymptotic exponent. Unfortunately, they show that this theoretical exponent
disagrees with the empirical estimates.
From there we adopt a quite standard definition of bubble: when the price of an
asset exceeds the theoretical sum of the stream of dividends also called fundamental
price, the remaining part is called a bubble.
3.1.2 Linearity of bubbles?
Using the formulation of Blanchard and Watson (1982), Gilles and LeRoy (1992)
went into the mathematical characterization of bubbles in depth. Let us consider
an asset A which delivers the stream of dividends (di)i>0 discounted at the interest
rate r. Assume that the price of the asset A in period t can be written the following
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way:
pt(A) =
∞∑
i=t+1
(1 + r)−(i−t)di + b(1 + r)
t. (3.6)
For any b > 0, there is a bubble in the price of the asset A, in addition to the
fundamental price. Let At be the same asset as A but starting only at time t.
Before time t the dividends of At are 0. We bring back the valuation to the time 0
for the asset At:
p0(At) =
∞∑
i=1
(1 + r)−(i+t)di+t + b. (3.7)
Using the property of linearity of the valuation, Gilles and LeRoy (1992) deduce
that the bubble b is also linear with respect to the asset: for any constant k,
b(kAt) = kb(At) and b(A1t + A2t) = b(A1t) + b(A2t). For example, a bubble can
be a function of the stream of dividends of the asset expressed at time t as follows:
bt(At) = lim
n→∞
∑n
i=1 dt+i
n
. (3.8)
Instead of considering the asset A, let us consider the sequence of assets Ai such
that Ai delivers the same dividend as A only in period i, and 0 otherwise. Using
equation (3.8) the bubble component bt(Ai) = 0 for all Ai.
The property of countably additivity, which says that the value of the sum is the
sum of the values of the parts remains true only for the fundamental price. For the
bubble on the opposite, the value of the infinite sum must exceed the values of the
parts. Precisely, considering the space of bounded sequences, a bubble corresponds
to a mathematical “pure charge”, which is not countably additive, whereas the
fundamental value is, also called a “measure”. Gilles and LeRoy (1992) consider
economic problems where bubbles may occur. Though they exhibit special cases of
utility functions and endowments where bubbles exist, they also show that when
the utility function discounts the future, no bubble is possible on bounded cash
flows. As a conclusion, bubbles are rare when usual hypotheses are employed.
Many authors have been looking for bubbles in usual economic and finan-
cial models: either models with infinitely-lived agents (traders), or models with
overlapping generations.
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3.1.3 Myopic behaviors allow for bubbles
Tirole (1982) studied the case of purely speculative markets. This is indeed a
particular case of Blanchard and Watson (1982). In a purely speculative market,
traders exchange claims for each asset at an equilibrium price before knowing
the realization of the price of the asset, which is indeed a random variable. The
gain of trader i depends on the net quantity xi he trades, the equilibrium price
p and the ex-post realized price p˜. In a “static speculative market”, the total
gain is 0 and there is no insurance. Traders maximize their utility with respect to
their information sets, given market prices. Traders are also supposed to have the
same probabilities (priors) on the set of states of nature and act under a rational
expectations equilibrium. In this case, concave utility functions, from risk neutral
to risk averse, rule out any possibility of speculation. Risk averse traders do not
trade because the expectation of the gain is 0, only risk neutral traders can trade.
Speculation and bubbles may exist if there is at least one irrational trader (wrong
anticipations, systematic biais or anticipations depending on irrational beliefs) or a
risk loving trader. Tirole extended the case to a dynamic sequential stock market
with assets delivering a sequence of dividends. Each trader at each period has
a signal about the stochastic process followed by the dividend. In the case of
homogenous information between traders, they are used to compare the current
price and the expected future price given by the probability distribution of it.
Given this reasoning they choose the action, buy, sell, or do nothing. In this
context, Tirole first deals with “myopic rational expectations equilibriums”. In this
equilibrium, information is heterogenous between traders. An equilibrium is the
set of traders’ price forecast functions, a set of asset holdings xit, market clearing
(
∑
xit = 1), and short-run (refering to myopic) maximization behaviors of traders
as explained by the following equations. Indeed, the ability to sell the asset at the
following period may influence the price, because the current price depends on the
next period price or the whole sequence of dividends.
• If short sales are allowed: pt = βEt[dt+1+pt+1|Ωt, ω
i
t], where Ωt is the common
information, ωit the signal of trader i and β the discount parameter.
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• When short sales are impossible, then the holdings depend on the forecast
prices:
– pt = βE[dt+1 + pt+1|Ωt, ω
i
t] then x
i
t ∈ [0, 1].
– pt > βE[dt+1 + pt+1|Ωt, ω
i
t] implies x
i
t = 0.
– pt < βE[dt+1 + pt+1|Ωt, ω
i
t] implies x
i
t = 1.
Tirole showed that the formulation pt = βEt[dt+1 + pt+1|Ωt, ω
i
t] remains exact even
if short sales are forbidden. Then Tirole also proved by induction that for active
traders in a finite horizon problem T the price only depend on the dividend forecast
sequence3, bubbles do not exist:
pt = E

T−t∑
k>1
βkdt+k|Ωt, ω
i
t

 . (3.9)
On the opposite, when the time horizon is infinite, prices may include bubbles
components satisfying a martingale property, wether short sales are allowed or not:
∀l, i, t
Bt(ω
i
t, pt) = β
l
E[B(ωit+l, pt+l)|Ωt, ω
i
t]. (3.10)
When bubbles arise, they have the same values for all market traders if the
information is homogeneous: ∀i, ωit ⊆ Ωt. When the time horizon is infinite and the
information is homogeneous, a bubble is no longer possible on a finite set of traders
because it would require that each trader realizes his gains in a finite time and
therefore sells the asset at some time, which violates the market clearing condition:
at each period every asset has to be held by at least one trader.
The last step of Tirole’s reasoning was to study a fully dynamic rational expec-
tation equilibrium. The difference between this model and the myopic equilibrium
3also refered as market fundamentals, in opposition to the expected short resale price, which
might be “disconnected” from fundamentals.
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is the maximization process of each trader: traders maximize their expected present
discounted gains from the current period to infinity using the common prior Ωt
and their personal informations ωit. This new maximization process restricts the
possible sets of prices and rules out bubbles when the number of traders is finite.
Tirole proved that bubbles are impossible with fully dynamic rational expectations.
Rational expectations models are widely used in finance and economics because
of their high plausibility and technical handiness, on the opposite, irrationality of
traders, unusual structures of information, asymmetry, sunspots, are difficult to
model. Adaptative – multiple – anticipations produce irregular equilibrium prices,
as shown by Brock and Hommes (1997). Also, behavioral finance is dealing with
those problems. For an example about heterogenous information, and different
behaviors of traders, see Frinoa, Johnstone, and Zhenga (2004). When agents
adjust their over-optimistic expectations on prices, this generates super-exponential
bubbles (Hu¨esler, Sornette, and Hommes, 2013). We remain in the context of
rationality to deal with the existence of bubbles.
Going back to myopic behaviors, bubbles are only possible when the number of
traders is infinite, the time is infinite, and when traders get their gains on bubbles
in the short term. Overlapping generation models satisfy these conditions. Tirole
(1985) clarified the role of money in those economies starting from the framework
of Diamond (1965). The fundamental market value of the money is zero, because
it does not deliver any dividend. As soon as money has a non-zero price, it is a
bubble. By arbitrage, money must have the same expected yield as capital, so the
price of money in perfect foresight (also called rational expectations) must verify:
pt+1 = E[
1 + rt+1
1 + n
pt|Ωt]; (3.11)
where rt+1 is the yield of capital from time t to time t+ 1, n is the growth rate of
the number of persons in the economy and pt the price of money at time t. The
existence of a bubble requires an equilibrium in which the sequences of interest rates,
wages, savings among which bubbles (money) are such that the market clearing
conditions are satisfied and a non-zero sequence of bubbles exists, especially in
the long term. The results of Tirole’s analysis can be understood by looking at
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the equation (3.11). In the Diamond’s model, an equilibrium interest rate r∗ is
deduced from the wage and the market clearing conditions. If this equilibrium
interest rate exceeds the growth of the population, there is a unique equilibrium
without bubble. The interest rate rt converges to the equilibrium one r
∗. Indeed
the bubble would grow faster than the resources of the economy, as showed by the
equation. On the opposite, for the other cases, bubbly equilibria exist and the value
of the bubble mainly depends on the value of the equilibrium interest rate r∗. If
r∗ > 0, depending on the initial values of the model, either the economy reaches a
bubbleless equilibrium in the long run, or the bubble converges to a non-zero value
and the interest rate rt converges to the growth rate of the population n. In the
equation (3.11), it means that the price of money is constant. When the equilibrium
interest rate is negative, there only exists one equilibrium including a persistent
bubble and the interest rate also converges to n. In the following, Tirole also proved
that bubbles can still exist if there are also rents in the economy4. The existence
of bubbles depends on the equilibrium interest rate of the economy, the initial
conditions, and the parameters values of the model, the form of utility functions.
Tirole concluded that the existence of a bubble can be an efficient equilibrium in
the intermediary case. Indeed, raising the question of the efficiency of bubbles is
relevant, especially when two or more equilibria coexist. Recently, Farhi and Tirole
(2013) developped an Overlapping Generation Model with firms where liquidity
scarcity may generate bubbles that might be dynamically efficient: the level of
capital is larger than the level provided by the golden rule. Martin and Ventura
(2012) introduced an “investor sentiment” in this overlapping generation model
(Tirole, 1985) which generates periods of bubbles, overall growth and consumption
while a change in this sentiment produces a collapse of these bubbles.
Again, many studies which reveal that, under weaker assumptions on the agents,
there might exist a large number of equilibria, among which inefficient ones. For
example, Yukalov, Sornette, and Yukalova (2009) analyze the price of an asset
traded by a population of heterogenous agents with uncertainty: there exists a large
4The existence of bubbles in overlapping generation models when borrowing is allowed was
recently undertaken by Hillebrand (2012).
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number of equilibria and the dynamic of the price of the assets switches between
different regimes.
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) deal with rational traders (arbitrageurs), but
point out coordination and information problems. They shows that a bubble may
persist, because traders do not coordinate. Traders know that there is a bubble in
the price because they receive information sequentially: this means that traders
do not receive informations on the fundamentals at the same time. They want to
benefit from the bubble before it bursts, therefore they keep buying the overpriced
asset. When the dispersion of opinion is sufficently large, the bubble never bursts.
When the dispersion of opinion is smaller, the bubble bursts before reaching its
maximal value, because traders coordinate. Public information also helps them to
coordinate and therefore provokes crashes. This model shows that when information
is not common, bubbles at equilibrium are likely to last.
Santos and Woodford (1997) formalize the general case therefore including the
two previous papers of Tirole. They point out the difficulty of ruling out bubbles
when the time is infinite. Their framework mixes spot markets for goods and
securities for a infinite sequence of dates in a intertemporal general equilibrium
model. We do not detail their formalization because of the complexity of this
article. They establish a strong theorem which states the existence of a state price
process that reaches the market prices, even when the market is incomplete, for
any security either of finite maturity or in positive net supply. They require that
consumer’s preferences are increasing for all goods and stricly for at least one,
and very tight borrowing limits: at least one consumer has to be able to repay
another one’s future endowment for some state price process. When they tighten
the preferences of the consumers by introducing discounting or impatience in the
consumer preferences, they get a stronger version of the prices in terms of one state
price instead of any possible state prices. In this situation, no bubble is possible
anymore with respect to the chosen state prices. When there exists a portfolio such
that, at any point in time it yields more than the aggregate endowment of that
state, then there is no need for borrowing constraint for the conclusions to hold.
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As the authors explain, the usual well-known models that allow for bubbles violate
at least one of the hypotheses.
3.1.4 Infinite horizon: the transversality condition against
bubbles
The well-known transversality condition is widely employed to solve infinite horizon
models, for example to solve Bellman equations. But this is also a formidable
protection against bubbles, detailed for example in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983). Note
that the transversality condition requires the utility function to be differentiable.
To show how it works, let us consider a simple example. Suppose we want to solve a
standard maximization problem of a househould whose utility function is u, stream
of consumption (ct)t≥0 and discount rate β. The household owns a share At of a
firm, which price is pt and which pays yt at each period. Given an initial wealth
A0 = 1 and a resource constraint linking the share At, the price of the firm pt and
the consumption ct:
pt(At+1 − At) + ct = Atyt,
we solve:
max
ct,t≥0
∑
t≥0
Et[β
tu(ct)], (3.12)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on the information available at t. We
impose the usual Inada conditions to ensure the existence of a solution: u(0) = 0,
u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, lim0 u
′ = ∞ and lim∞ u
′ = 0. An equilibrium price sequence is
such that the market clearing conditions are satisfied: ∀t, At = 1 and then ct = yt.
From this, we deduce the first order Euler equation:
u′(yt)pt = βu
′(yt+1)(pt+1 + yt+1). (3.13)
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From this recursive equation on prices, and given the sequence of incomes the firm
delivers, we can deduce the general form of the equilibrium price:
pt = Et

∑
k≥1
βk
yt+ku
′(yt+k)
u′(yt)
+ lim
k→∞
βk
pt+ku
′(yt+k)
u′(yt)

 . (3.14)
The term Pt = Et
[∑
k≥1 β
kyt+k
u′(yt+k)
u′(yt)
]
corresponds to the fundamental value of
the asset. If we consider a sequence qt such that u
′(yt)qt = βEt[u
′(yt+1)qt+1], we
see that Pt + qt satisfies the Euler equation (3.13) as well as the general form of
the equilibrium price (3.14). The transversality condition of this problem can be
written as:
lim
k→∞
βku′(yk)pk = 0. (3.15)
This transversality condition imposes qt = 0 and the general form of the equilibrium
price is restricted to its fundamental value. Imposing the transversality condition
rules out bubbles in most general equilibrium models, and together with the
Euler equation it is a sufficient condition for the optimality of the solution, as
explained in Stockey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). The transversality condition
can be understood as a first-order condition written “at the end of time” of the
problem. It is sufficient but also necessary in a finite time problem, because it
is the first-order condition for the last term. The transversality condition in the
inifite time problem is the limit for t→∞ of the transversality condition of the
finite time problem. It means that the value of the wealth – in this problem pt
– must not widely exceed its discounted utility. It prevents the accumulation of
wealth over and over. We can conclude that there will not exist any sequential
dynamic infinitely lived agent discounting optimization model in which bubbles
could emerge in the presence of the transversality condition.
3.2 Collateral constraints responsible for bubbles
In the following of this review, some models do not deal with financial assets
and their dividends. For example, they may consider the land, its price, and its
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production. In accordance with the authors and the topics, we keep the original
formulations of the problems. Actually, any production factor, (land or firm)
can be interpretated as an asset, and the production per period (output) can be
interpretated as a dividend of the asset. As a consequence, the concept of bubble
can be transfered to non-financial subjects. There is a limit to this analogy. For
example, Bouaskera and Prigent (2008) show that firms, and more broadly goods
and services, cannot be valued exactly as financial assets. Because the investment
decision is irreversible, the price of a firm is also depending on market’s features,
such as the global demand. In the sequel of the dissertation, restricting assumptions
on the market demand still allow to hold the analogy in the value of firms and
assets to be true.
3.2.1 Prices of land
The framework we use in our research was initially explicitely introduced by Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). Indeed, their paper does not deal with bubbles, but more with
credit, borrowing limits, and their effects on the economy, especially on prices. It
remains useful to include it in this presentation because it explains the genesis
of some of our assumptions, even though all of them are not used for the same
purposes. The authors show how credit may affect the economy through a model
of lenders-borrowers in a production economy with perfect foresight. They start
from a fixed supply of land K which is the unique production factor. This “funny”
context of land, farmers and vegetables can be interpretated as well in a context
of capital, firms and goods. On this land there are two types of producers that
do not have the same production function. They produce a unique tradable good
that they also consume. Among them, farmers have a linear production function
K → aK, while gatherers have a marginally decreasing production function G(K)
with G′ > 0, G′′ < 0. In addition a > G′(0): as we understand, farmers have a
better production function, (this assumption is justified by their specific skills).
Both farmers and gatherers borrow to buy the quantity of land they use at the
market price pt at each period. They take one-period loans bt and repay them
with the interests on the loan at the end of the period Rtbt. The interest rate is
108
Chapter 3. Bubbles in asset prices
supposed to be constant to R. They face at each period a budget constraint which
takes into account their production, their consumption ct, their level of debt bt,
and the land they use kt at the price pt. For example, a farmer faces the following
constraint:
pt(kt − kt−1) +Rbt−1 + ct = akt−1 + bt. (3.16)
The two types of producers are risk neutral and maximize their discounted con-
sumptions over their infinite lifetime:
Et
[
∞∑
s=0
βsct+s
]
. (3.17)
Because they own specific skills that give them a better production, the farmers
are subject to a borrowing limit: they have to be able to repay the debt with
the only asset they have, the land: Rbt ≤ pt+1kt. This constraint is designed to
capture the fact that, if a farmer stops working, nobody will be able to produce
any good on that land, because of the specific skills he owns. As a consequence
the lenders collateralize the debt on farmers with the value of the land. All these
assumptions are the keys of the model, though the authors add some others to
ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium. This competitive equilibrium is
a sequence of quantities of land, consumptions, debts, and land prices such that
the producers and gatherers maximize their utilities, markets clear on land and
consumption, and debts clear. At the equilibrium, the authors prove that farmers
are net borrowers and gatherers are lenders. To kill bubbles on land prices, they
impose the transversality condition.
The first results are not intuitive: when the prices of land climb, the global
demand of farmers increases because they can borrow more given the collateral
constraint. Even if they have larger repayment due to the increase of the debt,
the net worth of the farmers increases more than the debt because of the leverage
effect. The debt constraint reduces the quantity of land that farmers would get
in an unconstrained situation, because it would equalize marginal productivity of
farmers and gatherers. Particularly, the effect of an unexpected productivity shock
is highly amplified by the debt constraint. There is a intratemporal static effect
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increasing the prices of land because the demand of farmers increases and there
is overall a persistent effect due to the changes in prices of the land. That would
have not happened if there was no debt constraint. The respective multipliers’
sizes highly depend on the interest rate, which is reliable to the discount rate of
the gatherers. However, the global response of the economy to such a shock is
really large due to the ratio debt-asset of the farmers, which is quite large. To
improve the efficiency of the model, the authors introduce the technique of the
farmers in the model, such that farmers do not invest only in land as before, but
also invest in technique at each period, because it depreciates. The technique itself
has no liquidation value. Again they add a couple of parameters’ hypotheses to
ensure the existence of an interesting competitive equilibrium. When they study
the effects of an unexpected productivity shock, the economy now creates cycles.
When the demand of farmers in land increases, the level of debt also increases,
but the increase of the debt limits the farmers’ ability to buy land. This creates
large and persistent oscillations, also called cycles. To get even better results, the
authors add a probability of investment: there exists a probability such that a
farmer will not be able to invest at each period, especially in technique. This is
supposed to represent difficulties or the fixed cost that usually restrict investment
possiblities of firms. When a farmer is unable to invest, his technique depreciates,
and so the farmer can only use a smaller part of the land he owns, and therefore
he sells the remaining part. From the linearization around the steady state, adding
technique in the economy influences the prices more than the quantities, and the
probability of investment makes the cycles last over more periods. From these
conclusions, we may remember that credit constraints on a production economy
make it more responsive to production shocks and that restrictions on investment
make these effects last more than usual.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) also analyzed how collateral prices influence the
real economy, amplifying shocks. Their model is based on a neo-classical approach,
in which entrepreneurs are also borrowers. Their limits of borrowing depend on
their balance sheets, and the agency costs are also inversely related to balance
sheets of the borrowers. The result is the amplification of productivity shocks in
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both directions, either the economy is accelerated when the balance sheets are good,
or the credit is limited and the agency costs make the investment more difficult.
This idea of considering asset prices not only as values but also as credit
collateral expanded quickly. The credit helps the growth of the asset that is also
collateral, this self-acting phenomenon may help emerge distortions in prices among
which bubbles. For example, subprime loans were mortgage loans, that does not
help stabilize prices when demand is crashing. In a recent paper, Kunieda (2008)
extended Tirole (1985) by adding borrowing and analyzed how bubbles on money
can be inefficient, and what government may do to correct the inefficiency.
3.2.2 Bubbles in firms’ prices
Kocherlakota (2009) developed a model where limiting the debt to the value of
land generates a bubble on the prices. We will detail this model, because it
uses the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and deals with bubbles in this
context. The economy is composed of infinitely lived entrepreneurs who use land to
produce a common good. At each period, only a fraction of them face investment
opportunities and the others do not. Heterogeneity among entrepreneurs is created
with the production function: yt = Atk
α
t n
1−α
t , where y is the prodution, k the
capital, n the labor and A the technological factor which takes values either 0
with a probability 1− π or 1 with a probability π: At is a random value i.i.d over
entrepreneurs and time. The value of At is known at the previous period (t− 1).
When it takes 0 value, the entrepreneur does not want to produce anything, and on
the contrary when it takes value 1 the entrepreneur is willing to invest to produce.
To achieve the investment opportunities, money needs to be reallocated, and this
is done through loans. A new feature of this model is to endow each entrepreneur
with one unit of land at the beginning. When they borrow, entrepreneur’s loans
are secured by the value of the land they own. Since land does not deliver any
financial stream, any positive price on the land can be interpreted as a bubble.
Two equilibria exist in this model: either there is no borrowing and the price of
land is zero, or money is actually reallocated through loans, and the land has a
positive price. As in the previous models, an equilibrium is a sequence of prices of
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land, wages, interest rates of loans, and a sequence of consumptions, units of land,
loans, capitals, units of labor such that, given the prices and the budget constraints,
the entrepreneurs maximize their utilities and markets clear. Since there is no
constraint on the amount of work; entrepreneurs that produce choose the amount
of work they need to maximize their profits, and therefore they all have the same
capital labor ratio, an hypothesis that we will also use in our models. This delivers
the equilibrium wage. Given the two equilibria, the author compares the levels
of wealth, and proves that there is more wealth with bubbles, the consumption,
output, and wages are higher in the bubbly steady state, i.e. when land has a
positive price. After describing these equilibria, Kocherlakota generates a bursting
bubble and its effects on the economy. This is designed to capture housing prices in
the United States, and their links with loans. Starting from a bubbly equilibrium,
in which land has a non zero price, and where money is reallocated through loans,
the author introduces a probability of switching from this bubbly state to the non
bubbly one, less economically efficient. When the economy reaches the no bubble
equilibrium, it cannot go back to the other state. In the initial state, the economy
is bubbly and the equilibrium of this stochastic model approaches the bubbly one.
When the bubble bursts, the net borrowers are not affected, but the net lenders are
greatly affected, the distribution of wealth changes. The average level of capital
and wages decrease, as well as consumptions, because the land value is destroyed.
When the bubble collapses, the lenders always lose money, because their loans are
not refunded, while borrowers may benefit from the bubble’s collapse because they
do not have to refund their loans, unless the depreciation rate of capital is too high
and they also lose. The analysis reveals that even a stochastic bubble increases
the amount of capital and the wages before the bubble bursts, and therefore a
stochastic bubble has a net positive impact on the economy. Kocherlakota raises
the question of the role of the government, especially his ability to secure loans
because they are risky in the presence of stochastic bubbles. If the government
secures the loans by providing bonds, optimal response of the agents would be
to hold as much as they can of these bonds, and there is no easy way to see how
the government could inject such an amount of cash when the bubble bursts. The
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only possibility for the government would be to secure its own debt by taxation
and therefore substitute for private sector bubbles. In this model, the need of
reallocation of capital and borrowing constraints have been able to create bubbles
on the price of land, which generates more output, consumption and wealth.
Miao and Wang (2011) consider a production economy where the values of firms
themselves are collateral for borrowing. They show that investment restrictions
associated to investment difficulties generate bubbles. We choose to adopt this
approach mixing a production economy, possible restrictions in the investment and
credit constraints. We do not detail the model in this section because it will be
fully analyzed in next chapter.
Kunieda and Shibata (2012a) propose the same kind of framework to create a
bubble. Agents have the same production function, but there exist idiosyncratic
shocks on the production function: yt = AΦt−1kt−1, where yt represents the
production, kt−1 is the capital of the previous period and Φ is a productivity
function and random variable i.i.d over agents and time. Agents consume at each
period and have also access to an asset bt that they can use either as deposit, or
as debt, subject to the interest rate. The agents maximize the expected utilities
of consumption over their lifetime, with respect to a usual budget constraint. As
in other models, borrowing is limited to a fraction of the net worth of each agent.
At each period, an agent is willing to produce if his production function brings
more than the rent, which delivers a condition on his value of Φ. Besides this
production sector, there exist financial intermediaries that lend to agents who need
it and also collect the deposits from the others. These financial intermediaries
have also access to an “intrinsically useless asset” because the deposits exceed the
debts given the borrowing constraint. The supply of this new asset is fixed and the
asset is priced at pt. As soon as this asset is priced, it is a bubble, by definition.
By arbitrage, the price of the asset must verify Et[pt+1] = Et[rt+1]pt, otherwise
no financial intermediary would buy it. The authors aggregate all the variables
depending on the investing agents and the non-investing ones to get the dynamics
of the intrinsically useless asset, especially as a function of the distribution of Φ.
They get the global equilibrium and the existence of the useless asset depends on
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the distribution of Φ: either the debts correspond exactly to the deposits, and the
asset does not exist, or the asset covers the difference and has a positive price. It
might happen that two equilibria coexist, one without bubble and one with the
bubble. The authors prove that the growth rate of the economy is larger in the
bubbly one. Precisely, the bubble increases the interest rate, and this reduces
the number of investors, among them the less productive ones. This is what they
call the “crowd-out” effect of the bubble. On the opposite the net lenders get a
higher yield on their deposits, and this gives them more liquidity if they become
investors in the following periods. This is the “crowd-in” effect of the bubble, which
dominates the other. When there is no bubble, the less productive agents – having
a low Φ – will get low production and this limits their ability to invest, even if they
become high productive agents in the following. The authors prove that when both
equilibria exist, the bubbleless one is dynamically inefficient whereas the bubble
can correct that. From these results they develop then a Markov process acting
on the variable Φ to model a sunspot equilibrium. In this situation there are two
interest rates depending on the state in which the economy is located. One of the
states is bubbleless with a low growth rate, and the other is bubbly. When the
economy switches from the high growth rate state to the low one, this is irreversible,
it can never reach again the high growth rate state. This switch can be interpreted
as a financial crisis and the intrinsically useless asset does not exist anymore. The
authors suggest in the following that the governement could back this asset to keep
the economy in the efficient bubbly equilibrium by taxing agents’ net incomes. In
this case, the bubbly steady state becomes the unique perfect foresight equilibrium.
3.2.3 Reservations and Conclusion
As we just saw, borrowing constraints on firms may generate bubbles. Becker, Bosi,
Le Van, and Seegmuller (2012) show that similar borrowing constraints applied to
heterogenous discounting households within the Ramsey model rule out bubbles.
In their model, the lack of bubbles does not mean that the equilibrium is efficient,
but an efficient equilibrium rules out bubbles. To summarize, bubbles improve the
functionning of firms in production economies whereas bubbles were usually seen
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as dynamically inefficient before. The recent research has been also considering
how governments can secure bubbles, which seems a priori curious. We choose to
start from the framework of Miao and Wang (2011) and test through this model
the different borrowing constraints and assumptions that are necessary to ensure
the existence of bubbles, among which, the probability of investment (or stochastic
investment function) and the borrowing limits of type Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Miao and Wang (2011). In addition we introduce debts with a non-zero interest
rate. In chapter 4, we keep the debt structure of Miao and Wang (2011): firms
borrow only when the investment opportunity occur. This can be interpretated as
short-term debts. As proved by chapter 4, prices and capitals of firms are little
sensitive to interest rates. In chapter 5 we introduce a new hypothesis of long-term
debts in the capital of firms.
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The basis framework is the same as Miao and Wang (2011): there is a production
economy, and firms have the same production function. The labor adjusts to the
demand of firms, to maximize their profits. Firms face stochastic investment
opportunities: there is a fixed probability π such that firms can invest at each
period. In addition, when firms invest, they can borrow, but debts are restricted
to a fraction of the firms’ prices. Miao and Wang (2011) show that this framework
may generate bubbles in firms’ prices. We add a non-zero interest rate on loans to
test how this feature may help to control bubbles. Therefore section 4.1.1 presents
the same assumptions as the ones of the model of Miao and Wang (2011). They
adopt a continuous time formulation, but we rather use a discrete time formulation
to get more intuitive results on the debt. This also allows to produce Dynare
simulations.
4.1 Layout of the model
4.1.1 Firm: production, capital, wage
We assume that there exist a continuum of firms on [0, 1] with the same , constant
return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function. Y mt is the production of firm m
at time t, Kmt and N
m
t are respectively the capital and labor of the firm m.
Y mt = (K
m
t )
α(Nmt )
1−α, (4.1)
with α ∈]0, 1[.
We assume that the labor market is competitive, as Kocherlakota (2009). As a
consequence, there is a common wage wt per unit of labor. We also suppose that
this wage is fixed exogenously. We can derive it from solving the usual intertemporal
consumption problem in section 4.2.1. We also suppose that the supply of labor
perfectly adjusts to the demand of the firms1.
1This assumption is not perfectly neutral on the price of firms, e.g., Letifi and Prigent (2012)
analyze how the investment and employment decisions affect the value of firms facing a stochastic
demand, depending wether the owner has an option to hire/fire workers, and/or increase/shutdown
capital.
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Given the wage wt and the competitive labor market, each firm maximizes at
each period the cash-flow of period t by adjusting its level of employment. The
firms maximize their benefits:
max
Nmt
(Kmt )
α(Nmt )
1−α − wtN
m
t . (4.2)
This gives the optimal level of employment for firm m:
Nmt =
(
wt
1− α
)− 1
α
Kmt . (4.3)
We can deduce the rate of return on the capital, which is the same for all firms:
Rmt = Rt = α
(
wt
1− α
)α−1
α
. (4.4)
The following step is to study the dynamic of the capital of the firms. Usually
the evolution of the capital of a firm is subject to the depreciation rate of the
capital δ and the periodic investment of the firm. This requires the ability for the
firm to realize an investment at each period – each year in our case. As Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), we question this hypothesis: the firms of the economy have
different sizes. Precisely we know that the distribution of their sizes follows a
Zipf’s law, see e.g., (Axtell, 2001) or (Malevergne, Saichev, and Sornette, 2013).
There is a priori no reason why each firm could realize an investment at each
period but on the contrary firms could face difficulties like prohibitive costs or legal
barriers. To model this irregular investment behavior, we introduce a probability
of investment π as done in Miao and Wang (2011) but also in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Kocherlakota (2009). Such a probabilty should rely on the size of the
firms: the biggest firms should be able to invest almost every time whereas the
smallest would have little possibilities of investment, according to Kadapakkam,
Kumar, and Riddick (1998). For simplicity reasons, we consider this investment
probability as a constant. Instead of just a probability of investment, Kunieda and
Shibata (2012a) use a random variable, but we do not require such sophistication
to get interesting results.
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The results of this chapter will be valid only for economies including a large
number of middle-sized firms. We will show in the following chapter how this
investment probability is a sine qua non condition for pricing the equity more than
its nominal value.
Suppose that each firm has an opportunity to make an investment at each
period with a probability π. If π = 0, there is no investment possibility, if π = 1,
the firm invests at each period. When the investment is possible, firm m chooses
the amount of investment Imt+1, because K
m
t is the value of the capital at the end
of period t. We deduce the equation of variation of the capital:
• Kmt+1 = (1− δ)K
m
t with a probability (1− π), (4.5)
• Kmt+1 = (1− δ)K
m
t + I
m
t+1 with a probability π, (4.6)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of the capital. These two equations give:
Kmt+1 = (1− δ)K
m
t + πI
m
t+1. (4.7)
We aggregate the firms to get the evolution of the global capital. By equation
(4.3) we know that the capital labor ratio is identical for each firm. By aggregating
we deduce that:
Kt =
∫
Kmt dm = Nt
(
wt
1− α
) 1
α
with Nt =
∫
Nmt dm. (4.8)
We put this equality in equation (4.4) and we obtain a global version. Since the
rate of return on capital is the same for all firms, it only depends on the aggregate
variables.
Rt = αK
α−1
t N
1−α
t . (4.9)
We assume that the total labor supply is fixed: Nt = 1 and get Rt = αK
α−1
t .
Although the labor market is supposed to be perfectly competitive, we require this
strong hypothesis to get results on the global capital.
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The aggregate output Yt can be also simplified:
Yt =
∫
(Kmt )
α(Nmt )
1−αdm =
∫ (
Kmt
Nmt
)α
Nmt dm =
(
Kt
Nt
)α ∫
Nmt dm
= Kαt N
1−α
t = K
α
t . (4.10)
4.1.2 Loans and collateral
We suppose that each firm is owned by one or many risk neutral investors. Each
firm is listed on the stock market. The price of the equity logically represents the
discounted sum of the future cash-flows. We assume that the investors are risk
neutral, because there is no alea on the production functions.
Let Vt(K
m
t ) be the stock value at time t of the firm m. The investor-owner
wants to maximize the stock value of the firm. The only decision variable of the
firm is the amount of the investment – when the opportunity happens. To make
this investment, the firm uses the gains of capital of the previous period RtK
m
t
(from equation (4.4)) and takes also one-period loans Lmt+1 from the bank with an
exogenous interest rate rt. When there is no possibility of investment, the gains
of capital are distributed to the owner(s) of the firm. We suppose that the bank
supplies loans perfectly elastically and fixes the interest rate. This is the new
feature of the model vis-a`-vis Miao and Wang (2011).
There is no possibility for any firm of lending the gains of capital. This also
means that when a firm borrows from the bank, the interests of the loan are
definitively lost from a social welfare point of view. The model of Miao and Wang
(2011) is built with interest-free loans between the households, such that firms not
able to invest lend money to the others. This is possible only when the investment
probability is low, otherwise it might happen some liquidity problems.
The loans are just “one-period”, and the firms only borrow when an investment
opportunity happens. As a consequence the capital of firm is purely made of equity,
there is no laverage. Since this structure does not fit the reality, we study firms
whose capital is composed of equity and debt in the following chapter.
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The value of the investment is the only control variable of the investor in the
maximization process of a firm’s value. It is composed of the gains of capital and
the short-term debt:
0 ≤ Imt+1 = RtK
m
t + L
m
t+1. (4.11)
4.1.3 Choice of the borrowing constraint
There must be a warranty for the bank when the firm borrows, otherwise the
firm would never refund the bank. The firm logically pledges a part of its equity.
The physical capital Kmt is “physically” pledgeable, but the stock price of the
capital Vt(K
m
t ) is much better because it is priced and its value can be compared
to the amount of the loan. The bank may not allow the loan to cover the whole
capitalization of the firm but a fraction γ of it, for economic, risk or legal reasons.
Two natural constraints are possible, the bank may limit the loan either by
γVt(K
m
t ) or by Vt(γK
m
t ). These two constraints have been used in the recent
litterature. The first one Lt ≤ γVt(K
m
t ) has been used by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). It means that the loan is guaranteed by the liquidation value of a part
of the stock value of the firm. The second one Lt ≤ Vt(γK
m
t ) has been used by
Miao and Wang (2011)2 and they explain that the loan is guaranteed by the value
Vt(γKt) of a small firm whose real capital would be γK
m
t . Indeed if the firm can
not refund the loan at the following period, it does not necessarily mean that the
investors-owners of that firm are willing to sell a part of their stocks γVt(K
m
t ), they
could also choose to change the structure of their firm by selling a part of physical
capital γKmt . The price of such a capital on the market is Vt(γK
m
t ). These two
approaches could somehow correspond to some countries where laws protect the
workers, or the investors. This is quite difficult to make a choice about the form of
the constraint. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) have studied the liquidation values of
assets, who appear to be variable and especially depending on the global context
of the economy. At first sight it seems that the constraint introduced by Miao and
2Compared to the constraint Miao and Wang (2011), there are changes in the time indexes of
the capital and in the value to fit the time logic of the model. This detail is explained in next
section.
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Wang (2011) is a little less realistic that the other one. However the form of their
constraint is the key evolution that allow them to find what they call bubbles.
Whatever the constraint’s choice, it requires the uniqueness of market prices at
each period for all firms and for any level of capital. Indeed the market prices of
two firms with the same level of capital is the same because we already assumed
that all the firms have the same production function. However, the quotation is
not supposed to be linear, so γVt(K
m
t ) 6= Vt(γK
m
t ). Indeed, there is a priori no
proof that the stock price of a firm is proportionnal to its size. On the contrary, the
prices of firms may include a size premium: Fama and French (1993) observe that
small firms have lower earnings on assets than big firms. This would say that the Vt
value function is concave. Obviously, in the other situation, if γVt(K
m
t ) = Vt(γK
m
t ),
then the two constraints yield the same results.
We choose to use the Miao and Wang constraint for the following. We want to
test the response of their model to variations of the bank’s interest rate. We will
also detail the results obtained with the other because they can be easily related.
We name the constraints respectively MW and KM when a comparison is done.
4.1.4 Evolution of the capital of the firms
Once the investment is realized, the firm is supposed to refund the loan with
the interests at the following period. To determine the collateral constraint, we
consider that the firm pledges a part of the real capital γKmt at the beginning
of period t+ 13, and that the loan is supposed to be refunded with the interests
at the beginning of period t+ 2, so the value of the collateral will be Vt+1(γK
m
t ).
The bank delivers the loan Lmt+1 at the beginning of period t+ 1 and is asking for
Lmt+1(1 + rt+1) at the following period t + 2, see Figure 4.1. We can deduce the
constraint:
Lmt+1(1 + rt+1) ≤ Vt+1(γK
m
t ), (4.12)
3Kt represents the capital at the end of period t.
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Figure 4.1: Timeline of the investment decision of the firm
which is the same as:
Lmt+1 ≤
1
1 + rt+1
Vt+1(γK
m
t ). (4.13)
Usually the link between the long-term bank interest rate r∞ and the discount
rate of the investor is: β = 1
1+r∞
; otherwise the consumer would never save or never
consume, by solving its maximization consumption problem (if he would access
an asset with yield r∞). The discount factor of the investors should be related to
the growth rate of the economy, but we do not focus on the growth, and we also
assume that the long-term interest rate is fixed exogenously by the bank, because
it is the limit of the short-term interest rate, also fixed by the bank. The condition
β = 1
1+r∞
may not be realistic especially if the long-term interest rate is either close
to zero or quite high. We have to be careful in the interest rate analysis because
changing the long-term interest rate has an influence on the cash-flows, because it
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period capital cash-flow
beginning t+1 Kmt
investment opportunity yes no yes no
(RtK
m
t − I
m
t+1)
+ RtK
m
t
beginning t+2 Kmt (1− δ) + I
m
t+1 K
m
t (1− δ)
−(1 + rt+1)L
m+1
t 0
Table 4.1: Capital variation and cash-flow
represents the interests that a firm pays back but it also changes the value itself,
because it changes the discount factor, if the condition holds.
The stock value Vt(K
m
t ) of the firm is the discounted sum of the future ben-
efits. To write this valuation correctly we need to consider the dynamics of the
capital of the firm. We start from the end of period t. The possibility of bor-
rowing happens at period t + 1 and is supposed to be refunded at period t + 2
with the interests. To sum up the values of the capital and the cash-flows, we
use Table 4.1, where by definition the debt Lmt+1 = (I
m
t+1 − RtK
m
t )
+ and where
(RtK
m
t − It+1)
+ = RtK
m
t −min(RtK
m
t , I
m
t+1) represents the remaining part of the
gains of capital if the firm does not borrow at all in period t+ 1.
Using Table 4.1 and the one period discount rate of the owner β, we deduce
that the cash-flow of period t+ 1, CFt+1 is:
CFt+1 = (1− π)RtK
m
t + π(RtK
m
t − I
m
t+1)
+. (4.14)
The refunding of the debt is deduced from cash-flow of period t+ 2:
CFt+2 = −π(I
m
t+1 −RtK
m
t )
+(1 + rt+1). (4.15)
We bring back CFt+2 at time t+ 1 by discounting βCFt+2 in CFt+1:
CFt+1 = RtK
m
t − π
[
min(RtK
m
t , I
m
t+1) + β(I
m
t+1 −RtK
m
t )
+(1 + rt+1)
]
. (4.16)
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The valuation of the capital of firm m is given by the discounted sum of the
incoming cash-flows:
Vt(K
m
t ) = Et
[∑
j≥t
βj−t
(
RjK
m
j − π
(
min(RtK
m
t , I
m
t+1)
+β(Imt+1 −RtK
m
t )
+(1 + rt+1)
))]
. (4.17)
We can simplify the previous equation: if the investment exceeds the gains of the
capital, min(RtK
m
t , I
m
t+1) = RtK
m
t and if the investment is smaller than the gains
of capital Lmt+1 = (I
m
t+1 −RtK
m
t )
+ = 0, because there is no debt.
The owner(s) want to maximize the stock value of the firm over the investment
decisions. We can write the Bellman equation on the stock value of the firm m:
Vt(K
m
t ) = max
Imt+1
RtK
m
t − π
(
min(RtK
m
t , I
m
t+1) + β(1 + rt+1)L
m
t+1
)
+πβEt
[
Vt+1
(
(1− δ)Kmt + I
m
t+1
)]
+(1− π)βEt [Vt+1 ((1− δ)K
m
t )] ; (4.18)
where Lmt+1 = (I
m
t+1 −RtK
m
t )
+ and the constraint on the debt is given by Lmt+1(1 +
rt) ≤ Vt+1(γK
m
t ).
From this equation, two simple situations may emerge. Either the firms never
borrows Lmt+1 = 0 ∀t, or the firms borrows as much as possible and the constraint
is binding ∀t: Lmt+1 =
1
1+rt+1
Vt+1(γKt).
When the firm does not borrow, we go back to a classical problem of dynamic
programming and from the first order conditions we easily get the form of the
value function4: Vt(K
m
t ) = vtK
m
t + bt. For this reason, when we study the maximal
borrowing possibility, we suppose that the value function has the same special form
Vt(K
m
t ) = vtK
m
t + bt, as Miao and Wang (2011) do (guess and verify method). This
4A related case is detailed in the following chapter.
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value function presents a multiplier term vt, the shadow price
5, that we will relate
to the Tobin’s marginal Q, and a shift term bt that we relate – following Miao and
Wang (2011) – to a bubble component of the valuation.
We are especially interested in studying the situation of maximal borrowing
because the collateral constraint depends on the valuation of the firm. Borrowing
more needs to increase the stock value, maybe until “overevaluation”. This simplifies
the term min(RtK
m
t , I
m
t+1) = RtK
m
t and also the term (I
m
t+1 − RtK
m
t )
+ = Lmt+1 =
1
1+rt+1
Vt+1(γK
m
t ). The investment is given by:
Imt+1 = RtK
m
t +
1
1 + rt+1
Vt+1(γK
m
t ). (4.19)
This case of maximal borrowing needs the shadow price of the capital to exceed 1
β
,
because 1
β
is the shadow price of the unconstrained problem: vt >
1
β
. We replace
the investment in the Bellman equation we remove the expectations to improve
the clarity:
Vt(K
m
t ) =RtK
m
t (1− π)− πβVt+1(γK
m
t )
+ πβVt+1
(
(1− δ)Kmt +RtK
m
t +
Vt+1(γK
m
t )
1 + rt+1
)
+ (1− π)βVt+1 ((1− δ)K
m
t ) . (4.20)
Then we replace Vt(K
m
t ) by vtK
m
t + bt:
vtK
m
t + bt = RtK
m
t (1− π) + βbt+1 + πβ
vt+1bt+1
1 + rt+1
− πβbt+1
+ βvt+1
(
Kmt (1− δ + πRt − πγ) +
π
1 + rt+1
vt+1γK
m
t
)
(4.21)
We can derive the value of vt as well as the value of bt.
5The shadow price represents the net variation on the price of the firm resulting by relaxing
one unit of constraint on the investment.
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vt = Rt(1− π) + βvt+1
(
(1− δ) + πRt − πγ +
πγvt+1
1 + rt+1
)
, (4.22)
bt = βbt+1 + πβbt+1
(
vt+1
1 + rt+1
− 1
)
. (4.23)
These are two forward difference equations that give us the behavior of vt and
bt. We are still missing the values of Rt and Kt. Integrating equation (4.7) on m,
because Rt is independant of m, we get the dynamics of Kt:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + π
(
RtKt +
γvt+1Kt + bt+1
1 + rt
)
. (4.24)
Recall the definition of Rt = αK
α−1
t and we have the dynamics of all variables:
(Kt, Rt, vt, bt). Solving the whole system (4.22) (4.23) (4.24) gives us a solution to
the initial problem if the variables satisfy the two transversality conditions:
βtvtKt →t→∞ 0; (4.25)
βtbt →t→∞ 0. (4.26)
The term πβbt+1
(
vt+1
1+rt+1
− 1
)
remains strictly positive if vt+1
1+rt+1
> 1 which requires
vt > 1 + r∞. We already know that vt >
1
β
when there is maximal borrowing. If β
satisfies the relation β ≈ 1
1+r∞
, then the b component satisfies the transversality
condition.
4.2 Results of the model
There are three non-linear equations, we cannot solve the problem directly and we
study the stability of the system and try to find the possible steady states, as done
by Miao and Wang (2011). Then we study the stability of the system around these
points, this allows us to check wether the valuation of the firms may converge.
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4.2.1 Global equilibrium
For now, we obtained three equations that govern the firms value. We only focus
on the firm’s problem to deal with the existence of bubbles. This is a priori not the
solution to a competitive equilibrium, but indeed it is: we suppose that investors
maximize the price of their firms Vt(K
m
t ); we suppose that the infinitely-lived
households(j ∈ [0, 1]) maximize their lifetime consumptions cjt given wages wt and
prices of the goods pt, and that they have no access to the bank loans. In addition,
we suppose that the households are the investors6. We suppose that the bank
adjusts exogenously the interest rate7.
In this case, a competitive equilibrium is the set of global sequences:
(Yt), (Ct), (Kt), (It), (Nt), (wt), (Rt), (pt),
and the sets of individual sequences:
(Y mt ), (C
j
t ), (K
m
t ), (I
m
t ), (N
m
t ), (L
m
t ),
and the set of interest rates rt such that:
• Investors solve the firm’s values maximization problem;
• Households maximize their lifetime consumptions;
• Markets clear: Nt = 1 and Ct = Yt and ptCt = (1− π)RtKt + wt − rtLt,
where (1 − π)RtKt + wt − rtLt represents the net income, the rental rate of the
capital which is not used for the investment minus the interests paid to the bank.
By now, we restrict our analysis to the firm’s valuation problem, to check the
existence of bubbles and test the effect of the bank in our model.
6We could also consider the investors as purely intermediaries, and allow them to consume, by
adding another sequence of investors consumptions.
7The bank could also set the interest rate to maximize the profits. An example of such
maximization of consumers and financers is made in Kunieda and Shibata (2012b).
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4.2.2 No bubble
A solution is obtained taking bt = 0 ∀t. The valuation of the capital becomes:
Vt(Kt) = vtKt, which eliminates the bubble component. The steady-state values
have no t subscript. The long-term interest rate is r. To find them, keeping K and
v constant in equation (4.24) we deduce the rental rate of the capital:
R =
δ
π
−
γv
1 + r∞
; (4.27)
Then using equation (4.22) we get:
v =
δ(1− π)
π
(
1− β(1− πγ) + γ(1−π)
1+r∞
) . (4.28)
Using the previous equation, we deduce the value of R:
R =
δ(1− β + βπγ)
π
(
1− β(1− πγ) + γ(1−π)
1+r∞
) . (4.29)
Given the two last equations, there is a little influence of the bank interest rate on
the v steady market value of the capital and on the level of the capital as far as
the interest rate remains plausible. However, if we assume that β = 1
1+r∞
we get
new values of v and R:
v =
δ(1− π)
π
(
1− 1−γ
1+r∞
) , (4.30)
R =
δ
π
1 + πγ−1
1+r∞
1 + γ−1
1+r∞
. (4.31)
γπ < γ so when the interest rate increases the real rate of return of the capital
increases which says that the real capital decreases. The valuation v also decreases
if the interest rate increases. This fact seems to match the reality.
We still need to check if v > 1
β
. Increasing sharply r∞ gives v < 1 but this
is only for exaggerated values of r∞. In this case the discount rate condition
(β = 1
1+r∞
) would not be credible. This also gives an upper bound on π, since
limπ→0 v =∞ and limπ→1 v = 0.
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Figure 4.2: Shadow price v of the valuation with respect to π and r∞
Numerical tests: we take δ = 0.025, γ = 10% and β = 1
1+r∞
. We calculate the
v value. The dark area on Figure 4.2 corresponds to the “impossible” value of v,
because within this area v < 1
β
and the maximal investment rule would not be
satisfied.
If the discount condition does not hold, v and R still behave the same way,
but the curves are smoother. Keeping β = 0.96 leads to results close to the area
of r∞ = 4% on the previous figure. When the investment probability decreases,
especially under 10%, the v value increases, which says that the capital is highly
priced to relax the collateral constraint which is tight. These results are close
to the one of Miao and Wang (2011), what we easily understand, looking at the
little influence of the bank interest rate. They do not consider that this high v is
a bubble, however we could nevertheless interpret this valuation as bubbly. We
analyze this vocabulary question at the end of the chapter.
Using our difference equations (4.22) and (4.24) on v and K, we deduce by
linarization the behavior of the variables close to the steady state values. The
system has exactly one eigenvalue larger than 1 and one eignevalue smaller than 1,
as a consequence there is a unique saddle path such that the economy reaches the
long run steady state.
132
Chapter 4. Do interest rates on short-term debts impact bubbles?
As a conclusion, this solution (b = 0) exists and is stable. There is a unique path
such that the system converges to this equilibrium. In the next section, we study
the solutions to the Bellman equation (4.18), such that the bubble component is
non-zero.
4.2.3 What about a Miao and Wang bubble?
Suppose that there is a non-zero bubble term b at the steady state. Using the
difference equation (4.23) we deduce the new steady state values:
v =
(1 + r∞)(πβ − β + 1)
πβ
. (4.32)
v behaves the same way with respect to π and r∞ like in the no-bubble equilibrium,
though it reaches smaller values. We see that v remains larger than 1
β
as far as the
bank interest rate is not too low, because v > (1 + r∞) all the time. However, v
does not depend on δ and γ, unlike the previous case. The steady state value of
the capital K is given by the equilibrium value of the rental rate of capital R by
plugging the value of v into its own equation (4.22):
R =
(βπ − β + 1)(1 + r∞)(1− β(1− δ)− γ(1− β))
βπ(1− π + (1 + r∞)(1− β + βπ))
. (4.33)
The value of b is given by the equation on K:
b = (1 + r∞)K
(
δ
π
−R−
γ(πβ − β + 1)
βπ
)
. (4.34)
R is increasing with respect to the bank interest rate, which is realistic. K
decreases with respect to r∞. As a consequence, the net effect of r∞ on the bubble
remains indefinite. Taking the same values of the parameters as before, the bubble
only exists for low values of π: less than 10%. The size of the bubble is decreasing
with respect to the bank interest rate, but the trend is very weak.
On Figure 4.3, we draw the bubble value when the discount condition holds:
β = 1
1+r∞
. As we notice, the bubble is eliminated by large values of π or by large
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Figure 4.3: Bubble component with respect to π and r∞
values of long-term interest rate. (The dark area corresponds to a negative or null
bubble.)
4.2.4 Stability of the bubble
When the probability of investment is sufficently low and when the long-term
interest rate keeps usual values (less than 6%), there exists a steady state of our
production economy such that the valuation of the firm presents a consistent
“bubble” part – following the definition of Miao and Wang (2011). To know if this
valuation can be used to price firms, we need to know if the economy is attracted
by this bubbly steady state. To study the stability of this steady state, we linearize
the 3 difference equations (4.22), (4.23) and (4.24) around the steady state. We use
the notation Gt = G(1 + Gˆt), where Gˆt is the log-linearization of a small deviation
from the steady state.
bˆt = βπ
v
1 + r∞
vˆt+1 + β
(
1 + π
(
v
1 + r∞
− 1
))
bˆt+1; (4.35)
Kˆt+1 =
(
(1− δ) + παR + π
γv
1 + r∞
)
Kˆt+π
γv
1 + r∞
vˆt+1+π
b
K(1 + r∞)
bˆt+1; (4.36)
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vˆt = βR(α− 1)(βπ −
1
v
)Kˆt +
(
βπv
1 + r∞
+ 1−
R
v
(1− π)
)
vˆt+1. (4.37)
Using the steady state values (4.32) and (4.33), the “bubble” equation can be a
little simplified:
bˆt = (βπ − β + 1)vˆt+1 + bˆt+1; (4.38)
Let k∗ be
(
1− δ + πRα + π γv
1+r∞
)
. This factor represents the growth rate of K
close to the equilibrium, we can distinguish the depreciation rate of the capital
(1− δ), and the investment, limited by its probablity π, composed of capital gains
αR and of debt without the interests γv
1+r∞
. The equation on the capital becomes:
Kˆt =
1
k∗
Kˆt+1−
γ(πβ − β + 1)γ
βk∗
vˆt+1−
1
k∗
(
δ − πR−
γ(πβ − β + 1)
β
)
bˆt+1. (4.39)
The whole system can be summurized by the matrix A deduced from the previous
equations such that: 

bˆt+1
vˆt+1
Kˆt+1

 = A


bˆt
vˆt
Kˆt

 . (4.40)
By simulation over the range of parameters, the matrix A has three eigenvalues
among which two are bigger that 1 and one between 0 and 1. There are two forward
looking variables (vˆt, bˆt) and one backward looking variable Kˆt, this proves that the
system is stable. This means that when the investment rules are restrictive enough,
the market valuation of the firm becomes naturally bubbly8 to satisfy the optimal
rule of investment. Moreover, the tranversality condition holds, and therefore this
steady state is a solution to the initial problem.
8With MW vocabulary...
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4.2.5 Market response to changes of debt’s limit and in-
vestment probability
As explained before, the solution to the Bellman equation depends on the optimal
rule of investment. When vt >
1
β
the shadow price of capital leads to a maximum
investment, which in turn generates maximum borrowing. When vt ≤
1
β
the optimal
investment does not require borrowing. The influence of the two parameters π and
γ depends on the optimal rule of the firm:
• When vt =
1
β
, the firms are not going to invest as much as possible and not
borrow, therefore a change in the investment rules (γ, π) does not change the
investment policy9, the bubble component of the market value of the capital
will remain constant to zero and the v-shadow price also keeps constant;
(unless the parameters π and γ are such that this is a joint point for the
interior solution and the bubbly solution.) As a conclusion a change in the
investment rules has no impact on the market value of the firms.
• When the shadow price of capital vt >
1
β
, the bubble component of the market
valuation is strictly positive and the firm uses the bubble component to reach
the optimal level of investment. Tightening the investment rules (decreasing
γ or decreasing π) produces an increase of the bubble b to allow for a higher
level of debt.
When the investment rules are restrictive, the valutation of the capital of the
firms presents a bubble component. The amount of the loan remains low due to the
restrictive collateral constraint. A change in the bank interest rate does not change
a lot the results. However, if the long-term discount condition holds: β = 1
1+r∞
,
the steady state values evolve, because this also modifies the discount parameter
of the investors, and the prices of the firms. Figure 4.4 gives the evolution of the
equilibrium level of the average capital K, its price vK + b and the size of the
bubble b, with respect to the long-term interest rate.
9A related case is detailed in the following chapter.
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of the equilibrium values: the bubble b, the average capital K
and its price V (K) with respect to the long-term interest rate r∞.
4.3 Shocks on the probability of investment, the
collateral limit and the interest rate
We would like to determine the optimal paths of the price’s variables v, b and of
the capital K, which evolution is given by equations (4.22) (4.23) (4.24), when
the investment rules change. This analysis only concerns the situation of maximal
borrowing: vt >
1
β
. We consider that the parameters of the model (α, β =
1
1+r
, δ, γ, π, r∞) are constant and we suppose that the firm parameters (Kt, vt, bt)
have reached the steady state values that we denote by (K1, v1, b1).
4.3.1 Methodology
To simplify, we assume that there is an announced, unexpected and perma-
nent modification of the investment rules. This modification is a change of the
parameters π and/or γ. As a consequence the firm will reach in the future the
new steady state corresponding to these new investment rules. The average capital
Kt will change progressively because it is a stock variable. On the opposite the
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valuation parameters vt and bt will adjust instantaneously to reach an optimal
trajectory going to the new steady state, that we denote by (K2, v2, b2).
To find the optimal trajectories, we need to consider the backward and forward
terms of the non-linear system. The capital equation is purely backward (4.24)
and the valuation terms are forward looking (4.22) and (4.23). The usual solution
to this kind of problems should be a mix of backward and forward solutions, as
explained by Blanchard (1979a). In our case, to find all the intermediary values,
we can numerically determine all the optimal paths going backward10 from the
new steady state (K2, Q2, B2) to the previous level of capital K1. Numerically this
needs to invert the non-linear system, add a small deviation from the new steady
state (K2, Q2, B2) and calculate all backward paths from this little deviation to the
level of capital of the first steady state K1. We only consider the path(s) joining
K1 because this is the only continuous variable. Since the system is stable we
know that there is a unique way to reach the steady state starting from the small
deviation.
We still need to know and find exactly which little deviation from the steady
state can be considered. Let η be an infinitesimal variation. The variation might
be ηK, or ηv, or ηb, or any combination of three of them. Empirically we test all
possibilites. We initially exclude all the deviations that lead to irrealistic results:
v < 1
β
, b < 0 and K < 0. We also exclude the paths that never reach K1. We
consider all other deviations: the ones whose associated paths reach K1 and keep
positive values of v and b. Numerically we notice that the paths they induce are
equivalent, which means that for an intermediary time they back-converge to the
exact same values of (Kt, vt, bt). This outstanding numerical result allows us to
conclude on the numerical uniqueness of the optimal path. Since all the paths tend
to converge, we can consider any deviation among them11.
Therefore we can calculate the precise numerical trajectories of our productive
economy when there is an unexpected and permanent shock in the investment
10We can neglegt forward terms because the change of the parameters is unexpected and
permanent.
11Since the non-linear system is stable, we know that sufficiently close to the steady state, there
is a unique path. There is no theoritical warranty when we are far enough from the steady state,
but numerically this is true.
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Figure 4.5: Evolution of the equilibrium values for a large negative shock on the
collateral limit γ by 50% (credit crunch)
parameters. When the change of the parameters is announced a few periods before,
this method still works. If the information about the change(s) is not precise enough,
we would have to consider a mix of a backward and a forward solutions, wich could
either “smooth” or “emphasize” our following simulations. The interesting case of
changing the investment parameters for a fixed number of periods can be treated
as two following unexpected changes if the length of the changes is unknown.
Following this way of reasoning, we present two examples of optimal paths for
two changes in the investment parameters π and γ. The changes are supposed to
be unexpected and permanent.
4.3.2 Restricting the amount of collateral
We calculate the effect on the price of the capital and the evolution of the average
capital starting from an initial steady state, and going to the new steady state.
The initial parameters values are α = 0.4, β = 1
1+r∞
, δ = 0.025, r∞ = 4%. The
investment probability π remains constant to 10%. The collateral constraint
parameter γ skips from 10% to 5%: this represents a large 50% decrease!
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Figure 4.6: Effect on the price components v and b of the negative shock on the
collateral limit
On the simulation, Figure 4.5, the average capital slightly decreases after the
shock until reaching the new steady state. Reducing the collateral limit decreases
the amount of the investment and therefore also decreases the capital. However
this effect is very weak. It means that whatever the change of γ in the collateral
constraint, it does not change by a large extent the average capital. The v valuation
parameter is the same for both steady states because it does not depend on γ, as
shown is equation (4.32). On the opposite, the bubble component instantaneously
increases. This helps little capitalizations to relax the constraint. The new price of
the average capital remains close to the initial one because of the only variation of
the b component.
The effect of the variation of the valuation components highly depends on the
size of the firms, as shown on Figure 4.6. Two remarks arise from the simulation:
• If we consider a small firm with a small amount of capital, we still have
Vt(K
m
t ) = vtK
m
t + bt. This shows that the bubble component is going to
create a huge gap on the market price. This underlines how changing the
collateral limit for borrowing has a large impact on the valuations of the
small capitalizations. On the opposite, when firms have a large amount of
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Figure 4.7: Effect on the price components v and b of the negative shock on π by 5%
capital, their market prices are few sensitive to the collateral limit. These
conclusions confirm the intuition.
• To get such a sharp increase in b, it is necessary to change γ by 50%, this is
hardly believable, unless for a liquidity crisis. In the recent subprime crisis,
firms faced credit rationing, (Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010). This can be
interpretated as an important shock on γ. However, market prices did not
increase to keep the same borrowing level.
4.3.3 Variation of the investment probability π
In the following example Figure 4.7, we suppose that there is a permanent unex-
pected decrease of the probability of investment π from 10% to 5%. Again we show
the evolution of the valuation components.
Decreasing the probability of investment forces the firms to make larger invest-
ments when the opportunity occurs. Intuitively, a higher price per unit of capital
is the only solution to make larger investments, given the borrowing limits. By
simulation, this is what happens, v and b increase. Decreasing the probability of
investment penalizes small firms and big firms, while a decrease of γ mainly impact
small firms (previous case). Beyond these two examples, it remains impossible to
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predict exactly the effects of the changes of both parameters. The two components
of the prices (v, b) are discontinuous. Their effects might add up and create a jump
of the market value or offset and keep the market value smooth.
4.3.4 Do interest rate control bubbles?
The variations of interest rate have very little effect for two reasons. First, on
average, firms have low capital because of the investment constraints and the rental
rate of capital is high, this easily covers the interest rate of the bank. Second, the
amount of the loan is small and the firms pay interests only when the investment
opportunity happens. The results of this model can be summarized this way:
Conclusions:
• Reducing the probability of investment at each period leads to an increase
in the firms’ prices to reach the optimal level of investment. Actually, the
literature focusing on prices and investment did not study this question, but
rather the sensitivity of investment on firms’ pricesa. For example, Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) show that firms with a high shadow price v
are likely to make more investments.
• Reducing the amount of collateral the firms pledge only increase the bubble
component of the market value. Credit rationning should generate higher
prices. This may be true for growth periods, but false for crises periods.
In addition, the collateral limit γ has very little influence on prices, unless
shocks are really large.
• Prices increase when the investment becomes sparser.
• Interest rate shocks do not affect prices.
aMoreover, the literature is divided on this issue, Kaplan and Zingales (2000)
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The“disappointing” conclusions of the model (insignificant effects of the interest
rates and the borrowing limit) lead up to think about the significance of this model,
and also about the concept of “bubbles”.
4.4 Beyond Miao andWang bubbles: vocabulary
and welfare issues
Extending Miao and Wang (2011) by adding interest rates on loans is not com-
pletely satisfactory as we just showed. The authors nonetheless introduced, after
determining their equilibria, a probability of switching from the “bubbly” steady
state to the other one, as a couple of recent articles do, like for example Kocher-
lakota (2009) and Kunieda and Shibata (2012a). Needless to say that we could
do exactly the same and that would not change the results, except to make the
calculations a more complicated... As a conclusion to this model, there could be no
central-bank policy exclusively based on interest rates that could help the economy
evolve the best way. We adopt a different framework in the following chapter to
overhaul the efficiency of interest rates. Before introducing a new framework, we
would like to go back to the analysis of what Miao and Wang (2011) call a “bubbly”
steady-state.
4.4.1 What is a bubble?
As explained before, we adopted the definition of “bubbly pricing” of Miao and
Wang (2011). The additive component b is called a bubble, excluding v, because
firms whose capital is really close to zero are valued at least at the bubble price
and b is a non-proportionnal part in the valuation. We raise the question wether
their definition matches the historical one introduced by Blanchard and Watson
(1982). It appears that the non-bubbly equilibrium is just a linear pricing, and the
bubbly one is an affine pricing.
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First, the two pricings behave the same way: when b 6= 0, v is independant from
γ. On the opposite, when b = 0, v is varying with respect to π and with respect to
γ. We recall here both expressions, vb and vnb to represent the value of v whether
there is a bubble or not. To simplify we take β = 1
1+r∞
:
• b 6= 0:
vb =
(1 + r∞)(πβ − β + 1)
πβ
,
• b = 0:
vnb =
δ(1− π)
π
(
1− 1−γ
1+r∞
) .
The no-bubble valuation depends a lot on the γ parameter: the smaller γ, the higher
v. Indeed, the “bubbleless” equilibrium pricing v or linear valuation, is increasing
when the collateral constraint γ tightens. It is also increasing when the probability
of investment π decreases. As a consequence, the linear equilibrium price helps the
firms relaxing the investments constraints. To conclude, both pricings (linear and
affine) behave the same with respect to the investment constraints.
Let us consider an economy located at the bubbly steady state. We compare
the different pricings. The bubbly price is:
Vb(K) = vK + b. (4.41)
By definition, a firm’s fundamental price is the discounted sum of the net cash-flows
it generates. From equation 4.18:
Vf (K) =
∑
t≥0
βt (RK(1− π)− π(v(γK) + b)) . (4.42)
Numerical application: α = 0.4, β = 1
1+r∞
= 0.96, γ = 5%, π = 10%. From this,
we deduce the equilibrium values: v = 1.46, b = 1.31 and the equilibrium capital is
K = 13.25.
The real bubble corresponds to the difference between the two prices Vb − Vf .
For the equilibrium average value of capital K, both prices are identical, this shows
that for the average equilibrium capital, there is no bubble in the price. For low
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capitalization Vb Vf B = Vb − Vf
1 2.77 −1.60 4.37
K 20.60 20.50 0.1
20 30.43 32.50 −2.07
40 59.56 68.40 −8.84
Table 4.2: Comparison between the bubbly price and the historical one
capitalizations, the fundamental price is lower than the bubbly price, and for higher
capitalizations, this is the opposite. To conclude, there is no permanent bubble
in the market prices. There are however distortions of prices depending on the
capitalizations of firms. The bubbly price helps the little capitalizations.
4.4.2 Welfare of the steady states
It is interesting to compare the steady state values of the two equilibria. We use
the same parameters values: α = 0.4, r∞ = 4%, β =
1
1+r∞
. The consumption is
given by: C = Y − π(r∞L+ I) and the debt is: L = vγK + b
investment parameters π = 5% π = 10% π = 10% π = 20%
γ = 10% γ = 10% γ = 5% γ = 5%
affine price v = 1.89, v = 1.47, v = 1.47, v = 1.26,
R = 0.11, R = 0.08, R = 0.08, R = 0.08,
K = 9.12, K = 14.03, K = 14.03, K = 16.28,
b = 1.99, b = 0.38, b = 1.44, b ≈< 0,
C = 2.2, C = 2.51, C = 2.51, C = 2.56,
P = 19.23 P = 21.00 P = 22.01 P = 20.5
linear price v = 3.48, v = 1.65, v = 2.55, v = 1.13
R = 0.16, R = 0.09, R = 0.13, R = 0.07,
K = 4.6, K = 12.01, K = 6.51, K = 17.97,
C = 1.72, C = 2.38, C = 1.85, C = 2.5,
P = 16.00 P = 19.82 P = 16.6 P = 20.3
Table 4.3: Comparison between the two steady states
The linear pricing (bubbleless) is not as reliable as the affine pricing: from the
consumer (resp. investor, producer) point of view, the consumption (resp. firm
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average price, capital) is higher when using the affine pricing. In the linear pricing,
medium-sized and big firms are favoured, (v is high), and in the affine pricing, the
smallest firms are favoured, because of the shift term b. In the affine pricing, small
firms are less affected by the investment constraints.
This remark leads us to the constraint problem. The Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
constraint: Lt < γVt(Kt) applied to the same problem, with the same form of value
function Vt(Kt) = vtKt + bt rules out the term bt. In this situation (bt = 0) both
constraints are equivalent:
γVt(Kt) = γvtKt = vtγKt = Vt(γKt), (4.43)
and they delivers the same results: the solution to the same problem with the KM
constraint gives the same results as the linear pricing of the MW constraint.
4.4.3 Interpretation of v in terms of Tobin
Usually the Tobin’s Q represents the ratio: value of stock market over the net
worth. In the present model this ratio is given by Q = Vt(Kt)
Kt
. In the linear pricing,
Q = v, and in the affine pricing Q also depends on K: Q = v + b
K
. If the global
capital is very small, given the term b
K
the Tobin’s Q reaches high values. The
shadow price of the capital v corresponds to the marginal q. The Tobin’s q (on
Figure 4.8) has been criticized especially because it was failing to predict investment
correctly, for example in Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993). In this model, the
Tobin’s q reflects the investment given the investment constraints: it increases when
investment opportunities and collateral constraints tighten. When all constraints
are relaxed, and the firms do not reach the maximal investment, Q = v = 1
β
. When
the market crashes, usually the stock values collapse, the firms reduce investment,
and the regulators tend to make the investment easier to improve the state of the
economy, which precisely in our model, decreases v. So maybe the Tobin’s q reflects
better the investment taking into account the investment restrictions.
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Figure 4.8: Tobin’s Q ratio 1900-2009a
aSource: The Federal Reserve, Blanchard et al. (1993)
4.5 Conclusion of the model
To reach the maximal investment i.e. v > 1
β
, the probability of investment π and
the collateral amount γ have to be very low and this seems unrealistic. If we
intended to limit borrowing of firms by 50% of their values, it would require that
the probability of investment π is less than 0.001. This means that each firm would
invest on average every 1000 years, this never happens actually. These restrictions
on parameters hardly limit the level of debt.
We also disagree about the ability of the model of Miao and Wang (2011) to
create a “bubble”. We acknowledge the interest of the constraint they introduce,
which creates two different pricings while the usual borrowing constraint does not.
Unfortunately, interest rates have little effect (almost zero) on the prices of the
firms, as far as the discount rate of the investor does not depend on it. Indeed, the
interest rate reduces the remaining part of the production which is available for
the consumption but this is the only effect: the aggregate consumption is given
by Ct = Yt − π(It − rtLt). We were expecting some influence on the valuations.
Though the model shows intuitive and nice results to changes in investment policy,
the sensitivity of variables such as prices and capital remains low.
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Given the low credibility of the numerical results, and the weakness of the
model to reproduce the effect of the bank interest rate on prices, we introduce in
the next chapter a more realistic capital structure of firms, to include a permanent
part of debt (long-term debt). We do not change the other hypothesis.
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In the previous chapter, we considered that the capital of the firms was excusively
composed of equity, and firms were borrowing short-term debts when they were
investing. The debt was designed to help the firms increase the level of investment
when the opportunity of investment happened. Unfortunately, interest rates on
debts have little impact, because amounts of the debt are low, and debts only
exist when the investment opportunities occur. We also proved that there exist no
bubble in firms’ prices, but two different pricings, one affine and one linear pricing.
The existence of these two pricings depend on the form of the borrowing constraint,
the one of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or the one of Miao and Wang (2011). The
present chapter changes the financial structure of firms to include a permanent
part of long-term debt in the capital. In this case, the capital is composed of debt
and equity. Instead of relaxing the borrowing constraint, the debt is a production
factor. As a consequence, this model requires the existence of a debt market.
With this new structure of firms, we show that interest rates have a significant
effect on firms, precisely they influence the amounts of capital and the prices. In
addition, we are interested to test the robustness of this new capital structure to
the form of the borrowing constraint. Apart from this new feature, the following
model keeps the same assumptions as the previous chapter.
This new capital structure emphasizes the uniqueness of the way of pricing firms,
and this pricing does not depend on the choice of the constraint. Prices are quite
sensitive to interest rates. Generally, prices are free from bubbles. Nevertheless,
we exhibit a particular relation between the parameters of the model (limit of
borrowing, probability of investment), such that prices are bubbles.
The first part exposes the model, the second establishes the Bellman equation
and the difference equations. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the pricing systems and
their responses to interest rate variations, and last section concludes.
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5.1 Structure of the capital
The assumptions about the economic context of this model correspond exactly to
the ones of Chapter 4 section 1. We quickly recall them and then we detail the
new features of the model.
5.1.1 General informations
We assume that there exists a continuum of firms with the same “Cobb Douglas”
production function, with constant return to scale. Y mt is the production of firm m
at time t, Kmt and N
m
t are respectively the capital and labor of the firm m.
Y mt = (K
m
t )
α(Nmt )
1−α, (5.1)
with α ∈]0, 1[. The aggregate output is Yt. There is a unique wage wt per unit of
time. There is a fixed supply of labor, Nt = 1. Firms optimize their benefits at
each period with respect to their employment. As a consequence, the rental rate of
capital is the same for all firms: Rt = αY
1−α
t and the aggregate output satisfies
the same condition as before: Yt = K
α
t N
1−α
t . The depreciation rate of the capital
is δ and there is a probability π such that each firm can make an investment at
each period:
• Kmt+1 = (1− δ)K
m
t with a probability (1− π); (5.2)
• Kmt+1 = (1− δ)K
m
t + I
m
t with a probability π. (5.3)
The new structure of the capital of the firms is composed of equity and debt.
For a firm m, the equity is denoted by Emt and the debt by D
m
t . We have
Kmt = E
m
t +D
m
t . The debt is supplied perfectly elastically by the bank, which also
fixes the interest rate. The firms only borrows from the bank and have no access
to capital gains of other firms, which are paid to investors and consumed.
The equity of firms is priced on the stock market: the value of firm m at time t
is: Vt(E
m
t ).
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5.1.2 Borrowing limit
The bank limits the debt of each firm by a fraction of the value of the firm: to
borrow, the firm pledges a part of his equity. This is designed to guarantee that
the firm’s debt is sustainable: the firm has to pay the interests of his debt, and
the firm has to be able to repay the whole debt. The amount the firm pledges is
such that the firm has no interest to lose the equity instead of refunding the bank.
The collateral constraint obviously concerns the equity Emt instead of the whole
capital Kmt , to avoid securing the debt by another debt. All along this chapter we
consider the two constraints that are used in the recent litterature.
• the KM (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) constraint:
Dmt ≤ γVt(E
m
t ), (5.4)
• the MW (Miao and Wang, 2011) constraint:
Dmt ≤ Vt(γE
m
t ). (5.5)
The investment relies on the gains of the capital RtK
m
t . At each period, the
firm pays the interest on the debt, rtDt. Since the capital depreciates, the amount
of the equity changes at each period and the amount of debt might do the same.
We suppose that the rental rate of capital is higher than the bank interest rate,
otherwise the firm would never borrow from the bank: Rt > rt. The financial
cash-flow at each period is the yield on whole capital minus the interests of the
debt:
RtK
m
t − rtD
m
t = Rt(E
m
t +D
m
t )− rtD
m
t , (5.6)
= RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)D
m
t . (5.7)
While Rt − rt > 0 capital gains on the debt part are strictly positive, because the
objective function equation (5.7) is linear in Dmt , and Rt does not depend on firm
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m:
max
Dmt
RtK
m
t − rtD
m
t . (5.8)
As soon as Rt − rt > 0, the firm borrows as much as possible. This remains true,
whatever the choice of the constraint. When Rt − rt > 0 the collateral constraint
(MW or KM) is binding.
At each period the whole capital depreciates, Kmt becomes K
m
t (1 − δ). The
capital is composed of equity and debt, therefore the sum Emt +D
m
t depreciates.
As we just proved, at each time, the borrowing constraint must be binding. For the
sequel of the chapter, we adopt KM constraint: at any time t the debt of the firm
must satisfy Dmt = γV
m
t (E
m
t ). At time t + 1 the capital of the firm satisfies the
same relation: Dmt+1 = γV
m
t+1(E
m
t+1). The values of Et+1 and D
m
t+1 depend on the
possibility of investment. In addition, if there is a variation of the debt: Dmt+1 6= D
m
t ,
there must be a transfer to the bank. This variation (Dmt+1 −D
m
t ) can be included
either in the cash flow of the period, or from the next period capital.
Normally, when a firm wants to refund a bank, it uses the capital gains. If the
variation of the debt (Dmt+1−D
m
t ) is included in the cash flow, we get the following
equation on the investment:
0 ≤ Imt ≤ RtK
m
t − rtD
m
t +D
m
t+1 −D
m
t (5.9)
≤ Rt(E
m
t + γV
m
t (E
m
t ))− rtγV
m
t (E
m
t ) + γV
m
t+1(E
m
t+1)− γV
m
t (E
m
t ).
The investment Imt is the control variable of the firm. To solve the problem,
the control variable must not depend on the value of next period state variable.
However, equation (5.9) shows that Imt+1 is correlated to E
m
t+1 by term γV
m
t+1(E
m
t+1).
In addition ∂
∂Emt+1
Vt+1(E
m
t+1) > 0, because increasing I
m
t+1 increases E
m
t+1, which in
turns increases the maximal bound of the investment Imt+1. This allows for a Ponzi
scheme. Technically, this means that the correspondance is not compact.
Because of this technical point, we must include the variation of the debt in the
next period capital Kmt+1. The value of the debt at time t+ 1 is different wether
the investment happens Di(t+ 1) or not Dn(t+ 1):
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• Kmt+1 = (1− δ)K
m
t +D
m
n(t+1) −D
m
t with a probability (1− π), (5.10)
• Kmt+1 = (1− δ)K
m
t + I
m
t +D
m
i(t+1) −D
m
t with a probability π. (5.11)
These two equations are analog to (4.5) and (4.6) of the previous chapter. The
investment is bounded from above by the financial cash-flow of the period:
0 ≤ Imt ≤ RtK
m
t − rtD
m
t = RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)D
m
t . (5.12)
We can write the Bellman equation. We are pricing the equity Emt instead of the
whole capital.
Vt(E
m
t ) = max
Imt satisfying eq. (5.12)
RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)D
m
t − πI
m
t
+ πβVt+1(E
m
i(t+1))
+ (1− π)βVt+1(E
m
n(t+1)); (5.13)
where Emi(t+1) and E
m
n(t+1) are the respective values of the equity whether the
investment occurs or not. RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)D
m
t − πI
m
t represents the cash-flow of
period t + 1 minus the investment. We determine the next-period values of the
equity:
Emn(t+1) +D
m
n(t+1) = K
m
n(t+1) = (1− δ)K
m
t +D
m
n(t+1) −D
m
t . (5.14)
This gives:
Emn(t+1) = E
m
t (1− δ)− δD
m
t . (5.15)
The same way, we get the equation on Emi(t+1):
Emi(t+1) = E
m
t (1− δ)− δD
m
t + I
m
t . (5.16)
This leads to the complete Bellman equation of the price of the equity:
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Vt(E
m
t ) = max
0≤Imt ≤RtE
m
t +(Rt−rt)D
m
t
RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)D
m
t − πI
m
t
+ πβVt+1(E
m
t (1− δ)− δD
m
t + I
m
t )
+ (1− π)βVt+1(E
m
t (1− δ)− δD
m
t ). (5.17)
The transversality condition is:
βtVt(E
m
t )
t →t→∞ 0. (5.18)
To solve this equation, we distinguish two main cases, when the solution is
interior, and when the investment constraint is binding.
5.2 Solving the Bellman equation
5.2.1 Interior solution
Interior solution means that the constraint of the control variable will never be
binding: It+1 < RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)D
m
t and the first order conditions are satisfied.
Even if it does not create any bubble, it remains very useful to get an intuition on
the form of the value function V . We adopt the Kiyotaki and Moore constraint:
Dmt ≤ γVt(E
m
t ). As explained before this is an equality D
m
t = γVt(E
m
t ) because
the borrowing constraint is binding (5.8). The MW case gives the same results.
The Bellman equation becomes:
Vt(E
m
t ) = max
0≤Imt ≤RtE
m
t +(Rt−rt)γVt(E
m
t )
RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)γVt(E
m
t )− πI
m
t
+ πβVt+1(E
m
t (1− δ)− δγVt(E
m
t ) + I
m
t )
+ (1− π)βVt+1(E
m
t (1− δ)− δγVt(E
m
t )).
(5.19)
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The first order condition with respect to the investment:
V ′t+1(E
m
t (1− δ)− δγVt(E
m
t ) + I
m
t ) =
1
β
; (5.20)
where V ′(x) is the first order derivative of V . The FOC with respect to the state
variable Emt gives:
V ′t (E
m
t ) =Rt + (Rt − rt)γV
′
t (E
m
t )
+ πβV ′t+1 (E
m
t (1− δ)− δγVt(E
m
t ) + I
m
t ) (1− δ − δγV
′
t (E
m
t ))
+ (1− π)βV ′t+1 (E
m
t (1− δ)− δγVt(E
m
t )) (1− δ − δγV
′
t (E
m
t )) .
(5.21)
Substitute (5.20) in (5.21) and we get:
Rt + (Rt − rt)
γ
β
=
1− β
β
+ δ +
δγ
β
. (5.22)
We remark that the rental rate of the capital does not depend on π but on the
borrowing limit γ. Actually this is logical: the investment constraint is assumed not
to be binding, which means that the firm can reach the optimal level of investment.
The probability of investment does not affect the average level of capital, and
the rental rate of the capital. We understand that Rt has to cover the subjective
interest rate of the investor: 1−β
β
and the depreciation rate of capital δ. The rental
rate excess with respect to the debt (Rt − rt) associated to its proportion in the
capital γ has to cover the depreciation of the capital financed by the debt δγ. The
rental rate of capital can be also expressed as:
Rt =
1− β + δβ + δγ + γrt
β + γ
. (5.23)
For all values of γ ∈ [0, 1], Rt remains larger than rt, the borrowing constraint
keeps binding. When rt increases, Rt also increases and the capital reduces, as well
as the debt. Again, we need to be careful with long-term interpretations, depending
on the validity of the discount condition β = 1
1+r∞
, where r∞ is the limit of the
short-term bank interest rate rt. The derivative of Rt with respect to the borrowing
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parameter γ is:
∂Rt
∂γ
=
−1 + β + βrt
(β + γ)2
. (5.24)
The positivity of the numerator depend on the link between β and rt:
∂Rt
∂γ
> 0⇔
β > 1
1+rt
. When the subjective discount rate of the agents rc such that β =
1
1+rc
is
lower than the bank interest rate rc < rt, investors reduce the whole capital when
the borrowing constraint is relaxed, they consume more. This is the opposite as
the usual behavior of a household which stores a part of his wealth in a bank asset.
Indeed, when the debt is more costly, the investors decrease the capital to pay less
interests.
Increasing the bank interest rate reduces the capital of the firm, it reduces the
investment, and the debt. Relaxing the debt limit (increasing γ) increases the level
of capital if the bank interest rate is sufficiently low: rt <
1−β
β
.
We deduce from (5.20) that the valuation of the firms is given by:
Vt(E
m
t ) =
Emt
β
+ bt; (5.25)
where bt is a common constant that depends on the period. To find bt we substitue
equation (5.25) in the Bellman equation (5.19):
bt(1− γ(Rt − rt) + δγ) = βbt+1 (5.26)
We use the equation (5.23) to get:
bt
1 + γ + γrt
β + γ
= bt+1 (5.27)
Because2 1 + γrt > β the solution to equation (5.27) diverges. It can still be a
solution to the Bellman equation, only if it satisfies the transversality condition,
equation (5.18).
βtVt(A
m
t ) = β
t−1Amt + β
tbt. (5.28)
2We assume rt > 0.
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The first term converges to zero, and the second is:
βtbt = β
tb0
t−1∏
t=0
1 + γ + γrt
β + γ
= b0
t−1∏
t=0
β + βγ + βγrt
β + γ
. (5.29)
To know if equation(5.29) converges to zero, we must study the limit of the term
β+βγ+βγrt
β+γ
. Ler r∞ be the limit of the short-term interest rate:
β + βγ + βγr∞
β + γ
< 1 ⇐⇒ β <
1
1 + r∞
. (5.30)
Let rc be the discount rate of the consumers: β =
1
1+rc
. In this case, equation
(5.29) converges to zero if and only if:
rc > r∞. (5.31)
If equation(5.31) is true, the transversality condition (5.18) is true and any price
of type:
Vt(E
m
t ) =
Emt
β
+ b0
t−1∏
t=0
1 + γ + γrt
β + γ
(5.32)
is a solution to the Bellman equation (5.19). In addition this solution has a
diverging bubble component in the price. To know if this solution exists, we must
study the behavior of the bank.
In section 5.1.2, we proved that the firm was borrowing if and only if the rental
rate of the capital Rt is larger than the bank interest rate rt. This condition when
t→∞ becomes:
1− β + δβ + δγ + γr∞
β + γ
> r∞. (5.33)
In this equation (5.33), we can substitute β = 1
1+rc
. We get a new condition on rc:
rc + δ + δγ > r∞, (5.34)
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which is compatible with the previous condition, equation (5.31). The remaining
question is to determine the behavior of the bank.
5.2.2 The bank optimizes
To rule out bubbles, the bank can set the long-term interest rate to r∞ > rc.
However, if the bank optimizes the profits, the value of r∞ is the solution to the
bank’s problem:
The bank maximizes the limit of the sequence of one-period problems by solving:
max
r∞
r∞Dt, (5.35)
with Dt such that K = Et + Dt and R is given by equation (5.23): R =
1−β+δβ+δγ+γr∞
β+γ
. To link Et and Dt, we consider equation (5.32). To simplify
let us write Bt = B0
∏t−1
t=0
1+γ+γrt
β+γ
. Because R is constant, we know that K is
constant. At each time t we have:
Dt = γVt(E
m
t ) = γ
Emt
β
+Bt. (5.36)
Because Vt(E
m
t ) diverges if E
m
t ≥ 0, to keep Dt +Et constant, we need to consider
a negative equity:
K = γ
(
Emt
β
+Bt
)
+ Et
⇐⇒ Et = (K − γBt)
β
β + γ
. (5.37)
The bank problem at time t becomes:
max
r∞
r∞γVt
(
(K − γBt)
β
β + γ
)
= max
r∞
r∞
K
β
+
βBt
β + γ
= max
r∞
r∞
1
β
R
α
1
α−1
+
β
β + γ
B0
t−1∏
t=0
1 + γ + γrt
β + γ
. (5.38)
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The profit of the bank is strictly increasing in rt, which states that the bank should
fix r∞ as high as possible. However by equation (5.31), the firm borrows if and
only if rc > r∞. There is no well defined solution to this problem, because the
domain of r∞ is open. Any value of r∞ strictly lower but closed to rc guarantees
to the bank a large and increasing profit.
There is a state of the economy, such that the price of the equity includes a
non-zero growing bubble. There is a Ponzi sheme on the debt due to the bubble,
which still satisfies the transversality condition. This state generates a very unsual
situation of negative equity for the firm. If we impose a reasonable condition of
positive equity, this rules out the bubble in a finite time T , when EmT = 0.
If we suppose that the firm has a long-term positive equity, the bubbly term is
zero: B0 = 0. The price of the firm is therefore Vt(Et) =
Et
β
. We can deduce the
value of the debt: Dt = γVt(Et) =
γEt
β
. The value of the equity comes from the
value of R in equation (5.23):
K =
R
α
1
α−1
= Dt
(
1 +
γ
β
)
(5.39)
We deduce that the debt is constant over time, and the value of the debt is:
D =
β
β + γ
(
1− β + δβ + δγ + γr∞
α(β + γ)
) 1
α−1
. (5.40)
The optimization function of the bank is:
max
r∞
[
r∞
β
β + γ
(
1− β + δβ + δγ + γr∞
α(β + γ)
) 1
α−1
]
. (5.41)
This gives the optimal long term interest rate of the bank, expressed with the
discount rate of the investor rc:
r∞ = (rc + δβ + δγ)
1− γ
1− γ + γα
. (5.42)
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With the value of r∞, we can deduce the value of R, and the complete problem
(investor, bank, consumer) has a unique solution.
• If the equity of the firms is positive, the KM constraint rules out the hypothetic
constant term. As a consequence the valuation does not depend on the time,
and becomes:
V (Emt ) =
Emt
β
. (5.43)
The bank optimizes its profits by setting the long term interest rate. There
is a unique solution to the model.
• If the firms could be in negative equity, there would exist a bubble in the
prices of the firms. This bubble would be geometrically growing over time,
and would create a Ponzi scheme on the debt. This would also allow for
unlimited profits for the bank, while the long-term interest rate on debts
would remain smaller than the subjective discount rate of the investor rc.
We proved in this part that the investment probability π is “useless” when the
investment constraint is not binding, i.e. when the shadow price of capital does not
exceed 1
β
. We also remark the formulation of the value function in (5.25) that we
will impose to find the boundary solution. If we adopt the Miao and Wang point
of view: the constraint becomes Vt(γK
m
t ), the results are the same because the
derivative of Vt(γK
m
t ) also gives a factor γ.
5.2.3 Maximal investment
In this part, we consider intially the Miao and Wang constraint3. We go back to
the Bellman equation and now we suppose that the shadow price of the capital
exceeds 1
β
: when the investment opportunity happens, the firm is willing to
invest as much as possible, and the investment reaches its maximal level: Imt =
RtE
m
t +(Rt−rt)Vt(γE
m
t ), becauseD
m
t = γVt(E
m
t ). We replace this expression in the
Bellman equation and we also substitute the value function by Vt(E
m
t ) = vtE
m
t + bt.
3The KM case is done in Appendix C.
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We get the following equation:
vtE
m
t + bt =(RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)(γvtE
m
t + bt)) (1− π)
+ βvt+1(E
m
t (1− δ)− δ(γvtE
m
t + bt)) + βbt+1
+ πβvt+1(RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)(γvtE
m
t + bt)).
(5.44)
We identify the terms that depend on Emt and the others to get two difference
equations on vt and bt:
vt =
βvt+1 (πRt + 1− δ) +Rt(1− π)
1− γ(Rt − rt)(1− π) + βγvt+1 (δ − π(Rt − rt))
; (5.45)
bt (1− ((Rt − rt)(1− π) + (Rt − rt)πβvt+1 − δβvt+1)) = βbt+1. (5.46)
We still need to consider the equation on the global capital Kt to get the complete
dynamic system. We know that for each firm we have: Kmt = E
m
t + Vt(γE
m
t )
because the investment constraint is binding, so we need to get the evolution of
Emt :
Emt+1 = (1− δ)E
m
t − δVt(γE
m
t ) + π (RtE
m
t + (Rt − rt)Vt(γE
m
t )) . (5.47)
We aggregate all the firms to get:
Et+1 = (1− δ)Et − δ(vtγEt + bt) + π (RtEt + (Rt − rt)(vtγEt + bt)) . (5.48)
Since Kmt = E
m
t + Vt(γE
m
t ) = E
m
t (1 + γvt) + bt we deduce the equation on the
average capital:
Kt+1 − bt+1
1 + γvt+1
=(1− δ)
Kt − bt
1 + γvt
− δ
(
vtγ
Kt − bt
1 + γvt
+ bt
)
+ π
(
Rt
Kt − bt
1 + γvt
+ (Rt − rt)
(
vtγ
Kt − bt
1 + γvt
+ bt
))
.
(5.49)
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Instead of considering this “not so easy to use” equation, we focus on the equity
equation (5.48) and make the link between Et and Rt:
Rt = αK
α−1
t = α (Et(1 + γvt) + bt)
α−1
. (5.50)
The whole system is now given by equations (5.45) and (5.46), (5.48) and (5.50).
We impose the transversality conditions to the solutions.
βtvtEt →t→∞ 0,
βtbt →t→∞ 0. (5.51)
Given the complete system, we look for the equilibrium values of the variables.
This allows to find the price(s), and the equilibrium global level(s) of capital of the
production economy.
5.3 Linear pricing
5.3.1 Equilibrium values of the model
Taking b = 0 is a solution to equation (5.46). The solution of b = 0 is the same for
both constraints (MW and KM) for linearity reasons. We use the two equations
(5.45) and (5.48) and get the following results. The variables without t subscript
denote the steady-state values. We obtain the following system:
v =
R(1− π)
1− β − γ(R− r∞)(1− π)
,
v =
δ − πR
γ(π(R− r∞)− δ)
.
Together they give the values of R and v:
R =
δ(1− β) + δγr∞(1− π)
π(1− β)
, (5.52)
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v =
δγ(1− π)
γ (π(1− β)− δγ(1− π))
. (5.53)
The rental rate of capital R is inversely proportionnal to the probability of
investment π. This shows that when investment opportunities rarefy, the rental
rate of the capital increases, and the capital decreases. This corresponds to smaller
firms with higher rate of return on the capital. When the collateral constraint γ is
relaxed, the rental rate of the capital slightly increases. This corresponds to the
interests on the depreciation of the debt ∝ δr∞.
The rental rate of capital depends on the debt interest rate of the bank, it increases
when the bank interest rate increases. The effect of the bank interest rate is
emphasized by the scarcity of investment.
Curiously the v shadow price of the capital does not depend on the bank interest
rate. On Figure 5.1, we draw v as a function of π and γ to know when v > 1
β
,
necessary condition for maximal investment. On this graph and the following ones,
we limit the values to 20, though it reaches higher values. The same way, the lower
limit is 0 even if the values are negative. The dark blue area corresponds to the
values of v such that v < 1
β
, where the solution does not exist.
On Figure 5.1, we remark a curve along which v diverges. Looking at equation
(5.53), we understand that when π →>
δγ
1−β+δγ
, v → ∞. We will consider how
interpretating this phenomenon in the following. Above this curve, for any fixed
value of γ, v is decreasing with respect to π which means that there exists a
threshold such that v = 1
β
and we reach the interior solution. In this model,
the combinations of π and γ that allow v > 1
β
do not especially correspond to
restrictions in investment or collateral but on the opposite, the values are quite
large. To check the validity of the borrowing constraint, we check that R remains
larger than the long-term bank interest rate r∞ = 4% for any couple (π, γ).
We can draw the whole domain where the steady state of the linear pricing
exists.
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Figure 5.1: Shadow price v in maximal investment with respect to π and γ
In the blue zone, only the interior solution exists, v = 1
β
. On the π upper limit
of the red zone4, v = 1
β
and the value of R of the linear pricing correspond to
the value of R of the interior solution. This means that when π increases, the
equilibrium steady state of the linear pricing becomes continuously the steady state
of the interior solution.
On the left border of the red zone, R behaves continuously while v diverges.
This means that vγ diverges and K = E +D remains smooth. However E ≥ 0 and
D ≥ 0. The equity of the firm A→ 0 and the shadow price v diverges to keep the
product vγA smooth. On this limit the equity converges to zero and the capital is
only composed of debt. Along this curve, there exists a bubble. The value of the
debt is vγE = D and the value of the capital is K = E +D = 0 +D. There is a
bubble, and the price of the bubble is K
γ
.
4Right border of the red part Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Existence domain of the shadow price v: v > 1
β
and R > r∞ = 4%
The performance of this model relies on the ability of the economy and the prices
to reach a steady state for quite large and realistic values of π and γ, in which the
capital is priced over its “usual” value: v > 1
β
. There also exists a relation between
the investment parameters: π = δγ
1−β+δγ
such that when it is satisfied, the capital
of firms is only composed of debts, the amount of the equity is zero, but the equity
has a net positive price, there is a real bubble in the economy. The value of the
bubble is K
γ
.
By linearization and numerical tests, we prove that the steady state is stable where
it exists.
5.3.2 The bank’s equilibrium interest rate
Again, to get a global equilibrium, let us consider that the bank optimizes its profits
by setting the value of the debt interest rate. At each period, the global amount of
the debt is vγE. The value of the capital is E +D = E(1 + vγ). We deduce E
from R = αKα−1 = αEα−1(1 + vγ)α−1. The bank problem can be stated this way:
max
r∞such that eq.(5.55)
r∞γ
δγ(1− π)
γ(π(1− β)− δγ(1− π))
E. (5.54)
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δ(1− β) + δγr∞(1− π)
π(1− β)
= αEα−1
(
1 + γ
δγ(1− π)
γ(π(1− β)− δγ(1− π))
)α−1
(5.55)
When E is fixed, increasing r∞ increases the bank’s profit. Looking at the constraint,
an increase of r∞ leads to an increase of E
α−1. But (α−1) < 0, therefore increasing
r decreases E. To conclude there is a unique solution to the bank problem, which
determines the level of capital of the firms.
5.3.3 Interest rate shocks
In this section, we focus on the variations of prices and of capital when the capital
is priced over 1
β
. This correspond to the part “linear pricing”.
We evaluate the impact of an unexpected shock on the bank’s interest rate on
the price of the firm. We take α = 0.4, β = 0.96, r∞ = 4%, γ = 90%, π = 40%.
The interest rate mean is 4% and is shocked by 0.5% (absolute value). The steady
state values are: v = 6, R = 9.6%, E = 1.68. The price of the average equity is
V (E) = 10.07. On the following Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 these steady-state values
correspond to the red lines. We expose first the effect of a non-persistent shock,
lasting 1 period, on Figure 5.3.
The unexpected shock on the interest rate decreases the equity, but increases
the shadow price vt. The average price of firms decreases by less than 0.1%, because
the effect on vt is slightly delayed compared to the one on the equity Et. The
rental rate of the capital logically increases, which means that the global capital
first decreases, to refund the increase of the interests and then progressively goes
back to its initial level.
The results are amplified if the shock is more persistent. Suppose that the
interest rate shock is decreasing (AR-1 process, with autoregression coefficient
ρ = 0.4) lasting 5 years, on Figure 5.4. The responses of the shadow price vt and
the equity Et are amplified, but on average, the price of the equity Vt(Et) is not
changed compared to the shock lasting 1 period.
If the amplitude of the shock is increased, simulations show that the response
of the equity and the price are also proportionnaly increased.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of the equilibrium values in response to a shock of 0.5% on the
interest rate lasting 1 year
However, the price of the equity is highly impacted is the shock is lasting over
more periods5. For example, on Figure 5.5, the shock is lasting 20 years (ρ = 0.9
in the AR-1 process).
The main difference, due to the persistence of the shock, is the initial and
persistent decrease of the price Vt(Et) by more than 2%, which leads to think that
there is a fall of 2% on the markets. Obviously, if the amplitude of the shock on
the interest rate was higher, this would generate a larger fall.
5We cannot study the effects of large interest and persistent interest rate shocks because we
reach Dynare’s limits.
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of the equilibrium values in response to a shock of 0.5% on the
interest rate lasting 5 years
Prices of firms are very responsive to interest rate shocks. The shadow price
increases with a positive shock on the bank interest rate. It tends to counterbalance
the decrease of the net equity. On average, market prices decrease by a small
extent. The return to the equilibrium (prices and equity) is very long compared
to the length of the shock. When the interest rate shock is more persistent, the
shadow price first jump down at the shock, like the equity. This can be considered
as “stock market fall”.
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Figure 5.5: Evolution of the equilibrium values in response to a shock of 0.5% on the
interest rate lasting 20 years
5.3.4 Shocks on investment
We expose first the results of a 5% (absolute) shock on the limit of borrowing
γ lasting 5 years. We adopt the same parameters’ values as in the section 5.3.3
presenting shocks on the interest rate.
The effects are unpredictable. Indeed, if γ increases, we are waiting for a
decrease of vt to adjust the net borrowing vtγEt. Actually the pricing vt increases
and the equity reduces. This increase of 5% on γ creates a 2% increase of vt and
decreases Et by 0.4%. Though it might be difficult to understand the response of
the economy, we remark that the price is more volatile than the equity. The rental
rate of the capital does not change a lot, which means that the capital is almost
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Figure 5.6: Evolution of the equilibrium values in response to a shock of 5% on the
borrowing limit γ
constant. The equity reduces and the debt increases for the shock. To conclude
about the behavior of this linear pricing, we simulate the effect of a shock of 5%
(relative shock of 11%) on the probability of investment π.
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Figure 5.7: Evolution of the equilibrium values in response to a shock of 5% on the
investment probability π
The 5% shock on π generates an increase of the equity. In addition, even if
the shadow price decreases, there is an increase of the price of the equity, which
means that the debt increases for the shock. The rental rate of the average
capital decreases, which shows that the capital increases. A positive shock on the
probability on investment means that it is easier to invest. As a consequence, the
valuation of the firm can be relaxed a little bit, because the firm is able to invest
more often. Even if the shadow price of the equity reduces, a positive shock on π
generates a global increase of market prices.
To conclude about the linear pricing, the volatility of the price and the equity
is identical, both are highly impacted by interest rate variations. A positive shock
172
Chapter 5. Long-term debts and bubbles
on the interest rate reduces the equity, and reduces a little the whole capital. The
shadow price increases, except if the shock is persistent, in this case, it decreases
first. Relaxing the borrowing limit increases the shadow price and reduces the
average equity, and increasing the probability of investment increases the equity
and decreases the shadow price. In all cases, the effect on the equity exceeds the
effect on the shadow price, as a consequence, market prices evolve like the equity,
but “smoother”.
5.4 Multiple equilibria
We are also interested by the existence of an affine pricing as solution to the
maximal investment case, and we would like to see how it depends on the borrowing
constraint.
The equilibrium values of the affine pricing exist, see Appendix D. However the
system is unstable and the bubble component does not satisfy the transversality
condition. This affine pricing does not exist either when using the KM constraint,
see Appendix C.
We analyzed all interior solutions, and all situations of maximal investment
with affine prices. Only three solutions coexist:
• The shadow price of the capital v is exactly 1
β
and the average capital of firms
is determined by R through equation (5.23). Since K = E +D = E + vγE,
we can deduce all equilibrium values.
• The shadow price of the capital v strictly exceed 1
β
, the firms invest as much
as possible. The value of v is given by equation (5.53) and the value of R by
equation (5.52).
• The parameters satisfy π = δγ
1−β+δγ
and the value of the equity is a pure
bubble, the real capital is only composed of debt.
Since all these equilibrium values are stable, there is no reason to choose one or
the others. From a welfare point of view, the first case has lower values of R and
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therefore a higher capital. From an investor point of view, the bubble allows to
generate income with a zero equity. The solution may depend on the endowments
at the initial time of the problem.
In a production economy, where the capital of firms is composed of equity and
debt, limitation of the collateral and stochastic investment opportunities bring
firms to invest a lot when possible. There exists just one equilibrium pricing
excluding any form of bubble. It also does not depend on the type of constraint
(MW or KM). The shadow price and the equity are both volatile, but negatively
correlated. Consequently, market prices’ variations are small. However, market
prices might be discontinuous when interest rate shocks are persistent. When the
interest rate of the bank increases, the average equity decreases because of the
cost of the interests, and the prices increase to keep the debt laverage constant,
unless the shock is persistent and the prices crash. Any increase in the interest
rate reduces the amount of global capital and therefore the welfare. Increasing the
probability of investment increases the equity and the market prices. However, this
probability of investment must remain lower than 1 to guarantee the existence of a
solution with maximal investment, and the linear pricing. When the borrowing
limit is relaxed, the equity decreases but the global capital and the shadow price
increase. The debt takes the place of the equity which therefore keeps a high yield.
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Boundary solution with the KM
constraint
We apply the same reasoning as in section 5.2.3, starting from the Bellman equation
at the end of section 2, equation (5.19). The equation on vt does not change, but
the one on bt becomes:
bt [1− γ ((Rt − rt)(1− π) + ((Rt − rt)π − δ) βvt+1)] = βbt+1. (C.1)
We remark that the domain of transversality is the same as the one resulting from
the MW constraint. The equation on the average equity as well as the equation on
the rental rate of the capital evolve:
Et+1 = (1− δ)Et − δγ(vtEt + bt) + π (RtEt + (Rt − rt)γ(vtEt + bt)) , (C.2)
Rt = αK
α−1
t = α (Et(1 + γvt) + γbt)
α−1
. (C.3)
The steady state value change because the equation on the bubble leads to:
v =
1− β − γ(R− r∞)(1− π)
(π(R− r∞)− δ)βγ
. (C.4)
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The equation (D.2) does not change. The new value of R is given by:
R =
δ(1− β) + δγr∞(1− π)
π(1− β)
. (C.5)
The link between A and b also changes by a factor γ:
b = A
−δ − δvγ + πR + π(R− r∞)γv
γ(δ − π(R− r∞))
(C.6)
We take the same parameters values as before and draw the values of our valuation
components. R behaves the same way as the one with the MW constraint. There
are some problems for v because v remains negative for any value of R. This
means that v < 1
β
and the KM constraint rules out the non-linear pricing, as in
the previous chapter.
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Affine pricing with Miao and
Wang constraint
As proved in chapter 4, following Miao and Wang (2011), there exists steady state
of the model in which b 6= 0. Any firm has a positive b shift in the price, which
creates a distortion, especially for firms with low capital. This originality of pricing
comes from the use of the MW constraint. We check in our long-term debts model
whether the use of this constraint may create such a non-linear pricing.
We compute the steady state values when the bubble component is not zero.
The equation (5.46) gives the value of v:
v =
1− β − (R− r∞)(1− π)
β((R− r∞)π − δ)
. (D.1)
From its own equation, we also have a value of v:
βγv2(δ−π(R−r∞))+v−vγ(R−r∞)(1−π)−vβπR−βv(1−δ)−R(1−π) = 0. (D.2)
These two expressions of v lead to the value of R:
R =
(1− γ(1− β)− β(1− δ)) (1− β + r∞(1− π))
βπ(1− β) + (1− π) (1− βδ − γ(1− β)− β(1− δ))
. (D.3)
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Figure D.1: Shadow price v of the non-linear valuation with respect to π and γ
The value of v is given by the value of R and the link between b and A comes from
equation (5.48):
b = A
−δ − δvγ + πR + π(R− r∞)γv
δ − π(R− r∞)
. (D.4)
The equation (5.50) together with (D.4) determines A and b. We represent the
main values of b and v. We take α = 0.4, δ = 0.025, β = 0.96 and r = 4%. On the
values of v, we limit to an arbitrary value (20) because it also diverges like in the
linear pricing. The dark area is forbidden because v ≤ 1
β
.
The shadow price of the non-linear pricing does not exist for the same values
as the shadow price of the linear pricing: low values of the investment probabilities
are privileged. This corresponds to the results of the model of Miao and Wang
(2011).
We represent the bubble component on Figure D.2, again the dark value
corresponds to the negative values of b. Surprisingly the bubble is increasing with
respect to π which contrasts with the previous chapter. This may correspond to
acceleration phenomena, such as new technologies, for example the dot-com bubble.
We must also check that the value of the rental rate of the capital verifies
R > r∞ = 4%: this condition is satisfied while γ > 25% or π < 75%, on Figure
D.3.
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Figure D.2: Affine component of the valuation b, non-linear pricing, with respect to π
and γ
The last point is the average value of the equity E that needs to remain above
0 on Figure D.4:
We intersect all the previous domains to get the complete zone on Figure D.5
where the non-linear pricing exists in the economy.
Everywhere this steady state exists, it is unstable: the system of the 3 linearized
equations has 3 eigenvalues larger than 1 in modulus. The prices can never reach
this equilibrium. For all values of the parameters π and γ such that the non-
linear pricing exists, the equation (5.46) on the shift term b does not verify the
transversality condition if b 6= 0:
(Rt − rt)(1− π + πβvt+1)− δβvt+1 > 0. (D.5)
This shows that there is no equilibirum affine pricing using Miao and Wang
constraint.
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Figure D.3: Rental rate of the capital R, non-linear pricing, with respect to π and γ
When the capital of firms is composed of equity and debt, the choice of the
borrowing constraint does not matter, the prices of firms are the same, and there
exists only a unique linear pricing when stochastic investment opportunities force
the firms to invest “as much as possible”.
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Figure D.4: Average equity E, non-linear pricing, with respect to π and γ
Figure D.5: Existence domain of the non-linear pricing, with respect to π and γ
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General Conclusion
This dissertation proposes a multidisciplinary approach to the recent crises. The
analysis deals with two key issues of crises: the connectivity of financial activities
and the bubbles on assets before the crises. To study these aspects, we have
been using varied methods, among which, network and graph theories, Bellman
equations, Matlab and Dynare computing. The research is also “restricted to” a
standard context of rational agents within equilibrium markets, especially when
there are some kind of bubbles.
The global view of the financial network is presented in Chapter 2. By using
a new representation of the financial network, we have been able to model the
bilateral interactions between the financial agents and the network. We have built
our network on real connectivity, trying to capture the intermediate connected
state of financial activities: complete or sparse networks are not realistic. We
have deduced our results by simulating the network, which in return allowed to let
connectivity vary over a large range. Depending on the time-horizon maximization
of the agents, we have proved that financial networks may reach a more or less
connected equilibrium. When there are a lot of financial connections, there exists
systemic risk, but the systemic crisis probability remains low. When agents decide
to make only a few connections, because they fear defaults, there is no systemic risk,
but little profits, and more strategically defaulting agents. Intermediate connected
states are avoided because they tend to propagate defaults easily, and therefore
do not guarantee interesting payoffs. We have highlighted the problems linked to
myopic agents: when they are enough capitalized, they build a highly connected
network, which is subject to a significant systemic risk. The regulator may intervene
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to avoid such situations by properly settling a prudential ratio. However, this ratio
must be wisely employed, because it may generate liquidity problems.
Our network approach could be somehow improved by allowing agents of
different sizes. This could be done by introducing a random variable on the
capitalization of the agents, or directly by choosing more capitalized agents. In
this case, the model would account for too big too fail institutions. However,
the closer we get to real networks, the more difficult it becomes to derive the
properties (behavior of agents) of the network. Another extension of the model
would be to consider risk-averse agents. Because staying in the network includes a
part of risk (becoming contaminated by defaulting agents, face multiple defaulting
counterparties), a concave utility function would lead to more liquidity problems
and a higher systemic risk, even when agents optimize in the long-run. Nevertheless,
such a modification would obsucre understanding of the model and would not deliver
new policy implications.
To deal with bubbles, our approach brought out the significance of collateral
questions for borrowing and the necessity to introduce a stochastic investment
to generate linear prices of firms: recent research have demonstrated that when
the price of production firms guarantee loans, asset prices are likely to include
a bubble component. This bubble component in the prices permits the agents
to borrow more by relaxing the borrowing constraint. Our contribution was to
apprehend the effect of interest rates on such bubbles. In chapter 4, we started from
a recent article (Miao and Wang, 2011), where firms face stochastic investment
opportunities and borrowing constraints. Firms borrow when investment is possible,
to reach the optimal investment level. As a result, prices of firms may include
a bubble component. We adapted this model with a net positive interest rate
on the short-term debts. We proved that the effect of interest rates on prices
and capital was not significant. Furthermore, equilibrium prices were affine with
respect to the capitalization of firms and did not really include a bubble component.
We decided to change the capital structure of firms, by introducing a permanent
part of long-term debt in the capital of firms, in chapter 5. This new idea was
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successful: we proved that two equilibrium prices coexist for firms. One of them
corresponds to a higher average level of capital, where firms’ prices correspond to
the Tobins’ Q. In this case, the level of equity is high enough, such that firms are
not penalized by the stochastic investment. The other equilibrium corresponds
to a lower average capital, and maximal investment of firms. In this equilibrium,
firms’ prices are higher, and help firms to reach the optimal amount of investment.
Furthermore, these prices are very sensitive to the interest rates on loans. Positive
interest-rate shocks decrease the equity, but increase the price, allowing to keeps
a high level of debt. When interest rate shocks are persistent, firms’ prices may
be discontinuous, and somehow illustrate market’s crashes. Even if price of firms
exceed their usual Tobin’s Q value, there are no bubbles in prices as soon as the
equity is positive. Nevertheless, an unusual situation may happen depending on the
investments parameters: the equity does not exist, but has a net positive price, this
is a bubble. The bubble allows for borrowing, and with the debt used as capital,
firms can generate strictly positive cash flows. In this model of long-term debts
in the capital of firms, we also proved that the choice of the borrowing constraint
does not influence the equilibrium prices. In addition, affine prices of firms do not
exist either.
There are many ways to deepen the analysis of this model. First, it would be
relevant to get closer to the bubble, even if asymptotic properties (zero equity,
infinite shadow price, continuous price) represent a technical challenge. Then,
it would be interesting to investigate a global equilibrium in which the financial
intermediaries collect the households deposits’ and lend them to the firms. This
would endogenize the supply of loans, and the interest rate. By limiting the supply
of loans, pricings of firms could be different. Finally, to submit this long-term
debts model to a review, we could recreate a two-state problem, by introducing a
probability of falling from the linear-price to the Q-price.
Because this research concludes that bubbles are somewhat rare to appear
in equilibrium markets with rational agents, the research framework could be re-
examined. It was necessary to start with this particular framework to understand
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how we can broaden it step-by-step to the diversified set of other models. For
example, instead of introducing ad hoc irrational agents, it is more desirable to keep
rational agents, but to allow them some heterogeneity in their sets of information,
the timing of information, beliefs... Also models with multiple equilibria or non-
equilibrium markets are well-suited to recreate bubbles and crashes. Even if they
outperform classic models, how can we understand and test the validity of the
hypotheses, how can we improve their tractability, and how to standardize them
to use them in financial institutions? In the extreme, behavioral finance is very
specialized, and almost irreconcilable with any other approach.
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Re´sume´
La the`se traite de differents aspects des crises financie`res et de leur gestion par les re´gulateurs.
Les syste`mes financiers complexes, tel le re´seau interbancaire, peuvent eˆtre mode´lise´s par une
approche de type re´seau, pour calculer la propagation des faillites et mode´liser le risque syste´mique.
Partant d’un re´seau d’agents identiquement capitalise´s, l’impact d’un ratio de capitalisation est teste´
selon l’horizon de maximisation des profits des agents. Performante lorsque les agents optimisent en
horizon infini, la pre´vention du risque syste´mique par ce ratio peut cre´er d’importants proble`mes de
liquidite´ lorsque les agents sont myopes.
L’effet des taux d’inte´reˆts sur les bulles de cre´dit est analyse´ en partant d’un mode`le base´
sur une e´conomie de production, dans laquelle les entreprises font face a` de rares opportunite´s
d’investissement. Lorsqu’elles investissent, ces entreprises ont recours a` de la dette court-terme,
limite´e a` une partie de leur valeur boursie`re. Dans ce mode`le ge´ne´rant des bulles sur les prix des
firmes, les taux d’inte´reˆts sur la dette n’ont que peu d’effets sur les prix des firmes. En outre, des
re´serves sont e´mises concernant la pre´sence de ve´ritables bulles dans les prix vis-a`-vis des concepts
historiques.
Le pre´ce´dent mode`le est e´tendu en introduisant une part de dette a` long-terme dans le capital
des firmes. Dans ce cadre, les valeurs boursie`res des firmes sont tre`s re´actives au taux d’inte´reˆt, e´tant
meˆme discontinues lors de chocs de taux persistants. Par ailleurs, l’e´conomie de production peut
atteindre un e´tat bullier : les prix des firmes refle`tent les gains de capital uniquement dus a` la dette.
Mots Cle´s : Re´seau financier, contagion, risque syste´mique, bulles, taux d’inte´reˆt, valorisation,
capital, collate´ral, investissement stochastique, ratios prudentiels.
Complex financial systems, such as the interbank network, can be naturally captured using a
network approach. This allows to calculate contamination of defaults and to model systemic risk.
Our network is composed of identically capitalized agents. The effect of a capitalization ratio is
determined depending on the maximization horizon of the agents : short-term, myopic or long-term.
When agents optimize their payoffs in the long-run, the capitalization ratio is fully effective and
prevents systemic risk. However, when agents adopt a myopic behavior, the capitalization ratio may
trade systemic risk for liquidity scarcity.
Starting from a production economy, in which firms face stochastic investment opportunities, we
study the impact of the interest rates on bubbles in firms’ prices. Capital of firms is exclusively made
of equity, but when facing an investment opportunity, firms may borrow. Precisely, firms access
short-term debts, and the amount of the debt is limited to a fraction of the price of their equities.
This model seems to recreate bubbles on firms’ prices. Unfortunately, interest rates do not affect
prices to a large extent, and we may question whether prices of firms include a bubble component,
with respect to the standard definition of bubbles : the discounted sum of the incoming cash flows.
This previous model is extended by allowing firms to have a permanent debt. Actually, capital of
firms is composed of equity and debt. In this case, firms’ prices are very sensitive to interest rates,
and may be discontinuous when interest rate shocks last over the periods. This model also exhibits
a purely bubbly state : prices of firms only represent capitals profits generated by debts, there is no
equity.
Keywords : financial network, contagion, systemic risk, bubbles, interest rates, pricing, equity,
collateral, stochastic investment, prudential ratios.
